

# 6<sup>th</sup>

# Common Security & Defence Policy OLYMPIAD

SALON DE PROVENCE  
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**AUSTRIA BULGARIA  
CYPRUS CROATIA ESTONIA FRANCE GREECE  
HUNGARY ITALY POLAND PORTUGAL ROMANIA  
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## Foreword

With the support of the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union, the French Air and Space Force Academy had the honour of hosting the Sixth Emilyo Common Security and Defence Policy Olympiads from May 30<sup>th</sup> to June 3<sup>rd</sup> 2022.

The French Air and Space Force Academy warmly thanks the European College on Security and Defence – represented by Dr Dirk Dubois and Lieutenant Colonel Ilias Markis – and Colonel Associate Professor Harald Gell, chairperson of the Emilyo Implementation Group, for choosing Salon-de-Provence for the organisation of this competition.

The competition started at the end of 2021: 40 students from various military academies of the European Union's member states wrote essays on topics connected with Common Security and Defence Policy. In the first phase of the competition, each essay was assessed by a couple of scholars from military academies of other nationalities than the students.


The present publication comprises the top ten essays. Pretty tangle selection giving the quality of students' writings. Only 10 points (out of a theoretical maximum of 100) separate the first essay from the tenth.

In the second phase, 32 students gave an oral defence of their essays at the French Air and Space Force Academy in front of juries composed of 20 Officers or teachers from guest military academies, and 7 French Air and Space Force Academy's staff members. 10 students were selected for a second and final round, which was won by Cadet Iilda Elise Murumets from the Estonian Military Academy.

In addition to the competition, the Olympiads provided an excellent opportunity for cadets from all over Europe to learn from each other, and to start working together. Experience saved for their future careers, when cadets will be deployed alongside each other. In that perspective, sharing knowledge and experiences beforehand is obviously an important moment in the officer's training.

That is why the French Air and Space Force Academy is particularly devoted to Emilyo as a means of building a European defence culture.

Brigadier General Pierre Réal  
Director of the French Air and Space Force Academy



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# **Needs for an updated or revised EU Global Strategy**

Essay

created for the CSDP Olympiad 2022  
in Salon de Provence– France

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Wroclaw, November 2021

## **Abstract**

The European Union, as a community deepening the integration of its members, sooner or later had to face a difficult task which undoubtedly is to ensure common security. The dynamically changing situation required identification of threats and taking real, concrete steps to build a coherent and effective security strategy. As a result of long and intensive works, the Global Strategy of the European Union was published in 2016.

This document was verified very quickly, and many authors started a debate on the direction in which the EU is going and the tools proposed in the strategy.

This paper discusses if there is a need for an updated or revised Global Strategy of the European Union from the perspective of its values and the effectiveness of the fight against the existing threats. In an attempt to obtain an answer to the formulated problem, the author presents the ideas of one of the founding fathers in order to verify the current values of the EU. Secondly, it presents a list of challenges that the Union has faced recently and analyzes the effectiveness of the taken steps and the current status of a given threats. In the final part of the work, the solutions proposed by the author were described and the results were discussed.

*Global Strategy, European Union, Robert Schumann, European values, common safety*

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## **Preface**

I am a cadet studying command at the Military University of Land Forces in Wrocław - Poland. As a future officer, for many years I have been trying to deepen my knowledge of common security and the strategy pursued by the European Union. I am particularly interested in geopolitics and the military history of my country and Europe. Through active participation in the scientific life of the university, I try to make the best use of the opportunities offered by international cooperation of military universities. I was a tutor of foreign students twice, I had the opportunity to attend a two-month internship at Theresian Military Academy in Austria, or successfully complete the recruitment process for student exchange at West Point. The effect of the mentioned activity was the distinction which is undoubtedly the possibility of representing my university in the CSDP Olympiad.

I come from a country that is familiar with the fight for freedom and independence. For hundreds of years, Poland, located in the heart of Europe, defended access to the Old Continent against various threats, and Poles, for example during WWII, fought on many fronts for the freedom of many nations. Thus, the need to joint effort on the future security of our countries seems to be something obvious.

As a future commander, I believe that expanding my knowledge on common security and common defense capabilities is my duty and a necessary element directly affecting my command capabilities.

The above topic gives a very wide field for discussion and deepening the state of knowledge. Undoubtedly, the author's origin and the location of his country have a great influence on the position he takes. I am aware that each country represents its interests and perceives threats differently. That is why the discussion on the need to update or revise the EU global strategy can be colorful, and my work will bring a substantive voice to the whole matter.

This work deals with the subject of the global EU Strategy, which is important from the point of view of the European community. I would like to try in the best possible way to answer the question whether the EU needs to update or revise its strategy.

### 3. Introduction

The European Union undoubtedly was and still is a globally unique economic and political union of democratic European countries. From the very beginning, this uniqueness concerned the vision of creating a union of countries forming in the spirit of one civilisation, but not of the same history. In the spirit of a similar culture but with different traditions. Situated in Europe, but in different parts of it, in different geopolitical conditions. Being heirs of Christian tradition, but caring for citizens of different religions - respecting religious freedom in the spirit of respecting all religions. Developing in the 21st century, but at a completely different economic level. Finally, they are represented by the Union in the international arena, but have their own independent national interests.

As one of the founding fathers, Robert Schuman, wrote: *“A united Europe will not be built overnight and not without obstacles in its path. Its construction will follow the path of the spirit. Nothing that is lasting happens easily. Europe is on the move. But beyond the institutions, the roots of the idea of community and its spirit of solidarity as a community are essential”*<sup>1</sup>. Despite the many obstacles, centuries of wars, and things that divide member countries, in addition to the growing community, the EU's efforts were recognized when it received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012. It was the first symbolic award that paid tribute to the efforts made to ensure security not only in European countries, but also further afield.

The dynamic changes taking place since the beginning of this century show that the path of the Community will never be without obstacles and they throw up new challenges for all members of the Union to face every day. Some of them have already been defined, some of them we know how to deal with, but some of them are completely new and often unpredictable. At this point we can ask ourselves: how does the European Union deal with these threats and what allows for decisive and accurate responses? - The Union, thanks to its uniqueness, has the sum of the rich experience of its members combined with its own procedures and strategies developed over the years. Undoubtedly, the EU can boast of a remarkable and comprehensive array of instruments to respond to its immediate and wider environment. From the outset, the

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<sup>1</sup> Pursuit: <http://imschuman.com/idee/>



implementation of the European Global Strategy was intended to strengthen European defence capabilities, to intensify cooperation with NATO and to increase the resilience of Member States to hybrid threats. The Global Strategy addresses contemporary threats by identifying them properly and choosing an appropriate countermeasure strategy. Closer analysis of this strategic document allows us to say that it is intended to be a comprehensive document, whose global nature refers not only to the geographical dimension, but also to the whole range of sectors and areas of life that are most important for the security of the community. It seems crucial to recognise the need for community involvement at all stages of possible conflicts or crises.

The global strategy is an essential document, making a significant contribution to increasing the level of security of the people of Europe, but the changing international situation, particularly in the EU's immediate environment, is very quickly testing the effectiveness, relevance and topicality of any strategy. We see that the times of the obvious are over - and for the Union the times of constant choices and decisions have begun, the speed and accuracy of which will affect the future of millions of people. Russia is constantly demonstrating its military strength, China is actively investing in all the world's markets - the Union is negotiating, monitoring, implementing and producing new documents. For this reason the time has come for the EU to decide, both to partially revise and to update its existing Global Strategy, in order not to lose its own values and roots and to be slowly dismantled in the game of powers.

The suggested revision concerns a change of direction from a bureaucratic juggernaut with double standards, looking for modern values and ever greater control, to an institution that stands up for its roots and values, that cares about justice, that unites countries in a common security policy, that allows for greater independence in decision making and that is mindful of the differing interests and economic situations of member countries. This update of the Global Strategy stems mainly from the need for a realistic and sustainable vision of development, including ways to achieve priority objectives and specifying the forces and means assigned to achieve them.

The aim of this paper is to discuss the current global strategy - to point out both its good points and the need for further development and search for more effective solutions. Then, to argue the suggested necessity of changing and updating the global strategy and

to acquaint the reader with the solutions proposed according to Schuman's thought: "*Unity while fully preserving diversity*" solutions.

#### **4. Current State of Research**

The concept of a global EU strategy raises many emotions and divergent positions. This is due to many, often different ideas about the future of the community and the increasing number of member countries. Including the years after 2003 and 2016, many experts have undertaken to analyze the strategy and evaluate the effects of its implementation. Looking for information on this topic we can easily find many interesting sources. Starting from specialist literature - analyses devoted to the global strategy, through a large number of articles dealing with the above mentioned topic, ending with interviews and statements of individual experts and politicians. Virtually every member state contributed a separate contribution to the wide and varied spectrum of available sources.

Due to the large number of countries potentially interested in assessing the EU global strategy, the study focused on the available English-language literature and that written in the mother tongue - Polish. In order to create as complete a picture as possible, aware of the differences in perception and worldview, when selecting sources for analysis, I tried to find, analyse and understand quite a large number of differing or radically different opinions and ideas. Below are the most key ones from my point of view - bringing the greatest value to the discussion.

The first English-language work is "The European Union's Global Strategy three years on, looking forward". As an analysis of the direct creators of the EUGS, it summarizes three years of implementation and functioning of the strategy in many areas. The authors list achievements, shortcomings and suggest options for future action. The paper underlines the role of the EUGS as a compass for the whole EU and suggests the need to strive for greater autonomy of the EU in its actions. This autonomy, through a greater willingness and ability to cooperate with its partners and by acting more autonomously, is supposed to contribute to a higher level of security, thus defending its own interests and values in the world<sup>2</sup>. It is hard not to agree with the need for autonomy in action,

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<sup>2</sup> The European Union's Global Strategy: Three years on, moving forward, June 2019. Pursuit: [https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/eu-global-strategy/17304/global-strategy-european-unions-foreign-and-security-policy\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/eu-global-strategy/17304/global-strategy-european-unions-foreign-and-security-policy_en)

but the overly optimistic tone of the document means that few solutions can be seen to update or give a new direction to the strategy.

A more objective analysis by Flo Van Den Broeck, which brings much to the discussion, was published in November 2020. In her paper entitled "Four years later, time to revise the EU's Global Strategy?" the author stresses that despite many achievements in the area of security and defence, cooperation has not been strengthened and growing uncertainty and rivalry have become characteristic. He goes on to suggest that the EU is very helpless when trying to solve problems with Belarus, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict or the dispute between Israel and Palestine. Diagnosing the reasons for problems with applying in practice the concepts of state and society resilience, strategic autonomy and pragmatism, he points to a very vague description of these concepts leaving room for divergent interpretations<sup>3</sup>.

In their paper "The future of values in the EU Global Strategy 2020", authors Maryna Rabinovych and Zuzana Reptova analyse the Global Strategy in the context of the presented paradigm of pragmatism. They argue that the EUGS would benefit from a greater emphasis on values and from a more open and detailed position on fundamental pragmatism. Following their analysis, they explain how a stronger emphasis on values can enhance the EU's role as a global player<sup>4</sup>.

A well-known political scientist, Sven Biscop, takes a firm stance on this issue in his publication "Analysing the EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy". Biscop takes readers through the history of the creation and subsequent evolution of GS and suggests that the strategy should be systematically reviewed and updated after each new European election<sup>5</sup>.

In my opinion, the most valuable and thus appropriate position in written sources in Polish is the analysis written by Stanisław Koziej: "The EU Global Strategy: opportunities and further implementation challenges". The Polish professor shows that

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<sup>3</sup> Van Den Boeck, F. (2020). Four years later, time to revise EU's Global Strategy? <https://www.vocaleurope.eu/wp-content/uploads/Four-years-later-time-to-revise-the-EUs-Global-Strategy.pdf>

<sup>4</sup> Rabinovych, M. & Reptova, Z. (2019). The future values in the EU Global Strategy 2020. [http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano\\_en/contenido?WCM\\_GLOBAL\\_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano\\_in/zonas\\_in/ari112-2019-rabinovych-reptova-the-future-of-values-in-the-eu-global-strategy-2020](http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/ari112-2019-rabinovych-reptova-the-future-of-values-in-the-eu-global-strategy-2020)

<sup>5</sup> Biscop, S. (2021). Analysing the EU Global strategy on foreign and security policy, 4th Edition of the CSDP Handbook.

the adopted strategy is limited only to calculations, which is insufficient to adopt an effective operational strategy. He suggests considering updating the EUGS with assessments and forecasts of the European security environment<sup>6</sup>.

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<sup>6</sup> Koziej, S. (2017). EU Global Strategy: opportunities and implementation challenges.

## **5. Research Gap**

Despite a large number of works on the Global Strategy of the European Union, analysis of available sources allows for finding a hitherto undeveloped research space. This space, for the author, is to discuss the need to both revise and update GS, based on current examples from the functioning of the EU, complemented by attention to very important aspects of degradation of the values of the whole community and departure from its own roots. The work done so far has mainly advocated either waiting a specific period of time until the next revision, or suggesting adjustments and changes to update or revise the whole strategy. Moreover, in a significant number of cases, the aspect of the EU's values and departure from its own roots has been either completely overlooked or addressed only in a symbolic way.

The current situation in the world and in the immediate environment of the European Union requires, as never before, the preparation of appropriate tools and, above all, firm, rapid and effective responses from governments. The countries of the Union must not remain dormant in their present prosperity and times of relative peace. The Global Strategy should be discussed as often as possible and the effectiveness of the solutions implemented analysed. Presented as a comprehensive document responsible for our common security, it must be an answer to current and future challenges and threats. This is why this subject is so important.

## **6. Research Question**

Trying to answer the question - does the European Union need an update or revision of the Global Strategy? Or is it possible that it does not need any changes? The paper is divided into 3 parts - each of them is accompanied by an attempt to answer the research question.

In the first part - Has the Union moved away from its values and roots? If so, does it have a real impact on the policies it pursues? I would like to quote the visions and opinions of the founders of the Union and compare them with the current state of the Union.

The second part presents the EU response to crises and threats. Were the solutions proposed in the GS effective and did they give the Union a chance to react appropriately? This part contains examples of real conflicts and threats that have recently occurred in Europe or in its closest environment.

Finally, having answered the first two questions, I would like to focus my attention on the possibilities for implementing new solutions. What direction should the European Union take at a time of growing uncertainty? The proposals presented are intended to make a real contribution to increasing the effectiveness of the EUGS, thus contributing to a higher level of security for its inhabitants and strengthening the EU's position on the global stage.

## **7. Methodology**

Due to the specificity of the work, a vast majority of secondary data, i.e. literature developed by other authors, was used in the process of creating the EUGS assessment. In order to make a theoretical analysis of the problem, I made a preliminary selection of available materials, focusing mainly on official documents and publications under the aegis of the European Union, as well as articles and books of other authors studying the EU activities. The main sources of collected and used information were: internet publications, academic library, digital library, available podcasts. Due to the limitations of my language skills, in all sources I focused only on those written in English and Polish.

Through consultation with my mentor and discussion with the MEP on questions related to the topic of the paper, primary data was also used.

The information gathered was aimed at determining whether or not the hypothesis I set out at the outset: that it is time for the EU to decide - both to partially revise and update its existing Global Strategy so as not to lose its own values and roots and be slowly dismantled in the power play - is true. In order to get a definitive answer I first made a pre-selection, then a selection, as well as a thorough analysis. The whole process was aided by the research questions posed, based on which the answer obtained was contained in the conclusions.

## 8. Research and Result of Research

The European Union adopts successive strategies, condemns, talks, proudly speaks of its values: freedom, respect, unity and the fight for a better future for all inhabitants in a safe "green Europe". However, looking beyond EU reports and deliberations, we can see a completely different picture. The migration crisis, the Covid-19 pandemic, the upcoming energy crisis, the demographic crisis, the conflicts in Donbass and Nagorno-Karabakh, the toleration of the conflict in Palestine, the implementation of double standards with regard to the Member States, the increasing number of rapes and religious attacks, the growing invigilation of society, the unlimited influence of large corporations and the preference of EU regulations over Member State constitutions are completely different issues. That is, in a nutshell, the last years of functioning of the community with visible aspirations to become a Superstate that talks so much about its values, strategies and future. How much is left of European values? To what extent is the EU strategy effective? Is the Union prepared for future threats? In this paper I will try to consider the above issues and get answers to the questions posed, and above all, test the hypothesis.

### 8.1. The role of values and community roots in current European politics and situation

*"My idea is not to merge countries to create a Super State. Our European countries are a historical reality. It would be psychologically impossible and unreasonable to get rid of them. Their diversity is a good thing, and it makes no sense to remove them or to do equalization or unification."*<sup>7</sup> Robert Schuman

*"European policy certainly cannot be at variance with patriotic ideals. It should encourage everyone to have a special and genuine love for their homeland, thus fostering a love which, by its very nature, will not work to the disadvantage of other countries. Such an approach will lead to unity while fully preserving diversity"*<sup>8</sup>.

Robert Schuman

I would like to begin my reflections by quoting the words of Robert Schuman, who together with other Founding Fathers contributed to the creation of a common,

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<sup>7</sup> Pursuit: <http://imschuman.com/idee/>

<sup>8</sup> Pursuit: <http://imschuman.com/idee/>



institutional Europe, guided by its historical and cultural heritage and by Christian values. These values have for many years been the European link of our European history. The author of the quoted words assumed that the centuries-old religious and cultural tradition would be the foundation of lasting economic cooperation between European countries. He claimed that thanks to it it will be possible to overcome egoistic aspirations of countries and create a platform for dialogue, i.e. a source of values for peaceful negotiations. In his beliefs, he stressed the need to preserve the absolute sovereignty of states and patriotic ideals. He thus professed the idea of trying to achieve unity while preserving diversity. Diversity was thus seen as a natural resource, a heritage to be cherished and the driving force of Europe. The future Europe was to be characterized by such qualities as solidarity, discipline, equality of countries, cooperation, respect for differences and care for its own tradition, roots and Christian culture. These values were to protect the community against selfish ambitions, imperialistic aspirations or a Europe of double standards. At the same time caring for the security of all the inhabitants of the old continent<sup>9</sup>.

Firstly, the European Union has clearly begun to transform itself from an Economic Union into a Superstate without the explicit consent of all the Member States, thereby forcibly imposing its own views and new standards. An example is the ruling by the European Commission that European law takes precedence over a country's constitution<sup>10</sup>. This situation relates to the Polish State, whose Constitutional Court has ruled, on the basis of the prevailing law, that the Polish Constitution takes precedence. It should be added that the European Commission's ruling is based on a verdict of the European Court of Justice - despite the absence of specific provisions in the treaties or of legally binding arrangements<sup>11</sup>.

Going further, for many years the Union has systematically applied so-called double standards to its members. This means different attitudes towards countries in a similar situation. Consequences are drawn against some, while the situation in other countries is often simply kept quiet. For example, in 2018, France and Italy exceeded their budget

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<sup>9</sup> Pelt, J.M. (2002). Robert Schuman. The Father of Europe.

<sup>10</sup> Statement/21/5142, October 2021.

[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement\\_21\\_5142](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_21_5142)

<sup>11</sup> Kalnoky, B. (2021). Opinion: EU emphasizes power over values in row with Poland.

<https://www.dw.com/en/opinion-eu-emphasizes-power-over-values-in-row-with-poland/a-59600757>

deficits - Brussels kept quiet about the situation in France<sup>12</sup>, while pressure was exerted on Italy<sup>13</sup> despite a smaller deficit. Another example was tolerating double standards in food production for Western and Eastern Europe. It has been proven that producers have supplied inferior products to Eastern countries, despite systematic controls by EU operators<sup>14</sup>. Another example is the European Union's claim that it tried to politicise the media in Poland, when the state limited the proportion of non-European owners to 49%. France, Spain, Cyprus or Austria, for example, have the same or a lower share, and only Poland has been raised in Parliament<sup>15</sup>. The Union has allowed the construction of a gas pipeline that favours a specific country by cooperating with a state-owned company that has the tools of blackmail in the form of restrictions on the supply of raw materials in order to pursue its national interests. Despite stating that there is no Community benefit, increasing the influence of one company and upsetting the existing balance, the EU has not applied any specific penalties<sup>16</sup>.

The third, extremely important argument in the discussion seems to be all the activities conducted by the Union on ideological grounds. For several years now, one can observe a clearly increased activity of the EU bodies preparing an increasing number of directives and guidelines. This starts with general liberalism, the cult of freedom and the fight against traditional values under the broad aegis of tolerance. This seems to be particularly evident in actions concerning national education systems. These systems are continuously coordinated, monitored and evaluated according to very vague European criteria. The problem seems to be not only the attempt to ignore the rich diversity of traditions, language and geography, but above all the fact that this is not an agreed policy but an imposed fact<sup>17</sup>. Robert Spaemann in his essay "Europe - a community of values or a legal order?" wrote that: [...] *"Talking about values", "is both trivial and dangerous". It is trivial because every community shares certain values. It becomes*

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<sup>12</sup> Sheftalovich, Z.(2018). <https://www.politico.eu/article/macron-lost-authority-after-caving-to-yellow-jackets-says-oettinger-brexiteu-budget/>

<sup>13</sup> Pursuit: <https://www.dw.com/en/eu-shoots-down-italys-budget-plans-again/a-46388939>

<sup>14</sup> Euronews, (2017). <https://www.euronews.com/2017/10/13/east-v-west---how-double-standards-in-food-and-product-quality-are-causing-an>

<sup>15</sup> Schwarz, K. P. (2021). EU values and double standards. <https://www.gisreportsonline.com/opinion-eu-values-and-double-standards-politics,3628.html>

<sup>16</sup> Riley, A. (2021). Gazprom's folly. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/gazproms-folly-in-seeking-to-deliver-nord-stream-2-it-may-undermine-its-own-access-to-eu-markets/>

<sup>17</sup> Lacaita, F. & Latempa, R. (2018). The europeanization of schooling. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/europeanization-of-schooling/>

*dangerous when it wants to replace fundamental rights with fundamental values. "The Third Reich was unquestionably a community of values," that is, of ideals that were considered superior at the time - nation, race and health. The state, as in Marxist ideology, was only an agent of these supreme values. Therefore, when in doubt, the party was always above the state. Whenever "state power, invoking higher values, considers itself entitled to prevent people from doing something that no law allows it to forbid, danger lies ahead" <sup>18</sup>.*

To conclude this section, the values of the European Union play a very important role in the daily functioning of the community. Based on common values, the Founding Fathers dared to create a Union whose inestimable wealth is its diversity, but also its common Christian-European roots and culture. The present authorities of the Union also undeniably understand the essence of values. However, they are attempting, for their own purposes, to interfere in a dangerous manner with the ideological foundations and values handed down from generation to generation. There is a visible problem of the devaluation of certain values at the expense of modernity and the cult of the individual. The explanation for this state of affairs seems to be a desire for the Union's bodies to have an ever-increasing influence on the daily lives of its citizens and to control the Member States. All of this makes it possible to see the dangerous direction in which the whole community is heading, because the unity, equality, rule of law and democracy so emphasised are being invoked and interpreted and used according to need. Such actions have a direct impact on the security of the EU, which is mainly preoccupied with internal disputes.

## **8.2. Effectiveness of GS in real-world tests**

The Global Strategy presents a list of threats and challenges that the Union faces every day. Some of these seem obvious today, while others surprise us with their unpredictability. For this reason, preparing the tools to enable an appropriate, rapid and effective response seems essential for our common security. In the document we are discussing, there are many fine words about combating these threats, about the concept of pragmatism or joint action in times of various challenges. However, how can we evaluate the effectiveness of action on the basis of recent years? The table below

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<sup>18</sup> Schwarz, K.P. (2021). Op. cit. <https://www.gisreportsonline.com/opinion-eu-values-and-double-standards-politics,3628.html>

presents examples of selected challenges and a brief description of actions and their effects. For the purpose of this paper, brief assessments of the current situation as well as a gradation by colour have been made. The table was created subjectively on the basis of the collected information and the author's own opinion. Green means high effectiveness, yellow means neutral, red means conflict deterioration and white means

CHALLENGES	EU ACTIONS	EFFECTS	
<b>Migration crisis on the Polish border</b>	Conducting pro-immigration activities/lack of quick response/negative opinion on building the wall	Escalation of conflict/threat to border/lives of migrants and soldiers	
<b>Energy crisis</b>	Under the pretext of energy, introducing restrictive standards and limitations	High degree of uncertainty/risk to continuity of supply/impoverishment of society	
Pandemic Covid-19	Lack of prepared procedures/cooperation with big corporations/censorship of contracts/lack of logic	High number of vaccinations/confusion of the public/much contradictory information/forced vaccination	
Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh	Lack of appropriate instruments/mediator role/issue of statements	Little influence on the conflict/no real help possible/putting mediation in the hands of Russia and Turkey/failure to resolve the conflict	
Migration crisis	Lack of a firm migration policy/insufficient assistance to countries of emigrants/high level of bureaucracy/lack of border preparation	Continuous state of uncertainty/large numbers of migrants trying to enter Europe/Turkey/Belarus blackmail	
Conflict in Ukraine	Role of the negotiator/no clear declaration on Ukraine's admission to the EU	Situation of continuing tension/demonstration of the strength of the Russian military/cooperation between Germany and Russia on Nord Stream 2	
<b>Terrorist attacks</b>	Increased security measures: dams, patrols. Increased surveillance	Reducing the number of group assaults	Increased number of single incidents

difficult to assess.

*Table 1: Current threats and challenges<sup>19</sup>.*

<sup>19</sup> Table created by the author, 2021.

Firstly, on the basis of the information gathered, we can state that with the passing of time more and more problems appear. Those that are already known often remain unresolved, in limbo or in transition. In practically all cases, the sheer length of the procedures and the activation of response paths have prevented a swift and effective Union response.

The migration crisis has shown perfectly well that the Union has no idea how to solve this problem on a permanent basis. Europe's economic situation is an incentive for people from poor countries and those affected by warfare. After the adoption of the migration policy, the influx of refugees to the continent was significantly reduced, however, looking at the current example of Poland, we can see that new transit corridors are being created all the time. In addition, refugees are used by Turkey and Belarus as a bargaining chip in international politics<sup>20</sup>.

As far as current conflicts are concerned, the EU, despite having a Global Strategy and the desire to influence security in its immediate surroundings, has played a marginal role in them. It has not taken the initiative in any of these cases, and its statements condemning military action and calling for peace can be regarded as symbolic<sup>21</sup>.

Europe is likely to face an energy crisis in the near future. It is, in a sense, an artificially created crisis, the effects of which may be felt particularly by the poorest countries. All this is due to a lack of independence from Russian gas supplies - Germany has even strengthened its cooperation. In addition, the decarbonisation policy being pursued has an impact on rising gas prices. Unfortunately, the combination of these two factors leads to very high uncertainty and a lack of control over the situation<sup>22</sup>.

In conclusion, from the above cases we can see that the EU did not have and still does not have effective tools for a quick and efficient response. However, the continuous work on improving and developing such tools should be appreciated. Better and better identification of future threats also plays a very important role in ensuring security.

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<sup>20</sup> Schmid-Druner, M.(2021). Immigration Policy.

<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/152/immigration-policy>

<sup>21</sup> Van Den Boeck, F. Four years later, time to revise EU's Global Strategy?, November 2020. <https://www.vocaleurope.eu/wp-content/uploads/Four-years-later-time-to-revise-the-EUs-Global-Strategy.pdf>

<sup>22</sup> Dempsay, J.(2021). Judy asks: Is Europe's Energy crisis self-inflicted. <https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/85668>

### **8.3. Preparing for future threats**

The European Union is paying increasing attention to the security of the community. It is working on building new capabilities and enhancing those already acquired and functioning. From the perspective of the threats and challenges under discussion, it seems crucial at this point to understand the needs of the members of the community and to give them an appropriate level of autonomy in making certain decisions. A level of autonomy that will be constantly accompanied by constant access to community tools such as common analyses and expertise, additional financial resources, material assistance, specific assistance of law enforcement services, the possibility of introducing sanctions, a common database, technological exchange, e.g. know how. This autonomy in taking strategic decisions on the security of a given country is intended to enable the country to determine the degree of need for assistance and to enable the country to act on its own with the support of other countries, since in most cases it is the countries at risk that know best how to deal with the situation without infringing on their own sovereignty<sup>23</sup>.

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<sup>23</sup>

Author's note: Conclusion based about the author's argument.

## 9. Discussion of Results

The results of the research show that there is now a clear need to both partially revise and update the Global Strategy of the European Union. The existing threats have been mostly correctly identified. Some new ones have had very little impact on the EU. A period of five years seems to be the right time to check the effectiveness and analyse the solutions introduced, but the suggested changes and updates could result from a different approach, a look at the pursuit of the highest possible level of security.

Based on the research carried out, I am of the opinion that the European Union now needs both a partial change and an update of its strategy. This conviction should be treated as the author's personal opinion based on the arguments presented and the discussion devoted to them. I am aware that this paper presents only a small fraction of the information and examples that could have influenced the final evaluation of the hypothesis. The threads not raised so far leave considerable space for further discussion and counterarguments. Moreover, the author's background, personal values, and the current situation in Poland may have had some influence on his opinion. Nonetheless, I hope that the work presented here will bring new life and freshness, and above all, new substantive value to the discussion on this topic.

In order to make the discussion more objective, at this point I would like to consider the opposite position to the hypothesis.

Contrary to my opinion, some people may say that the Global Strategy has only just been supplemented by the EU Security Union Strategy 2020-2025, in which new solutions are presented. In addition, preparing such a strategy and making significant changes requires time and a lot of work. Immediate implementation of a new strategy could misappropriate the work which has already been done and would not allow sufficient time for verification.

I see this argument as very legitimate, however, I would like to emphasize that the need for a change and an update of the strategy that I suggest stems from the approach to the topic from the perspective of values and its practical effectiveness. The aforementioned values are the indispensable foundation of the entire strategy, therefore it seems necessary to verify them on the basis of the values of the Founding Fathers. What's more, the differences in the approach to life values should be taken into account here. Going further, the indicated low practical effectiveness in the confrontation with current

challenges and threats results in the need for deep reflection and the introduction of necessary changes. At no point do I indicate that these should be drastic changes overnight. I believe that such changes need time, so they could be taken into account when creating the next version of the Global Strategy in 4-5 years.

Another important counter-argument may be a difference in views due to a person's background or different point of view. For example, a person coming from a country with different geopolitical conditions may not share the arguments presented above as relevant. Such a person may perceive threats in completely different terms and expect the EU to act in a way that is beneficial from the point of view of their country's policy. Additionally, as I mentioned above, the system of values that a given person is guided by plays an important role. All this may influence the opinion that there is no need to change or update the Global Strategy.

In attempting to respond to this argument, I would like to emphasise that, in my opinion, the considerations that were carried out took into account the overall interest of the European Union as a community. This interest is to ensure the highest possible level of security for all residents of the Community by maintaining its own values and introducing effective solutions. I am aware that the perception of security will depend on the economic level, location, geopolitical conditions, politics and values of the state in question.

In conclusion, I believe that in order to increase the effectiveness of the European Union's Global Strategy some changes are needed in the system of values and in the tools used to respond to subsequent threats. We should make use of past experience and very well-diagnosed threats. The suggested changes should be implemented without haste, taking into account the time needed for their preparation. The main suggested solution is to ensure an appropriate degree of country/site autonomy while providing a wide range of support in the form of necessary forces, resources, knowledge, expertise, and sanctions. We need a systematic review of the Global Strategy, and a period of 4-5 years seems optimal. Let the words of Robert Schuman - '*Unity while fully preserving diversity*<sup>24</sup>' - be the message to guide our actions.

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<sup>24</sup>Pursuit: <http://imschuman.com/idee/>



## **10. Annexes**

### **10.1. List of Abbreviations**

<i>Abbreviation</i>	<i>Definition</i>
EU	European Union
EUGS	European Union's Global Strategy
GS	Global Strategy
MEP	Member of European Parliament
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
WWII	World War II

### **10.2. List of Tables**

Table 1: Current threats and challenges

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## 11. Affidavit

### Affidavit

I declare that I have written the present essay independently and on my own. I have clearly marked any language or ideas borrowed from other sources as not my own and documented their sources. The essay does not contain any work that I have handed in or have had graded as a previous scientific paper earlier on.

I am aware that any failure to do so constitutes plagiarism. Plagiarism is the presentation of another person's thoughts or words as if they were my own – even if I summarize, paraphrase, condense, cut, rearrange, or otherwise alter them.

I am aware of the consequences and sanctions plagiarism entails. Among others, consequences may include nullification of the essay, exclusion from participation in the CSDP Olympiad. These consequences also apply retrospectively, i.e. if plagiarism is discovered after the essay has been accepted and graded. I am fully aware of the scope of these consequences.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Dominik Porczak". The signature is written in a cursive style and is positioned above a horizontal dotted line.

Cadet Dominik Porczak

Wroclaw, Poland in November 2021

**Implementation of Health Promotion Aspects in European Basic  
Officer Education and Leadership Training as an Essential  
Contribution to Common Security and Defence Policy.**

Essay

Created for the CSDP Olympiad 2022  
in Salon de Provence – France

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Spain

Marín, November 2021

## **Abstract**

It's been more than eighteen years since the first time an operation was conducted under the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy. After that first one, quite a few missions and operations have followed worldwide. These actions are developed in very complex scenarios, demanding proper leadership skills and competences.

The education provides basic, advanced, pre-deployment and in-mission training for personnel to be deployed in crisis management areas. Health promotion is one of such areas that should be considered and, therefore be taken into account to be implemented in basic officer education in order to build a kind of health culture among the young officers. Needless to say, this initial education should be followed by lifelong training.

## **Keywords**

Health promotion, leadership, training, officer, education

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## 1. Preface

When I was a teenager I lived one year in Bonn, the hub of the United Nations in Germany and home to many international companies and non-governmental organizations. There, I had the opportunity of going to an International Baccalaureate (IB) world school with students from more than eighty countries, a strong diversity inspiring an appreciation for different perspectives, cultures and approaches to life and learning.

The IB framework aims to ensure the students develop the real-life skill sets needed in our rapidly changing world, promoting some values that connected me with the topic of this essay: critical thinking, risk-taking and health promotion as the foundation for sustainable achievement. After reading all the proposed topics I found that the one developed in this essay might be, from the author’s point of view, a little different from the others which in some cases had been already a topic in previous Olympiads.

During that period of time, my father, a Navy Captain (OF-5<sup>1</sup>), was working for an international organization with the goal of being a centre of excellence and the first choice in Europe for cooperative defence equipment programmes. It was my first contact with European defence workings and, in a way, it awakened my interest in this matter.

On the one hand, the Olympiad represents a great opportunity to acquire better knowledge of European Security and Defence Policy. On the other hand, this essay topic is a challenge in terms of critical thinking and risk taking.

## 2. Introduction

Since 2003, the European Union has been ready to go abroad within the framework of the CSDP and make its contribution to security and stability worldwide. In more than 30 missions and operations, some 150,000 personnel have been deployed, serving under the European banner<sup>2</sup>. The missions and operations have been conducted in many different scenarios, each one with its own peculiarities. This fact highlights the need for the personnel to be educated and trained following a comprehensive approach.

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<sup>1</sup> NATO code

<sup>2</sup> Jochen Rehrl and Galia Glume. (2015). Handbook on CSDP Missions and Operations. Page 7

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Public health measures, being an aspect of health promotion, are essential to develop CSDP missions and operations. Even if their impact is not easy to measure, a focus on public health will contribute to the sustainability of EU personnel in operations and missions. Other aspects of health promotion also contribute to the CSDP.

Basic officer education plays a key role in preparing future officers for the tasks they will have to accomplish. The educational institutions' curricula should include all the subjects of interest in order to achieve a better performance in an operations theatre.

The aim of this essay is to assess, taking into account the research done and following a hermeneutical approach, whether the implementation of health promotion aspects in basic officer education and leadership training contributes to CSDP missions and operations.

### **3. Current State of Research**

In order to get a better understanding of the state of the art regarding the essay topic, research was conducted into literature dealing with health promotion aspects in European basic officer education and leadership training as essential contributors to the CSDP. When it comes to health promotion aspects, the research results showed very limited sources available. Based on this fact, a change in the methodology was implemented, focusing on health from the perspective of CSDP missions and operations. The rationale behind this approach is to provide the answer to a single question: is health an important factor in CSDP missions and operations?

The Handbook on CSDP Missions and Operations identifies as a challenge the public health engagement in CSDP operations and missions in order to enhance personnel sustainability<sup>3</sup>.

Statistically, in conflicts with military personnel involved, only 20% of all hospital admissions have been from combat. The other 80% are related to disease and non-battle injuries that could be prevented by public health measures<sup>4</sup>. It's paramount that commanders, when making decisions, take into account not only the nature of the operation but also the health condition of the deployed personnel<sup>5</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. Page 208

<sup>5</sup> Cf.: Ibid. Page 208

When planning a mission or an operation, detailed measures should be taken into account for the prevention of physical or mental illness and injury of deployed mission personnel or military forces as a key factor of personnel sustainability.

The concept of Force Health Protection (FHP) deals with “*the conservation of the working or fighting potential of a force so that it remains healthy, mission combat capable and available to the Head of Mission or Commander*”<sup>6</sup>. The Head of Mission and Commanders have to consider the threats and the countermeasures to fulfil the mission’s objectives without putting the sustainability, health and well-being of personnel at risk.

Public health measures to prevent disease and non-battle injuries contribute to the sustainability of EU personnel in operations and missions<sup>7</sup> and, therefore, should be considered as a key factor to successfully conduct, CSDP operations and missions.

In 2014, the European Union External Action Service (EEAS) developed the document “Comprehensive Health and Medical Concept for EU-led Crisis Management Missions and Operations”. This document aimed to set out medical support principles for the guidance of Commanders, Heads of Missions and their staff in order to optimize health and healthcare support on EU-led crisis management missions and operations.

From the author’s perspective, and taking into account what has been mentioned, health prevention aspects provide an essential contribution to CSDP implementation.

The importance of training is widely recognised by the EU authorities. Training and professional performance of people are interlinked. Better trained staff will display a better performance on the ground and will make civilian missions and military operations more effective. Training is essential to making the CSDP effective<sup>8</sup>. The development of training courses related to leadership and management<sup>9</sup> is also identified as an emerging need. After quite a few years conducting missions and operations in the context of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy, it has been learned that leadership is the key to success<sup>10</sup>.

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid. Page 210

<sup>7</sup> Cf.: Ibid

<sup>8</sup> Cf.: Jochen Rehl. (2021). Handbook on CSDP. Page 242

<sup>9</sup> Cf.: Ibid. Page 243,

<sup>10</sup> Cf.: Jochen Rehl. (2014). Handbook for decision makers.

Keeping in mind the importance of leadership, an analysis on leadership and management training requirements was developed by the European Union military Staff in collaboration with the Institute of Military Aeronautical Sciences of Florence. The conclusions are documented in a report that aims to recommend guidelines for specific training programmes at political-strategic, strategic and operational level. Leadership training is considered as a top priority by the EU Member States<sup>11</sup>.

#### **4. Research Gap**

The previous chapter has shown that some research has been done on the importance of health and healthcare aspects in terms of CSDP missions and operations. Nevertheless, such research does not deal with the implementation of health promotion aspects in European Basic Officer Education (EBOE) as a contribution to CSDP. This research gap will be addressed in this essay.

With regard to leadership training, it was found CSDP-related authorities have fully recognised the key role played by leadership training in achieving success when it comes to CSDP operations and mission. Based on this fact, no significant research gap is identified in relation to the contribution of leadership training to CSDP missions and operations and, therefore, this essay will not assess leadership training as an essential contribution to CSDP, as it is something that has been already proved.

#### **5. Research Question**

The key question, formulated within the European basic officer education framework, which is answered in this paper is:

**Does the implementation of health promotion aspects in basic officer education contribute to the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations?**

In order to achieve a better understanding, the author first needs to answer the following sub-questions:

- 1) What is health promotion?

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<sup>11</sup> Cf.: EUMS, Institute of Military Aeronautical Sciences of Florence. Leadership and Management Training Requirement Analysis. Final report.

- 2) Does education contribute to CSDP missions and operations?
- 3) Do health promotion aspects contribute to CSDP missions and operations?

## 6. Methodology

In order to define the state of the art, a thorough internet search was undertaken with the aim of compiling the required information for this essay. The main sources are officially published internet-based documents.

The aim of this essay is to answer the key question established in the previous section. Instead of trying to answer this complex question directly, it was decided to break down the key question into three simpler questions. The methodical approach of this essay is an author-based interpretation, also known as hermeneutics.




Figure 1: Flowchart of the hermeneutical approach<sup>12</sup>

## 7. Research and Results of Research


### 7.1 Health Promotion

The World Health Organization Constitution<sup>13</sup> defines health as a state of complete physical, social and mental well-being, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity<sup>14</sup>.

<sup>12</sup> Figure created by the author

Health promotion is defined by the Ottawa Charter<sup>15</sup> as the process of enabling people to increase control over and to improve their health by seeking to influence lifestyles, health services and environments, which are not limited to the physical environment but encompass as well the cultural and socioeconomic circumstances that substantially determine health status.<sup>16</sup>

There are different viewpoints related to health promotion. One of them considers that health promotion comprises three overlapping components which, in the past, were considered as separate components: health education, health protection and health prevention. Health education goes beyond increasing the knowledge of personal health behaviour and also covers the development of skills that demonstrate the political feasibility and organizational possibilities of different forms of action to address social, economic and environmental determinants of health. The combined efforts of the three components stimulate a social environment favouring the success of preventive health protection measures<sup>17</sup>.



<sup>13</sup> Constitution of the world Health Organization.(1946)

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> World Health Organization. (1986). Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion

<sup>16</sup> World Health Organization. (2012). Health education: theoretical concepts, effective strategies and core competencies: a foundation document to guide capacity development of health educators. Page 15

<sup>17</sup> Cf.: Ibid Pages 13,15

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**Figure 2:** A model of health promotion<sup>18</sup>

But there are other viewpoints. For example, O’Byrne states that health promotion encompasses health education and public health policy. Through health education, individuals and groups are provided with the knowledge, values and skills that encourage effective action for health. Through healthy public policy, political commitment is generated for health supportive policies and practices, as well as the provision of services and increased public interest in and demand for health<sup>19</sup>.

Another concept to be taken into account is health literacy, defined as the degree to which people are able to access, understand, appraise and communicate information to engage with the demands of different health contexts in order to promote and maintain good health across the life<sup>20</sup>. Health literacy could be viewed as an outcome of effective health education the increases an individual’s capacities to access and use health information, make appropriate health decisions and maintain basic health<sup>21</sup>.


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<sup>18</sup> Ibid. Page 16

<sup>19</sup> Cf.: Ibid. Page 16

<sup>20</sup> Cf.: Ibid. Page 13

<sup>21</sup> Cf.: Ibid. Page 18



**Figure 3:** Relationships between major health concepts<sup>22</sup>

So far, several health promotion-related concepts have been presented. But the research should go deeper in trying to define what could be considered as health promotion aspects. In this respect, the Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion identified five areas of action to act as a guide in the process of engaging in health promotion<sup>23</sup>:

- Create supportive environments: ensure physical and social environments support people’s abilities to live healthy lives. Make healthy choices the easy choices.
- Strengthen community action: Support activities that increase groups’ abilities to organize around and act upon those things in their physical and social environments that affect health.
- Develop personal skills: enable people to learn throughout life and prepare themselves for all its stages. Skill areas may encompass personal/familial or group dynamics, organizing, political action and social analysis.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. Page 17

<sup>23</sup> Cf.: Ibid. Page 61

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- Build a healthy public policy: most health determinants lie outside the medical/illness sector (income, housing, environmental protection, work, agriculture). These sectors must begin to take conscious accounting of the health impacts of their policies. Health must be on the agenda of all policy-makers.
  - Reorienting health services towards health promotion: the responsibility for health promotion in health services is shared among individuals, community groups, health professionals, health service institutions and governments. They must work together towards a health care system which contributes to the pursuit of health.

For the purpose of this essay, these areas of action will be considered by the author as health promotion aspects.

## **7.2 Does education contribute to CSDP?**

The effectiveness of European security depends on the skills and competences of our future military leaders to understand and face common challenges, enhance the interoperability of national responses to potential threats and coordinate military instruments with civilian ones<sup>24</sup>.

The attainment of such competences and skills relies, to a great extent, on the education and training provided to the officers, historically at national level but supplemented recently with new approaches.

In November 2008, the Ministers of Defence of the European Union approved a document formally launching the initiative known as the European Initiative for the Exchange of Young Officers, inspired by Erasmus. Although this initiative addresses the basic education and training of officers, that is, cadets before being commissioned as officers, the initiative itself builds on the foundation of existing basic education and training systems at national level of the EU Member States at a national level<sup>25</sup>.

The active engagement of basic education and training institutes underpins the initiative and paves the way for the consolidation of a European security and defence

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<sup>24</sup> Cf.: Sylvain Paile. (2014). European Education and Training for Young Officers. European Initiative for the Exchange of Young Officers, inspired by Erasmus. Page 6

<sup>25</sup> Cf.: Ibid.



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culture<sup>26</sup>. The annual European Military Academies Commandants’ Seminar (EMACS) is an example of such engagement.

With no doubt, education not only plays an essential role in the shift towards a more coherent and efficient CSDP, but it is also the most basic way to promote a European security and defence culture<sup>27</sup>.

Federica Mogherini<sup>2829</sup> stated in 2018: “*Today, our Common Security and Defence Policy already reaps the benefits of Military Erasmus on the theatres of operations, with young leaders trained to work together. We see the practical benefits of a common military culture*”. From the author’s perspective, this statement clearly endorses the education contribution to CSDP.

Another example that illustrates the importance of this education in terms of CSDP is the establishment of the European Security and Defence College in 2005. This institution provides EU-level training and education in the field of the Union’s CSDP. It aims to develop and promote a common understanding of CSDP among civilian and military personnel, and to identify and disseminate, through its training activities, good practices in relation to various CSDP issues. By doing so, the ESDC complements the national efforts in the field of training and education<sup>30</sup>.

### **7.3 Do health promotion aspects contribute to CSDP?**

The approach to answer this question will be a three-step one<sup>31</sup>:

1. The first step will be identifying what could be considered as health promotion aspects.
2. Secondly, CSDP missions and operations’ requirements will be assessed in terms of health
3. Finally, it will be assessed whether health promotion aspects contribute to fulfilling CSDP missions and operations’ health needs.

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<sup>26</sup> Cf.: Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Cf.: Harald Gell, Sylvain Paile-Calvo and Symeon Zambas. (2018). European Education and Training for Young Officers. European Initiative for the Exchange of Young Officers, inspired by Erasmus. 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition. Page 29

<sup>28</sup> Ibid. Page 11

<sup>29</sup> High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (2014-2019)

<sup>30</sup> Homepage of the European Security and Defence College. Page: “Who We Are”. URL: [Who we are – ESDC \(europa.eu\)](http://www.esdc.europa.eu). [16.11.21]

<sup>31</sup> Approach designed by the author

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The first step will be developed taking into consideration the research done in section 7.1, where it was already stated that, for the purpose of this essay, the aspects of health promotion to be considered will be the five areas of action defined in the Ottawa Charter<sup>32</sup>:

- Create supportive environments
- Strengthen community action
- Develop personal skills
- Build healthy public policy
- Reorientate health services towards health promotion

The health-related requirements in CSDP missions and operations are not explicitly documented. Therefore, the Handbook on CSDP missions and operations will be reviewed in order to capture the requirements. In particular, chapter 2.5.4, which deals with public health engagement<sup>33</sup>.

After conducting the analysis, the following health-related requirements were identified<sup>34,35</sup>:

1. Application of public health measures to prevent disease and non-battle injuries.
2. Leaders’ education in order to include, in the making-decision process and in the planning process, health-related aspects, for instance, medical threats or health condition of the deployed personnel.
3. Awareness-raising of individual responsibility in terms of health.
4. Dissemination of accurate information to the personnel involved.

Finally, based on the definition of each area of action defined in the Ottawa Charter, a linkage is established connecting the health-related requirements and the areas of action that contribute to fulfilling each requirement. The result is showed in the following table<sup>36</sup>:

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<sup>32</sup> Assessment by the author.

<sup>33</sup> Assessment by the author.

<sup>34</sup> Assessment by the author.

<sup>35</sup> Each requirement is identified by a number to allow traceability.

<sup>36</sup> Author’s note: Conclusions based on author’s arguments.

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Area of Action	Requirement
<b>Create supportive environments</b>	1, 2
<b>Strengthen community action</b>	2, 4
<b>Develop personal skills</b>	2, 3
<b>Build healthy public policy</b>	1
<b>Reorient health services towards health promotion</b>	1

**Table 1:** Correlation between areas of action and health-related requirements<sup>37</sup>

## 8. Discussion of Results and Personal Conclusions

The research initially done to assess the state of the art related to the topic of the essay led to a twofold conclusion. On the one hand, current CSDP-related documents highlight the importance of public health aspects in CSDP missions and operations, but no literature was found researching the potential contribution of implementing health promotion aspects in European basic officer education. On the other hand, it was made clear that leadership training is a cornerstone in achieving success when conducting CSDP missions and operations, hence any further research might be redundant as well as superfluous.

Based on these findings, the focus was placed on the potential connection between three aspects: education, health promotion and CSDP missions and operations.

The research related to the connection between education and CSDP missions and operations proved that basic officer education plays a key role in developing defence cooperation within the EU. The basic officer education has two main pillars: the education at the national level and the education at EU level. The combination of both provides the required competences and skills, improves interoperability and boosts European culture.

With regard to health promotion aspects, the lack of previous research providing some kind of connection with CSDP represented a challenge that required a different approach. Based on a three-step assessment, it was concluded that the implementation

<sup>37</sup> Table created by the author. The number identifies the requirement.

of health promotion aspects contributes to fulfilling CSDP missions and operations’ health-related requirements.

From the author’s perspective, the implementation of health promotion aspects in basic officer education contributes to improving the performance in operations within the CSDP framework.

If the basic officer education institutes add health promotion aspects to their curricula, the young officers will be able to develop skills and competences in terms of health that will support them as future CSDP operations leaders. In addition, it would be a good opportunity to build a culture of health.

But implementing health promotion aspects in basic officer education is not enough. The education and training of a military officer is a lifelong path. Therefore, from the author’s point of view, health promotion aspects should also be added to the ESDC curriculum.

Finally, I personally believe that any aspect contributing to CSDP should be developed at EU level, rather than national level, in order to reinforce the ability of the European Armed Forces to work together, as well as the interoperability of the forces.

## **9. Annexes**

### **9.1 List of Abbreviations**

CSDP: Common Security and Defence Policy

EBOE: European Basic Officer Education

EEAS: European Union External Action Service

EMACS: European Military Academies Commandants’ Seminar

ESDC: European Security and Defence Collage

EU: European Union

FHP: Force Health Protection

IB: International Baccalaureate

### **9.2 List of Figures**

Figure 1: Flowchart of the hermeneutical approach

Figure 2: A model of health promotion

Figure 3: Relationships between major health concepts

### **9.3 List of Tables**

Table 1: Correlation between areas of action and health-related requirements

### **9.4 List of Literature**

#### **9.4.1 List of documents**

01. Jochen Rehrl and Galia Glume (2015). Handbook on CSDP missions and operations
02. Comprehensive health and medical concept for EU-led crisis management missions and operations. (2014). European External Action Service (EEAS),
03. Jochen Rehrl. (2021). Handbook on CSDP.
04. Jochen Rehrl. (2014). Handbook for decision makers. The common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union.
05. European Union Military Staff, Institute of Military Aeronautical Sciences of Florence. Leadership and Management Training Requirement Analysis. Final report.

06. Constitution of the World Health Organization. 1946.
07. World Health Organization. (1986). Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion.
08. World Health Organization (2012). Health education: theoretical concepts, effective strategies and core competencies: a foundation document to guide capacity development of health educators.
09. Sylvain Paile. (2014). European Education and Training for Young Officers. European Initiative for the Exchange of Young Officers, inspired by Erasmus.
10. Harald Gell, Sylvain Paile-Calvo and Symeon Zambas (2018). European Education and Training for Young Officers. European Initiative for the Exchange of Young Officers, inspired by Erasmus. 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition.

#### **9.4.2 Online sources**

01. Homepage of the European Union External Action Service. URL: [European Union External Action - European External Action Service \(europa.eu\)](https://european-union.europa.eu/external-action)
02. Homepage of the European Security and Defence College. URL: [ESDC – European Security & Defence College \(europa.eu\)](https://esdc.europa.eu/) .
03. Homepage of the World Health Organization. URL: [WHO | World Health Organization](https://www.who.int/).

## 10. Affidavit

I declare that I have written the present essay independently and on my own. I have clearly marked any language or ideas borrowed from other sources as not my own and documented their sources. The essay does not contain any work that I have handed in or have had graded as a previous scientific paper earlier on.

I am aware that any failure to do so constitutes plagiarism. Plagiarism is the presentation of another person's thoughts or words as if they were my own – even if I summarize, paraphrase, condense, cut, rearrange, or otherwise alter them.

I am aware of the consequences and sanctions plagiarism entails. Among others, consequences may include nullification of the essay, exclusion from participation in the CSDP Olympiad. These consequences also apply retrospectively, i.e. if plagiarism is discovered after the essay has been accepted and graded. I am fully aware of the scope of these consequences.



.....

GM 2 Francisco Antón Antón, 4<sup>th</sup>-Year Cadet

Marín, Spain, in November 2021

**The need for an EU "Defence Minister", "Defence Council" or a  
"Commission Director General (DG) on Defence**

Essay

Created for the CSDP Olympiad 2021  
in Salon-de-Provence - France

Author:

**Sergeant Iida Elise Murumets**

Student of the Estonian Military Academy  
Estonia

Tartu, November 2021



## **Abstract**

European Parliament's proposal to delegate part of Member States' security and defence competencies on decision making to the European union and thus matching institutional developments with the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The change includes creating a permanent Council of Ministers configuration of the Council, a Directorate General for Defence in the Commission and a fully-fledged Committee on Security and Defence in the European Parliament. This proposal would mean some changes in the decision making processes. Furthermore, by creating a Defence Minister's post the possibilities of an intergovernmental as well as a supranational work order are considered.

This essay aims to seek justifications of such an institutional change with the case study method and a qualitative content analysis. In the empirical part of the essay, the author illustrates how the new institution will fit in the current order of CSDP institutions and that the change in institutions will either be positive or unnoticeable. If the Defence Minister would work as a supranational body, it would mean another step in the line of federalization and create new opportunities for cooperation with NATO.

These institutional changes and their political consequences can help fulfil the European ambition of becoming a stronger force in the world, and support a more independent approach for defending Europe's borders and values.

Keywords: CSDP, supranationalism, intergovernmentalism, federal European Union, NATO.

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## 2. Preface

The topic of military capability development is a difficult subject to convey to the public. Especially if the understanding is constrained by the state's budget and the sense of security. What we learned from the last century wars and capability development, is that it is important to keep the discussion going and not forget the lessons we have learned. Between the world wars, many pilots were afraid, that with the disarmament and shutting down aircraft industries the state would also lose their knowledge of air battles.<sup>1</sup> In the Falkland's War Royal Air Force discovered that they have not been developing the right kind of aircrafts to send to the Falkland's, because most preceding conflicts had been closer to base.<sup>2</sup>

When discussing the future of Europe and Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP), the same framework applies. Once proposing a change, the conversation dies with pessimism disguised as realism. This loop of conversation is evident from the ever persistent message for European Countries to be more independent, start looking out for itself, become an important player in world politics. To break the vicious cycle, it is important to start thinking along with the Union and start finding solutions. The proposal to create the post for a Defence Minister could be a change with great impact to world politics and unifying Europe.

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<sup>1</sup> Budiansky, S. (2004). *Air power: the men, machines, and ideas that revolutionized war, from Kitty Hawk to Gulf War II*. London. Penguin Books Ltd. P. 125-126.

<sup>2</sup> Anderson, D. (2014). *The Falklands War 1982*. Osprey Publishing. Passim.

### 3. Introduction

European Union's external action and defence policy has been an intergovernmental forum, where decisions are made unanimously. On the other hand, European Union's strategy reacts to the world politics and shows an understanding for the need to cooperate. In order to fulfil the promise in the Global Strategy, Common Security and Defence Policy needs more power to urge as well as support the Member States' capability development and collaborations in fighting common threats. On the 26<sup>th</sup> of February 2021 the Members of the European Council stated:

*"11. [...] Specifically as regards security and defence, we want to promote the EU's interests and values as well as its resilience and preparedness to effectively tackle all security threats and challenges. We reaffirm that, in the face of increased global instability, the EU needs to take more responsibility for its security."*<sup>3</sup>

The European Parliament has suggested to make institutional developments to match policy developments: a Council of Defence Ministers, a Directorate General for Defence, and a Committee on Security and Defence.<sup>4</sup> This could mean delegating Member States' power to decide on defence related issues to the Union which is not something most states would do without hesitation. The need for change would be justified if it would make things better: the decision process faster and more efficient, integrate the common values and help respond with joint action. Most importantly, Member States need to perceive the new order as empowering them.

This essay will look at the proposed developments in the Union's work order and look at wider political consequences. In the first part the author will describe the new work order in intergovernmental and supranational decision making procedures and what role each institution plays. The second part looks at a Federal Europe and the nature of CSDP-NATO possible cooperation.

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<sup>3</sup> European Council (2021). Statement of the Members of the European Council SN 2/21. Brussels. Version as of 26-2-21. P. 4.

<sup>4</sup> Federal Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Austria. (2021). Handbook on CSDP. Vienna. Directorate for Security Policy of the Federal Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Austria. 4th edition. P. 62.

## 4. Current State of Research

### 4.1 Supranationalism and intergovernmentalism<sup>5</sup>

Studies conducted on the European Union have their roots in integration theories, which firstly focused on the world in its entirety, but since the mid-fifties they started looking specifically the European Communities, hence making the theories less normative and more descriptive. Neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism have been in the centre of European integration debate and thus is widely used as a theoretical framework.

(New neo-functionalism) supranationalism, as shown by Tranholm-Mikkelsen, is about the relation between de-regulative and re-regulative integration: deconstructing barriers urged the need for new rules to balance economic discrepancies. Burley and Mattli found spillover effect, because the existence of complex Union law, enforced Member States' expectations towards the EU. Neo-functionalism is based on an understanding of a spillover effect and they see that supranational institutions help define common interests.

Intergovernmentalism was based on the criticism of neo-functionalism mainly pointing out that the theory has excluded the effects of external environment and neo-functionalism was not able to successfully differentiate low politics (trade, culture, and healthcare) from high (diplomacy, external affairs). By which they meant, that in high politics no integration was evident. The subsequent theory of liberal intergovernmentalism is based on the matters that Member states focus on their own interests and represent lower level interests on an international arena.

Two theories asking different questions: neo-functionalists try to find out how to explain the birth of a supranational political community and intergovernmentalism focuses on the motivation behind state cooperation. Their opposition lies in the locus of most information about the preferences of Member States, whether it is the supranational institution or the states themselves. Both theories can be used to examine

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<sup>5</sup> Author's note: this entire chapter is based on Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M. (2006). *Debates on European Integration: A Reader*. Basingstoke. Palgrave Macmillan. Passim.

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the integration process of the EU, they are not just conflicting theories, but also complement each other.

## 4.2 Studies on CSDP

Studies on CSDP look for ways to show the way to handle future crisis, to redefine concepts already known and analyse world event impacts on the policy's resilience.

A lot of research tries to find new meaning to policies and relations between organizations. A research report on crisis management stresses the inevitable that the EU's foreign policy objectives are driven by politics and adds the need for a permanent military capability for the CSDP in order for the Union to become a serious power. The authors found the Europeans' reactive attitude as their biggest handicap.<sup>6</sup> Interestingly, Kashmeri's brief redefined NATO's role and in light of its relevance, suggested to merge it with the CSDP.<sup>7</sup> This shows that change can be welcomed from both sides.

Reports on crisis management issues tackle the influences of creating objectives and defining new threats. Biscop and Coelmont found the need for crisis management and reinforcing transparency linked to CSDP operations' objectives, which are ultimately political and not military.<sup>8</sup> In 2016 the answer to what the EU should be doing to handle the refugee crisis was to start using hard power, start supporting Frontex and to further build partnership with NATO and the United States.<sup>9</sup> Recent studies write about how to better support the defence industry<sup>10</sup>, predicts Frontex agencies displacing CSDP

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<sup>6</sup> Simon, L. & Mattelaer, A. (2011). 'Crisis Management' Just Won't Cut It Anymore: Military Planning and CSDP After Lisbon. . In *A Strategy for CSDP Europe's Ambitions as a Global Security Provider*. Egmont Institute. P. 12.

<sup>7</sup> Cf: Kashmeri, S. A. (2010). *Save NATO: Merge it with CSDP*. Atlantic Council.

<sup>8</sup> Cf: Biscop, S. & Coelmont, J. (2010). *The Benefits of a CSDP Strategy*. In *A Strategy for CSDP Europe's Ambitions as a Global Security Provider*. Egmont Institute. P. 9-12.

<sup>9</sup> Bakker, A. & Drent, M. & Landman, L. & Zandee, D. (2016). *A Stronger CSDP: Deepening Defence Cooperation*. Hague. Netherlands Institute of International Relations. Passim.

<sup>10</sup> Maulny, J.-P. (2020). *No time like the present: Towards a genuine defence industrial base for the CSDP*. *The CSDP in 2020: The EU's legacy and ambition in security and defence*. European Union Institute for Security Studies. P. 124-134.

deployments<sup>11</sup> and names climate change, rapid urbanisation and disruptive technologies as the trends for new threats.<sup>12</sup>

Frequently studies looked at CSDP's resilience to world events. For example, in 2016 Tsertsvadze applied Putnam's Two-Level Game theory to analyse why Britain backed the launch of the CSDP but did not consistently support it.<sup>13</sup> She found that Britain's decisions relating to the CSDP have been influenced by domestic politics and developments within the EU.<sup>14</sup> The Danish Institute for International Studies concluded their report stating that while Brexit enhanced the willingness for military cooperation between Member States, it also reduced EU's military and political weight.<sup>15</sup> This explains why Brexit did not have much of an influence on CSDP further developments. Another endurance test for CSDP was COVID-19. European Union Institute for Security Studies published a report which stated that on the outbreak of the pandemic missions with a stabilisation or security mandate were more resilient than training and capacity building to local partners.<sup>16</sup>

The trend in research findings is that most situations are calling for the EU to start using more hard power and become a more serious actor on world politics. It shows that CSDP is not dependent on any particular state and that it is willing to learn from every crisis, every event.

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<sup>11</sup> Cf: Parkes, R. (2020). Reading the runes: The future of CSDP and AFSJ. *The CSDP in 2020: The EU's legacy and ambition in security and defence*. European Union Institute for Security Studies. P. 97-109.

<sup>12</sup> Cf: Lindstom, G. (2020). Emerging security challenges: Four futures for CSDP. *The CSDP in 2020: The EU's legacy and ambition in security and defence*. European Union Institute for Security Studies. P. 88-96.

<sup>13</sup> Tsertsvadze, I. (2017). Britain and the Common Security and Defense Policy of the European Union. *Connections*. Volume 16. No. 3/2017. Passim.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. P 85-86.

<sup>15</sup> Cf: Nissen, C. (2017). The CSDP and the UK's role in it. *Forged in Crisis: The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy after Brexit*. Danish Institute for International Studies. P. 13-25.

<sup>16</sup> Pietz, T. (2021). *The Impact of Covid-19 on CSDP*. European Union Institute for Security Studies. Passim.



## **5. Research Gap**

Discussions about European integration leading to a Defence Union and steps that need to be taken in order to develop the Union into a globally substantial player are ever relevant. Research so far has focused on the realization of the need for a United Europe. The gap in research is with European Parliament's proposal to delegate part of member state's autonomy to decide on security related questions and thus creating a supposed Directorate General for Defence to work within the Commission as well as other institutional changes to the work order. This proposal is waiting on Member States' response and needs an assembled view on the necessity and of said change. This essay aims to close the gap by giving sense to these shifts in work order and what it would mean institutionally, politically, and legally.

## 6. Research Questions

The purpose of this essay is to investigate the need to impose institutional changes by creating bodies to work on defence issues on the European Union's level. By studying the existing decision making models and the EU institution's work order should give an overview on how big of a change it would mean institutionally and legally. In order to assess the necessity, the author will also look what this change would mean politically.

Thus four research questions are proposed:

- 1) What are the weaknesses of the existing security and defence policy institutions on a decision making level and what are the strengths of the new work order?
- 2) What sorts of weaknesses could the new order compensate?
- 3) What could be the political consequences of delegating defence related powers to the European Union?
- 4) How justified are the needs for a new work order considering its capabilities and political consequences?

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## 7. Methodology

This essay uses mixed methods to draw conclusions. Starting with a case study on the work order of the institutions working in the field of the Common Security and Defence Policy and continuing research with a qualitative content analysis for identifying the consequences and their scope.

### 7.1 Case study<sup>17</sup>

Case studies are used to examine a phenomenon in its natural environment. The author applies this method to illustrate the supranational and intergovernmental decision making model. The new work order will be fitted into the existing model and given an overview of its function and ability to influence the process. The shortcoming of this method lies in the high demands on the ability to ask relevant questions, understand the problem's political and theoretical tendencies when collecting data as well as disregard pre-existing opinions.

### 7.2 Qualitative content analysis

Qualitative content analysis focuses on meaning and context. It investigates the clearly stated as well as hidden messages. Conventional content analysis is used to describe a phenomenon.<sup>18</sup> The analysis starts with the first reading of documents trying to understand the whole and follows with the second reading aims to find the most important idea.<sup>19</sup> This approach to content analysis addresses research in the discussion section of the essay. The challenge of this method lies in full comprehension of context and the possibility to confuse this method with other qualitative methods.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Author's note: this sections is based on Yin, V. R. (2003). *Case study research: Design and methods*. Thousand Oaks. Sage. Passim.

<sup>18</sup> Hsieh, H. & Shannon, S. (2005). Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis. *Qualitative health research*. Volume 15. No. 9/2005. P. 1279-1281.

<sup>19</sup> Cf: Mayring, P. (2000). *Qualitative Content Analysis*. *Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research*. Volume 1. No. 2/2000. Passim.

<sup>20</sup> Hsieh, H. & Shannon, S. (2005). Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis. *Qualitative health research*. Volume 15. No. 9/2005. P. 1279-1281.

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## **8. Research and Results of Research**

### **8.1 Institutions in connection with CSDP**

#### **8.1.1 Intergovernmental institutions in the EU**

##### **8.1.1.1 The European Council and the Council of the European Union**

The European Council does not exercise legislative functions and takes its decisions by consensus, except in the area of CFSP where the European Council acts unanimously. The main function for the European Council is to drive the Union's developments and to define the strategy of CFSP and CSDP.<sup>21</sup> The European Council consists of Head of States.

The Council of the European Union's competences lie in policy making and coordinating functions as laid down in the Treaties. The council usually acts by a qualified majority, except in the area of the CFSP and CSDP, it acts by consensus and unanimity. The Council consists of representatives of the Member States ministerial level and meets in 10 configurations, one of which is the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC). This configuration ensures the consistency in the Union's external actions including foreign policy, security and defence, trade, development cooperation and humanitarian aid.<sup>22</sup> The HR/VP occupies the central institutional role, chairing the Foreign Affairs Council in its 'Defence Ministers configuration' (the EU's CSDP decision-making body) and directing the European Defence Agency (EDA).<sup>23</sup>

##### **8.1.1.2 Intergovernmental decision-making procedures in the EU**

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<sup>21</sup> Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union (2016) OJ C 202 7.6.2016, p. 13. Version as of 1-3-2020. Art 15 & Art 26.

<sup>22</sup> Federal Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Austria. (2021). Handbook on CSDP. Vienna. Directorate for Security Policy of the Federal Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Austria. 4th edition. P. 50

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

In the CFSP (and several others) the decision-making procedure is different from that of the ordinary legislative procedure and its dominant feature is the stronger component of intergovernmental cooperation.<sup>24</sup> There are several procedures set for decisions in the field of CFSP: procedure for amendment of the Treaties<sup>25</sup>, enhanced cooperation procedure<sup>26 27</sup> and procedure for decisions in foreign affairs<sup>28</sup>.

## 8.1.2 Supranational institutions in the EU

### 8.1.2.1 The Commission and the European Parliament

The Commission's role regarding CSDP lies mainly in achieving set goals and managing other related external action policies. The Commission plays a direct role by managing the budget and an indirect role by ensuring cooperation with non-CSDP instruments in implementing the CSDP.<sup>29</sup> The Commission is run by the college which takes decisions on the Commission's political and strategic direction.<sup>30</sup> Their work is organised into Directorate-Generals which develop, implement and manage EU policy.

The European Parliament (EP) has established an important relation to the development of CSDP, yet its main role is to advise and ensure its support to the CSDP. The parliamentary committees put together and adopt legislative proposals. They consider

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<sup>24</sup> Homepage of European Parliament. Page Intergovernmental decision-making procedures. URL: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/9/intergovernmental-decision-making-procedures>. [6-11-21].

<sup>25</sup> Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union (2016) OJ C 202 7.6.2016, p. 13. Version as of 1-3-2020. Art 48.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid. Art 20.

<sup>27</sup> Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. (2012). OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 47–390. Art 329.

<sup>28</sup> Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union (2016) OJ C 202 7.6.2016, p. 13. Version as of 1-3-2020. Art 22 & Art 42 (2).

<sup>29</sup> Federal Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Austria. (2021). Handbook on CSDP. Vienna. Directorate for Security Policy of the Federal Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Austria. 4th edition. P. 53-54.

<sup>30</sup> Homepage of European Commission. Page How the Commission is organised. URL: [https://ec.europa.eu/info/about-european-commission/organisational-structure/how-commission-organised\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/info/about-european-commission/organisational-structure/how-commission-organised_en). [6-11-21].

Commission and Council proposals.<sup>31</sup> The EP adopts CFSP report drafted by the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and a report on CSDP drafted by the Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE). The EP hosts Joint Consultation Meetings with the Council, the EEAS and the Commission for exchanging information on CSDP operations and CFSP budget.<sup>32</sup>

### **8.1.2.2 Supranational decision-making procedures in the EU**

The Member States have agreed to transfer some of their powers to the EU institutions and allow them to make supranational binding decisions in certain policy areas.<sup>33</sup> The procedures relevant regarding decisions on CSDP are: consent procedure<sup>34</sup>, ordinary legislative procedure, conclusion of international agreements and a quasi-constitutional procedure called system of own resources<sup>35</sup>.

### **8.1.3 The European External Action Service (EEAS)**

The EEAS is specifically dedicated to external action and like other European Commission directorates it is involved in EU external policy implementation. Its main focus is to assist the HR in fulfilling his mandate.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Homepage of European Parliament. Page The Committees of the European Parliament. URL: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/about-parliament/en/organisation-and-rules/organisation/committees>. [6-11-21].

<sup>32</sup> Federal Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Austria. (2021). Handbook on CSDP. Vienna. Directorate for Security Policy of the Federal Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Austria. 4th edition. P. 54.

<sup>33</sup> Homepage of European Parliament. Page Supranational decision-making procedures. URL: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/8/supranational-decision-making-procedures>. [6-11-21].

<sup>34</sup> European Parliament. (2019). Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament. Version as of 26-8-2021. Rule 105.

<sup>35</sup> Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. (2012). OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 47–390. Art 289 & Art 294 & 218 & Art 311.

<sup>36</sup> Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union. (2016). OJ C 202 7.6.2016, p. 13. Version as of 1-3-2020. Art 27.



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**Figure 1:** The relations between institutions regarding CSDP related work including proposed institutional developments.<sup>37</sup>

#### **8.1.4.1 Council of Defence Ministers (CDM)**

With the creation of a permanent Council of Defence Ministers it will start to function separately from the FAC and could presume its position as the main CSDP decision-making body. The new configuration would consist of defence ministers of each member state and decide on security and defence matters unanimously unless relating to the EDA and permanent structured cooperation (PESCO), where decisions are taken by qualified majority voting (QMV).<sup>38</sup> It will be chaired by the HR/VP. The new council would enhance the work done by the Political and Security Committee (PSC). When creating the Defence Ministers Configuration, it would also increase its influence to the CSDP compared to the FAC.

#### **8.1.4.2 Directorate General for Defence (DG-DEF)**

The work of the Commission is organised into Directorate-Generals. During the weekly meetings decision-making is done in oral procedure.<sup>39</sup> The Oral procedure involves a debate and agreement on the initiative by the Commissioners. The Commission may delegate the adoption of management to the Directors-General acting on its behalf.<sup>40</sup>

The work of the Directorate-General for Defence should operate similarly to the Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space<sup>41</sup>, leading the European Commission's activities in common defence and towards a European Defence Union as stated in the 2022 Commission Work Program:

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<sup>37</sup> Figure created by the author.

<sup>38</sup> Homepage of EUR-Lex. Page Glossary of summaries. URL: [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/european\\_security\\_defence\\_policy.html](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/european_security_defence_policy.html). [6-11-21].

<sup>39</sup> Homepage of European Commission. Page How decisions are made. URL: [https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/decision-making-process/how-decisions-are-made\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/decision-making-process/how-decisions-are-made_en). [12-11-21].

<sup>40</sup> European Commission (2000). Rules of Procedure of the Commission. Version as of 23-4-2020.

<sup>41</sup> Homepage of European Commission. Page What the Commission is doing. URL: [https://ec.europa.eu/info/topics/defence\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/info/topics/defence_en). [12-11-21].



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*“The different global crises have confirmed that we need to strengthen partnerships with allies, and we will present a new EU-NATO Joint Declaration and will seek to accelerate work on a genuine European Defence Union.”*<sup>42</sup>

### **8.1.4.3 Committee on Security and Defence (SEDE)**

The European Parliament’s work is supported by committees and directorate-generals which examines questions referred to them.<sup>43</sup> For example, the Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union focuses on foreign policy providing expertise to the Parliament’s main actors in this field. It ensures the secretariat of the Parliamentary committees in the field of security and defence among others.<sup>44</sup> Thus the function of the Security and Defence Committee lies in ensuring support to the European Parliament. The European Parliament’s work on Security and defence is currently supported by AFET and its subcommittee SEDE. When constructing the new fully fledged Security and Defence Committee, it will probably put together and adopt legislative proposals concerning its sector. The AFET and SEDE can jointly consider matters falling within their competence, but they may not take a decision jointly.<sup>45</sup>

## **8.2 Federalization of the European Union**

The European Union is described as a supranational organization, with features of an intergovernmental organization and increasingly of a federal system.<sup>46</sup> Kim and Jung say that the most important difference between a federal state and a confederation is whether central government and members share sovereignty especially in the defence

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<sup>42</sup> European Commission (2021). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. COM 645. Strasbourg.

<sup>43</sup> European Commission (2000). Rules of Procedure of the Commission. Version as of 23-4-2020. Rule 210.

<sup>44</sup> Homepage of Alumniportal Deutschland. Page Working for the EU: European Parliament. URL: <https://www.alumniportal-deutschland.org/en/career/working-for-the-eu/>. [12-11-21].

<sup>45</sup> European Commission (2000). Rules of Procedure of the Commission. Version as of 23-4-2020. Rule 210.

<sup>46</sup> Cf: Levrant, N. (2010). EU: Intergovernmental Relations in a Supranational Federation. In Dialogues on Intergovernmental Relations in Federal Systems. McGill-Queen's University Press. P. 26-30.

area.<sup>47</sup> It would seem that the European Union is on its path to federalization and giving more powers to decide on defence issues, if not bringing a qualitative change at once, certainly speeds up the process.

The first big debate about federalization lies in the concept itself. There are ideas on centralized European superstate and their opposition with views on rejecting the European project and returning to nation-states.<sup>48</sup> It is not important how long politicians have planned to gradually federalize the European Union. Even more, a large part of the federalization process may have gone unnoticed.<sup>49</sup> Either way by creating a European Union's Defence Minister's post, a lot more power will be given to the Union.

Why should we bring about this change? Firstly, federalization requires the insistence on individual freedom and responsibility, it favours the voluntary cooperation in solving mutual problems.<sup>50</sup> Reho & Dalibor say that federalization is feared because of transferring national power to the European level, but actually a federal Europe would be able to keep national policies in line and promote individuals and communities.<sup>51</sup> To add on, the reliance on harmonization destroys diversity – the main substantive feature of federalism.<sup>52</sup> In other words, because economic powers would be given back to the local level, federalism would mean greater autonomy.<sup>53</sup>

Why not go ahead with this change? It has been argued by Joseph Weiler that the EU has witnessed hidden constitutionalisation already, e.g. the Court having adopted several constitutional principles like direct effect and supremacy. Weiler has, however, also offered a version of supranationalism which does not necessitate full-blown

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<sup>47</sup> Kim, N. & Jung, S. (2010). Democratic Deficit, European Constitution, and a Vision of the Federal Europe: The EU's Path after the Lisbon Treaty. *Journal of International and Area Studies*. Volume 17. No. 2/2010. P. 53.

<sup>48</sup> Reho, F. O. & Rohac, D. (2017). *The Case for a Federal Europe*. American Enterprise Institute. P. 2.

<sup>49</sup> Weiler, J. (1999). *The transformation of Europe*. In *The constitution of Europe: 'Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor' and Other Essays on European Integration*. Cambridge. Passim.

<sup>50</sup> Reho, F. O. & Rohac, D. (2017). *The Case for a Federal Europe*. American Enterprise Institute. P. 4.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Cf: Ibid. P. 5-7.

<sup>53</sup> Siedentop, L. (2001). *Democracy in Europe*. London. Penguin Books. Passim.

federalization.<sup>54</sup> Negative solidarity lies in members believing fiscal consequences of solidarity are more important than the social consequences and it protects the sovereignty of the Member States against the delegation of competencies to a higher level of government.<sup>55</sup>

What would it mean in the field of CSDP? The Treaty of Lisbon converged more sectors with the European Union's and policy areas including CFSP, to which from now on QMV was extended, making the decision process faster and more efficient.<sup>56</sup> To change intergovernmental bodies with supranational structures<sup>57</sup> has enough support, because it is seen as the solution for empowering Europe.<sup>58</sup> This is where decentralized federalism comes into play. Giving the Union policy competences and allowing majority decision-making in policy areas such as military command and at the same time granting flexibility and discretion to the states in the application of central rules.<sup>59</sup>

To conclude, more power to the European Union, would help to better stand by the common values and take on more responsibility over security, and other functions would be decentralized in turn.

### 8.3 CSDP cooperation with NATO

EU strategy for the 2020s<sup>60</sup> urges Europe to take a position in the great power rivalry. Biscop called Europe out for being either a puppet of the USA or a "*cynical free-rider on American military might, which, behind a façade of lofty rhetoric on values, pursues*

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<sup>54</sup> Weiler, J. (1999). The transformation of Europe. In *The constitution of Europe: 'Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor' and Other Essays on European Integration*. Cambridge. Passim.

<sup>55</sup> Trein, P. (2020). Federal dynamics, solidarity, and European Union crisis politics. *Journal of European Public Policy*. Volume 27. No. 7/2020. P. 1.

<sup>56</sup> Kim, N. & Jung, S. (2010). Democratic Deficit, European Constitution, and a Vision of the Federal Europe: The EU's Path after the Lisbon Treaty. *Journal of International and Area Studies*. Volume 17. No. 2/2010. P. 64.

<sup>57</sup> Reho, F. O. & Rohac, D. (2017). *The Case for a Federal Europe*. American Enterprise Institute. P. 7.

<sup>58</sup> Biscop, S. (2013). *Europe and the World or Snow White and the Seven Fallacies*. Egmont Paper 61. Gent. Academia Press. Passim.

<sup>59</sup> Hix, S. (2018). Decentralised federalism: A new model for the EU. In B. Martill & U. Staiger (Eds.), *Brexit and Beyond: Rethinking the Futures of Europe*. UCL Press. P. 72-73.

<sup>60</sup> Biscop, S. (2020). No peace from corona: defining EU strategy for the 2020s. *Journal of European Integration*. Volume 42. No. 8/2020.

only its own economic advantage<sup>61</sup>. The author said that Europe should maintain NATO alliance but at the same time not simply join the USA's rivalry against China, EU needs to defend its interests as well.<sup>62</sup>

In the light of the 2008 Financial Crisis, Kashmeri suggested NATO's merger with the CSDP.<sup>63</sup> At the time, people had differing beliefs on NATO's relevance. Its dream of becoming a world-cop was said to be dying "*a slow death in the mountains of Afghanistan*".<sup>64</sup> Although the years to follow, less so with Georgia in 2008 but then more acutely with Ukraine in 2014 have changed the image of NATO a lot. In 2015 Biscop wrote about Europe's dependence in the area of defence and encouraged Europeans to take responsibility for their crisis management, reminding that NATO's purpose has evolved a great deal from trying to stop Soviet invasion.<sup>65</sup> Furthermore, NATO is said to see the VJTF as an Article 5 measure that has to be initiated by the Europeans and the EU.<sup>66</sup>

Kashmeri reason for making the CSDP primary force in Europe is that neither EU nor NATO has an army, both use the input from their member states, the organizations' military staffs cannot officially collaborate due to Cyprus-Turkey conflict, and the duplication is largely paid by the European taxpayers.<sup>67</sup> The pressure on Member States' defence budgets creates small clusters of cooperation, because cutting off a little from every capability no longer works, they are facing a choice which units to disperse completely.<sup>68</sup> On the other hand, NATO's value is being an alternative option when a

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<sup>61</sup> Biscop, S. (2020). No peace from corona: defining EU strategy for the 2020s. *Journal of European Integration*. Volume 42. No. 8/2020. P. 1011.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid. Passim.

<sup>63</sup> Cf. Kashmeri, S. A. (2010). Save NATO: Merge it with CSDP. Atlantic Council.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid. P. 1.

<sup>65</sup> Biscop, S. (2015). The state of defence in Europe: dependence, deterrence and deployment. *Global Affairs*. Volume 1. No. 2/2015. Passim.

<sup>66</sup> Biscop, S. (2015). The state of defence in Europe: dependence, deterrence and deployment. *Global Affairs*. Volume 1. No. 2/2015. P. 171.

<sup>67</sup> Kashmeri, S. A. (2010). Save NATO: Merge it with CSDP. Atlantic Council. P. 3.

<sup>68</sup> Biscop, S. (2015). The state of defence in Europe: dependence, deterrence and deployment. *Global Affairs*. Volume 1. No. 2/2015. P. 178-179.

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CSDP operation is not preferred and gives the possibility to select the structure for an operation case-by-case<sup>69</sup>.

In his 2020 article<sup>70</sup>, Sven Biscop says that there is no lack in initiative, just ambition. In addition to PESCO and its EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core (CROC), there is continually a role for NATO. Or rather, CROC could play a part for NATO as one of its army corps. Biscop suggests that in order to meet the targets for NATO Defence Planning Process and EU's Capability Development Plan, the processes should be joined. What is more, working on NATO and EU's co-decision on defence planning is also feasible. The article ends similarly to the ones preceding it: reminding that Europeans should be able to fight for their interests and not hope for others to do it for them.<sup>71</sup>

EU-NATO relations need to align with what is actually happening, addressing e.g. China's aggressions in South-China Sea in a way that is aligned with respective interests and be able to have different opinions without using sanctions. Therefore, Europe needs to increase its dependence from other powers to defend its sovereignty and be able to choose its battles.

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<sup>69</sup> Biscop, S. (2015). The state of defence in Europe: dependence, deterrence and deployment. *Global Affairs*. Volume 1. No. 2/2015. P. 172-173.

<sup>70</sup> Biscop, S. (2020). Battalions to Brigades: The Future of European Defence. *Survival, Global Politics and Strategy*. Volume 62. No. 5/2020.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.* Passim.

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## 9. Discussion of Results and personal Conclusions

### 9.1 Discussion of Results

In this chapter the author will answer the research questions. What are the weaknesses of the existing security and defence policy institutions on a decision making level and what are the strengths of the new work order? What weaknesses could the new order compensate? The first two questions will be answered by looking at the summary of decision making procedures and the institutions' roles which is presented in Table 1.

The columns below "importance of institutional developments" illustrate whether the new committee, directorate-general or the council of ministers could affect the decision (+) or not (-).

Table 1 shows that the biggest role is played by the Council. If the decision process remains unchanged, they will be the biggest force behind fulfilling CSDP and CFSP goals. Most decision are made unanimously and could slow down the implementation process. Admittedly the importance of the European Parliament lies in supranational decision-making procedures. The Commission's role remains the same.

When considering the European Parliament's proposal to develop institutions to match the policy, the change would be positive in work efficiency and neutral in inter-institutional cooperation. The CDM, DG-DEF and SEDE would be able to do more with the new work order and defined responsibility. Proposals will be more impactful and better coordinated across the main institutions. Figure 1 shows that creating new institutions will not make the work order more complicated.

The reasons for "needing a defence minister" are now evident. But under which institution will he be placed? When working in an intragovernmental setting within the Council, the Defence Minister would coordinate defence related questions similarly to the HR/VP and decisions would still be mostly taken unanimously. On the other hand, if the European Union wants to become a Defence Union, decisions about common defence will need a supranational process and the creation of the Defence Minister post would be within the powers of the Commission.

Decision making procedures		Roles of existing institutions			Developments		
		The Council	The Commission	EP	CDM	DG-DEF	SEDE
Intragovernmental	Enhanced cooperation procedure	QMV	Proposal	Consent	+	+	+
	Enhanced cooperation procedure in the field of CFSP	Application to the Council, HR opinion Unanimity	-	Informed	+	-	-
	Procedure for decisions in foreign affairs	Unanimity	Proposal	Informed	+	+	-
Supranational	Ordinary legislative procedure	QMV/ Unanimity *	Proposal	Simple majority	+	+	+
	Consent procedure	Forward the draft	Proposal	Absolute majority	+	+	+
	Conclusion of international agreements	QMV/ Unanimity CFSP*	(HR)/Presents recommendations	Informed/ consent CFSP*	+	+	+
	Quasi-constitutional procedures	Unanimity	Proposal	Consultation	+	+	+

**Table 1:** Summary of roles in decision-making procedures.<sup>72</sup>

What could be the political consequences of delegating defence related powers to the European Union?

Giving authority to decide on defence matters to the European Union level could be considered a big step towards the federalization of the Union. A federal Europe is seen as a satisfactory outcome in the pursuit for an “ever closer union”. Many authors support a decentralized federal European Union, because if it is able to lessen Euroscepticism, it could also improve solidarity and that in turn furthers the Common Security and Defence Plan.

<sup>72</sup> Table created by the author.

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European Union's most important partner is NATO and its support to Europe's defence is important. Will the creation of a Defence Minister diminish cooperation between the two organizations? That is difficult to predict because as seen from reports, most states' ambitions are related to their budget. If the new work order could give the same or even better service, EU-NATO joint operations would continue. A stronger and more unified message sent by the EU through the Defence Minister could help align respective goals and enhance the merger that was suggested in 2010 by Kashmeri<sup>73</sup> and also in 2020 by Biscop<sup>74</sup>.

The cons of delegating defence related powers to the EU are the danger of fragmentation due to democratic deficit and lack of Member States' solidarity when a region should feel that their needs are not met or well represented. Regarding cooperation with NATO, Member States could start investing in the Union's military industry and a clearer European message could create more diverging opinions. Since membership of the two organizations overlaps to a great degree, conflicts should not arise. Stronger cooperation among the European states would mean a stronger NATO. In the end, the most valuable shared aspect between NATO and the CSDP is cooperation and while enhancing cooperation among European states, this should be done without weakening the transatlantic relations.

## 9.2 Conclusions

The last research question combines the answers to the previous three and concludes this essay. How justified are the needs for a new work order considering its capabilities and political consequences?

When looking at the possible rise in decision making efficiency and speed, things could either get better or stay relatively same. So a hope for a better work order is justifiable enough. Even when the proposal ends in just creating new bodies to help coordinate CSDP related policies between the institutions, it would still create a positive change. And yet there is considerable hope of these structural changes to go hand in hand with

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<sup>73</sup> Cf: Kashmeri, S. A. (2010). Save NATO: Merge it with CSDP. Atlantic Council.

<sup>74</sup> Cf: Biscop, S. (2020). Battalions to Brigades: The Future of European Defence. Survival, Global Politics and Strategy. Volume 62. No. 5/2020.



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enhancing defence cooperation and joint capability building. By creating the position of HR/VP, the new “foreign minister” offered more stable relations for the European Union<sup>75</sup>, there is a strong belief that the defence minister can further this cause.

Political consequences are in accordance with the EU’s strategic priorities: a stronger Europe protecting itself from terrorism, cybercrime and hybrid threats and strengthening security research and innovation.<sup>76</sup> The possible federalization of the Union as well as a stronger message and coordination with NATO can have positive impact on holding priorities. Federalization would help capability development and EU-NATO codecision would make the EU a stronger power. And therefore, also a stronger ally of the USA.

*„Specifically as regards security and defence, we want to promote the EU’s interests and values as well as its resilience and preparedness to effectively tackle all security threats and challenges. We reaffirm that, in the face of increased global instability, the EU needs to take more responsibility for its security.“<sup>77</sup>*

These institutional changes and their political consequences can help fulfil the European Council’s statement.

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<sup>75</sup> Kim, N. & Jung, S. (2010). Democratic Deficit, European Constitution, and a Vision of the Federal Europe: The EU’s Path after the Lisbon Treaty. *Journal of International and Area Studies*. Volume 17. No. 2/2010. P. 54.

<sup>76</sup> European Commission (2021). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. COM 645. Strasbourg.

<sup>77</sup> European Council (2021). Statement of the Members of the European Council SN 2/21. Brussels. Version as of 26-2-21.

## **10. Annexes**

### **10.1 List of Abbreviations**

1. AFET – Committee on Foreign Affairs
2. CDM – Council of Defence Ministers
3. CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy
4. CSDP – Common Security and Defence Policy
5. DG-DEF – Directorate-General for Defence
6. EDA – European Defence Agency
7. EEAS – European External Action Service
8. EP – European Parliament
9. EU – European Union
10. EUFOR CROC – European Union Force Crisis Response Operation Core
11. FAC – Foreign Affairs Council
12. HR – The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
13. NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
14. PSC – Political and Security Committee
15. QMV – qualified majority voting
16. SEDE – (sub)committee on Security and Defence
17. USA – United States of America

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1. Figure 1: The relations between institutions regarding CSDP related work including proposed institutional developments. Page 12.

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## 10.3 List of Tables

1. Table 1: Summary of roles in decision-making procedures. Page 19.

## 10.4 List of Literature

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  5. Homepage of European Commission. Page What the Commission is doing. URL: [https://ec.europa.eu/info/topics/defence\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/info/topics/defence_en). [12-11-21].
  6. Homepage of European Parliament. Page The Committees of the European Parliament. URL: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/about-parliament/en/organisation-and-rules/organisation/committees>. [6-11-21].
  7. Homepage of European Parliament. Page Intergovernmental decision-making procedures. URL: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/9/intergovernmental-decision-making-procedures>. [6-11-21].
  8. Homepage of European Parliament. Page Supranational decision-making procedures. URL: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/8/supranational-decision-making-procedures>. [6-11-21].

## 11. Affidavit

I declare that I have written the present essay independently and on my own. I have clearly marked any language or ideas borrowed from other sources as not my own and documented their sources. The essay does not contain any work that I have handed in or have had graded as a previous scientific paper earlier on.

I am aware that any failure to do so constitutes plagiarism. Plagiarism is the presentation of another person's thoughts or words as if they were my own – even if I summarize, paraphrase, condense, cut, rearrange, or otherwise alter them.

I am aware of the consequences and sanctions plagiarism entails. Among others, consequences may include nullification of the essay, exclusion from participation in the CSDP Olympiad. These consequences also apply retrospectively, i.e. if plagiarism is discovered after the essay has been accepted and graded. I am fully aware of the scope of these consequences.

.....  
(Sergeant Iida Elise Murumets)

Tartu, Estonia in November 2021



# **Effects of pandemic onto Common Security and Defence Policy**

Essay

Created for the CSDP Olympiad 2022  
in Salon de Provence – France

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Varna, November 2021

## Abstract

In the European history, there have been numerous pandemics, including smallpox, cholera, plague, typhus, syphilis, Spanic Flu, Ebola, and AIDS, as well as a SARS-CoV outbreak from 2002 to March 2003.<sup>1</sup>

All of these diseases also seem to be dangerous, but when the SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19) pandemic struck in early 2020, governments and international organisations were put under unprecedented strain.

The crisis resurfaced previously unresolved concerns about missions and operations, cyber security, capacity building, and medical infrastructure. All of which aspects are directly related to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

The CSDP establishes a framework for the European Union (EU) and its member states' crisis management and risk assessment capacities, which have been discovered to have serious deficiencies as an escalation of the crisis is demonstrated.

As a result, an immediate and efficient solution was necessary. The European Council (EC) adopted two approaches to better manage the situation: post-mortem and future-oriented.<sup>2</sup> The first analyzes the effects of the pandemic, which has been in place for two years. The other tries to anticipate the future impact on global life and events.

Given the current scenario, the one of EU's main objectives – social and territorial cohesion, as well as solidarity among its members and the neighbouring countries, has taken on even greater significance.

European organisations advocate for the consolidation of capabilities and cooperation in the fight against the Coronavirus because no government has the resources to deal with the crisis on its own. Even though there is a need for social isolation and minimisation in face-to-face interactions.

Keywords: COVID-19, pandemic, CSDP, EU, effects.

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<sup>1</sup> Cf.: Cohn, S.K. (2012). Pandemics: waves of disease, waves of hate from the Plague of Athens to A.I.D.S. Historical Research. Volume 85. P. 535-555.

<sup>2</sup> Cf.: Policy Department for External Relations & Directorate General for External Policies of the Union. (2021). IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS: How the COVID-19 crisis has affected security and defence-related aspects of the EU. PE 653.623 - January 2021. P. 4.

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## 2. Preface

As a future doctor and a recovered COVID-19 patient, I am constantly confronted with the pandemic's impacts. As a medical student, I notice the virus's effects and their reflection on education systems, healthcare systems and restrictions of sports and social activities. All of which have a direct influence on the individual's mental state and motivation to study and perform routine everyday tasks.

Furthermore, as a future officer, I am well-versed in the structures and operations of the EU, as well as how they are affected directly and indirectly by the Coronavirus. The military's consequences of the virus are not to be overlooked in their seriousness too. This pandemic situation is incredibly difficult – not only for medical personnel – but also for political and military organisations entrusted with determining the course of action. Both the medicals and the armed forces were on the front line (literally and metaphorically) in the uneven fight with the Coronavirus.

As a future military doctor, I am dedicated to combining two very distinct careers. Both the military and the medical aspects are equally significant as they embody the principles that propelled the formation of the European Union as a political and economic organisation – unity, mutual help, security and stability, discrimination exclusion and respect for diversity.

I would want to take this opportunity to thank my parents for their unwavering guidance and encouragement. Their never-ending motivation and inspiration were the main driving force behind my career choice and development as a person.

This essay is in honour of my great-grandfather, Ivan Petrov Mitev, who served in World War II and succeeded in returning home safely and all those killed in the line of duty with the unequal battle against the Coronavirus.

### 3. Introduction

#### 3.1 Evolution of Coronaviruses

Coronaviruses are a large family of viruses that were initially discovered in 1965 as a cause of common cold in humans. They are so-called because of their crown-like structure. Although there are seven coronaviruses that may infect people, the majority of Coronaviruses infect animals such as bats, camels, and cattle.

In 2002, the first SARS-CoV outbreak was discovered in Southern China, and it quickly spread to 28 countries, infecting 8000 and killing 774. At the time, the virus caused fever, headaches, and respiratory problems, including coughing and shortness of breath.

But how did SARS-CoV-2 (causing COVID-19) emerge?

The SARS-CoV-2 virus, which had previously infected animals through animal-to-animal contact, is thought to have "jumped" to people at Wuhan's open markets. Those are locations where customers can buy fresh (killed-on-spot) meat, fish and banned species as cobras, wild boars, and racoon dogs.<sup>3</sup> Then, from a minor illness through an epidemic, COVID-19 progressed into a global pandemic.

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<sup>3</sup> Cf.: Bhargava, D. (2021). Coronavirus History. WebMD Medical Reference. Article.

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### 3.2 COVID-19's Impacts on Security

To understand the impacts, we should first define the term security: Security is a state of mind where all risks are being managed in a way that allows citizens to go about their normal life.<sup>4</sup>

With the pandemic influencing the CSDP, security and the international landscape are severely compromised. As a result, peacekeeping operations in hotspots throughout the world have been halted. Furthermore, we are witnessing an increase in the rate of violence in third countries, leading to decreased stability in these regions. Capacity building operations were discontinued, as well.<sup>5</sup>

Secondly, with the implementation of the measures to limit the spread of COVID-19, there was a significant digital upheaval. This raised awareness of potential cyber security threats, as well as the need for better and more effective methods of preventing cyberattacks.

Another point of discussion is the impact on the function of the medical infrastructure. Due to the pandemic's severity, there were shortages of hospital beds and therapeutics for the treatment of chronic and non-Covid-related illnesses. In addition, medical personnel has been subjected to extreme stress to match expectations and help patients, resulting in an increased numbers of COVID-19 cases among healthcare workers.

The pressure on healthcare systems was so significant that the military stepped in to help with disinfection, allowing access to military hospitals, and constructing field hospitals. In addition, military planes and helicopters were used to transfer urgent patients.<sup>6</sup> This led to an increased risk not only for the military staff, but also for EU organisations' personnel and civilians.

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<sup>4</sup> Cf.: Policy Department for External Relations & Directorate General for External Policies of the Union. (2021). Op.cit. P. 10-13.

<sup>5</sup> Policy Department for External Relations & Directorate General for External Policies of the Union. (2021). Op. cit. Passim.


<sup>6</sup> Cf.: Ibid. P. 26.

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## 4. Current State of Research

### 4.1 COVID-19 in the Time of Writing

Globally, as of 5:11 pm CET, 5 November 2021, there have been 248,467,363 confirmed cases of COVID-19, including 5,027,183 deaths, reported to WHO. As of 5



November 2021, a total of 7,027,377,238 vaccine doses have been administered.<sup>7</sup>

**Figure 1:** Cases per 100 000 population in the time of writing.<sup>8</sup>

### 4.2 Direct Impacts

The direct impacts on the CSDP affect military personnel, as well as the staff in European control organisations. One notable illustration is the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt. Due to inadequately imposed social distancing measures, 1271 sailors (26.6 per cent) of the carrier's 4779 crew tested positive for COVID-19 on board. This resulted in diversion of the ship to the U.S Naval Base Guam. The confirmed cases

<sup>7</sup> Cf.: WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19). Dashboard. URL: <https://covid19.who.int>. [5-11-21].

<sup>8</sup> Homepage of European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. COVID-19 situation update worldwide, as of week 44, updated 11 November 2021. URL: <https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/geographical-distribution-2019-ncov-cases>. [7-11-21].



of COVID-19 were put into isolation and people with one or more negative results (but with previous contact with infected) were put in quarantine.<sup>9</sup> This led to the halt of the majority of the operations performed on the ship.

Another direct consequence is the number of infected healthcare professionals (152,888<sup>10</sup> worldwide) who assisted COVID-19 patients. As a result, hospital staffing levels were reduced, leading to less healthcare being provided at the most inconvenient times. Military doctors also put their health at risk to benefit society by building field hospitals, assisting civilian colleagues, and providing help in low-economy regions affected by the COVID-19 outbreaks.

Thirdly, the imposed measures have a direct impact on the behaviour of the residents. Hard measures instil fear of the unknown and unfaithfulness, which leads to events of strikes and other forms of protest.<sup>11</sup> This causes additional tension and dislocates the focus from performing actions against the upcoming financial, healthcare, economic and cultural crisis. In such instances, the deployment of police and military personnel is required to quell the uprisings.

### **4.3 Indirect Impacts**

#### **4.3.1 Peace and Stability in Third-World Countries**

The indirect aspects of the pandemic are related to the military missions, operations, and general activity. Not all countries and nations are affected uniformly by the pandemic. Some are greater than others. However, third-world countries are affected both by the pandemic and its indirect consequences.

To elaborate, I shall first state that by April 2020 all training operations have ceased or been placed on hold by the outbreak of COVID-19. Civilian Planning and Conduct

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<sup>9</sup> Cf.: Kasper, M&Geibe, J. (2020). An Outbreak of Covid-19 on an Aircraft Carrier. N Engl J Med 2020. Article.

<sup>10</sup> Cf.: Bandyopadhyay S, Baticulon RE, Kadhum M, et al. (2020). Infection and mortality of healthcare workers worldwide from COVID-19: a systematic review. BMJ Global Health 2020. 5:e003097. Article.

<sup>11</sup> Cf.: Policy Department for External Relations & Directorate General for External Policies of the Union. (2021). Op. cit. P. 11ff.

Capability (CPCC) and the Member States initiated recalling the deployed troops which left the mission in Mali with fifty per cent working staff by April 3rd.<sup>12</sup> As a result, peacekeeping efforts suffered regression from their pre-COVID levels. Also, The Democratic Republic of Congo has witnessed an increase in the violence in the east region. In other countries, tension rose, as well, as people sought to punish those spreading the virus in the pursuit of justice.<sup>13</sup>

#### **4.3.2 Media Disinformation and Propagandistic Movements**

As state authorities were preoccupied with the approaching waves and crises of the pandemic, certain groupings took advantage of the situation and exploited the current condition of weakness. As a result, there has been a rise in misinformation, propagandistic movements, and attempts to undermine government's efforts to solve the crisis with eye-catching but no-legitimate titles. Another concern for the citizens was the rising surveillance which was first implemented in China to supervise the full lockdown. Later this intrusive surveillance has found its way towards Europe.<sup>14</sup>

#### **4.3.3 Economic, Financial and External Relations Impacts**

COVID-19 pandemic also gave its effects on the global economy as countries enforced great lockdowns and experienced massive financial losses. This is evident given that the global growth for 2020 was - 4.4 per cent.<sup>15</sup>

External relations and peace negotiations were severely hindered as face-to-face interactions were impossible. This led to increased IT development, which partly benefited continuing the peace process in some areas.

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<sup>12</sup> Cf.: Homepage of EUTM Mali. AN EXPECTED REDEPLOYMENT AND RESUMPTION OF ACTIVITIES. EUTM Mali Press. URL: <https://eutmmali.eu/an-expected-redeployment-and-resumption-of-activities/>. [7-11-21].

<sup>13</sup> Cf.: Policy Department for External Relations & Directorate General for External Policies of the Union. (2021). Op. cit. P. 11.

<sup>14</sup> Cf.: Ibid. P. 12.

<sup>15</sup> Cf.: International Monetary Fund. (2020). World Economic Outlook: A Long and Difficult Ascent. Washington, DC, October. Full Report 2020. P. 27-30.

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On the other hand, relations between Member states have improved as a consequence of joint efforts in scientific research and development of COVID-19 vaccines.

## 5. Research Gap

According to the up-mentioned aspects and broad spectrum of investigation, some topics are still not researched at all or not enough.

During the time of the writing of this essay I realized how severely COVID-19 has affected human's life, especially the security.

In terms of security successfully applicable theory is The Securitization/Desecuritization of the Copenhagen School.<sup>16</sup> Securitization is a process of when regular political issues are being transformed into national security problems. But in what margins health and education crises are security crises and which spheres does national security cover? Isn't COVID-19 excessively Securitized?

Another aspect of great security power is monitoring, intelligence and early detection of potential threats. But how does the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) work and does it have reliable and timely health information in order to detect future outbreaks early?

## 6. Research Questions

The first main question to answer in this essay is:

1. What are the direct and indirect effects of COVID-19 pandemic onto CSDP?

A sub-question is necessary for better understanding of the importance of the topic and the first main question:

- 1.1. Is COVID-19 excessively Securitized?

The second main question of this essay is:

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<sup>16</sup> Cf.: Diskaya, A. (2013) Towards a Critical Securitization Theory: The Copenhagen and Aberystwyth Schools of Security Studies. Aberystwyth University. Article.

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## 2. What are the long-term effects of the pandemic?


Another sub-question is needed to support the second main question.

### 2.1. What are the EU efforts for monitoring and solving the crisis?

With answering the Research Questions, I attempt to provide the reader with a greater knowledge of the COVID-19 relation with EU, CSDP and life in general.

## 7. Methodology

The chosen methodology for answering the Research Questions and gathering knowledge for the writing of the essay is a systematic and explicit method of identifying, evaluating, and synthesising relevant information from completed and published work produced by researchers and practitioners in the current sphere. To comply with the methodology chosen, I have sorted, observed, and analysed a wide range of literature, including EU reports, articles from reputable authors, academic journals and the online CSDP course. At last, I have interpreted the collected data through my viewpoint and values in order to present the current knowledge, explain the research findings and support the need for new research.



**Figure 2:** Methodology for answering the Research Questions.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Figure made by the author.

## **8. Research and Results of Research**

To answer the Research Questions, I have gathered knowledge through wide spectrum of EU reports and documents and presented them structured and logically.

### **8.1. Direct Impacts**

In answer of the first main question and as mentioned in Chapter 4, direct impacts pose a threat to military and EU organisations through infecting employees. By November 10, 2021, there were 251,698 confirmed cases of infected military personnel in the US army, with 2,272 hospitalized and 75 deaths.<sup>18</sup> Similar figures may be found in the armies of EU Member States which were also severely impacted by the virus. As a result, the number of military troops assigned to special operations and state sovereignty defence has been reduced. Consequently, simple attacks, terrorism, migrant invasions, bioweapons, bioterrorism and other state threats became a possibility for individual countries, as well as the EU. That is due to the fact that the majority of the seriously afflicted countries (including Bulgaria) are located on the periphery of the Union and serve as an external border.


Furthermore, the decision-making process was slowed down due to the infection of EU's staff and therefore lack of quality control and management.

### **8.2. Indirect Impacts**

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<sup>18</sup> Cf.: Homepage of U.S. Department of Defense. SPOTLIGHT: Coronavirus: DOD Response. URL: <https://www.defense.gov/Spotlights/Coronavirus-DOD-Response/>. [13-11-21].

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**Figure 3:** CSDP missions around the world and Coronavirus.<sup>19</sup>

Indirect effects have been associated with EU peacekeeping and humanitarian activities. Currently, 17 CSDP missions and operations with varying objectives are underway in various areas of the world.

Coronavirus hampered efforts by infecting deployed personnel and, secondary, by forcing EU institutions to recall their soldiers and suspend operations, thereby negating any progress achieved so far. Some nations regarded this as an opportunity to revert back to former regimes and reestablish the state of anarchy and lawlessness.

The military departure prompted mob violence in a number of regions, with The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) registering 1800 incidences of vigilantism.<sup>20</sup>

Another indirect factor was the mainstream media's increasing popularity in disseminating irrelevant and misleading statements, which resulted in a diminished trust in the government's competence in dealing with the crisis. Due to the prevalence of

<sup>19</sup> Cf.: Lazarou, E. (2020). CSDP missions and coronavirus. EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service. PE 651.967 – June 2020. P. 1-2f.

<sup>20</sup> The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). (2021). A YEAR OF COVID-19: THE PANDEMIC'S IMPACT ON GLOBAL CONFLICT AND DEMONSTRATION TRENDS. Report. Passim.

misinformation, individuals are unable to get credible and trustworthy information, in order to make an educated decision, particularly in the context of vaccination.

Without a doubt, the pandemic is a significant factor in the escalating economic and financial crisis. Because of the substantial expenditures required by the Coronavirus countermeasures, the GBP sank to - 4,4 in 2020, a considerable drop. The majority of the governments restricted the work and utility of vital economic sectors such as tourism, culture, transport, shipping, restaurant and hotel enterprises, etc. Governments also activated their crisis budgets, which were the final viable source of funding to support the affected industries and lessen the burden exerted on them.

Furthermore, the high infection rate, paired with the unprepared healthcare facilities and disfunctioning enterprises, put pressure on healthcare systems, depleting critical resources such as masks, protective gear, hospital beds, oxygen, etc.

To summarise, COVID-19 has serious implications for the CSDP in terms of infecting EU and military personnel (direct impact) and impeding CSDP-mandated military and civil actions and operations (indirect impact).

### **8.3. Is COVID-19 Excessively Securitized?**

To answer the sub-question of the first main question I will use the following theory. The Securitization theory of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies defines security as a mean of survival. That is, a security risk is identified as anything that poses a threat to an object and, as such, must be addressed immediately and with drastic measures.<sup>21</sup>

The core argument of the Copenhagen Securitization theory is that in foreign politics, anything becomes an issue when an individual claims that rather than posing a genuine threat to national security. This empowers the actors to subject what they perceive to be a danger and handle it with exceptional measures, but that is not always necessary. This is accomplished by a securitizing actor undertaking a securitizing manoeuvre to elevate the problem from the political sphere to the highest level of state or (inter)national security. The main security related reason concerning COVID-19 is that it might be utilized as a bioweapon, such as anthrax, but is COVID-19 a genuine risk?

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<sup>21</sup> Cf.: Wright, I. (2021). Are We at War? The Politics of Securitizing the Coronavirus. Monash University. Article.f.

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Initially, the virus was declared a security threat by the presidents of the majority of states. In the context of the pandemic, for example, French President Emmanuel Macron repeatedly stated: "*Nous sommes en guerre*,"<sup>22</sup>, which translates as "We are at war." This clearly expressed global political sentiments and encouraged the securitization move.

The securitization of COVID-19 facilitated the deployment of police and military forces on the streets throughout numerous states to sustain the emergency measures. This culminated in ongoing violence, which was blocked by the utilization of weapons such as tear gas and batons on civilians, with several people being shot and killed as a consequence. That action was performed as a response of the over Securitization of the Coronavirus crisis, that resulted in such brutal militaristic methods of addressing the issue, which might have been handled better in politics. The Copenhagen School of Security Studies refers to this phenomenon as a "security trap" in which certain military measures instil greater fear and unfaithfulness in individuals rather than establish a sense of security and serenity.

Furthermore, the ramifications of the Securitization sparked conflicts between states around the world, as American President Donald Trump referred to the virus as a "Chinese Virus,"<sup>23</sup> alleging China being the source of the threat as there was the initial outbreak. Rather than viewing COVID-19 as a common threat, nations started to recognise one another as adversaries.

The Securitization had also good impacts as the governments focused their efforts and raised awareness giving the virus a priority status. This had its results in the quick research and developing of the vaccines.

To summarise the answer of the first sub-question, COVID-19 could be overly securitized, but this has its advantages and disadvantages.

#### **8.4. Long-term Effects of the Pandemic**

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<sup>22</sup> Emmanuel Macron, "Adresse Aux Français du Président de La République Emmanuel Macron," Élysée, March 16, 2020. Television Address. URL: <https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2020/03/16/adresse-aux-francais-covid19>. [17-11-21].

<sup>23</sup> Donald Trump, Twitter Post, March 18, 2020, 10:46PM, URL: <https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1240243188708839424>. [16-11-21].

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To begin with the answer to the second main question, one of the most significant long-term effects of the pandemic is the reduced aviation traffic. Aircraft companies face revenue losses as a result of the restrictions introduced to counteract COVID-19. Air travel losses are a major source of concern, since the aviation industry is one of the most important actors in the economy.


The expression "long-term effects" implies a negative connotation. COVID-19 does not necessarily have only negative consequences, particularly long-term.

Secondly, in reaction to the Coronavirus outbreak, the EU invited all Member States to engage in Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), thereby stabilising the states' external relations. As a result, long-standing disputes between countries were settled and international sentiments were rekindled.

Additionally, the pandemic accelerated technology development and innovation, resulting in the generation of newer and potent cyber capabilities. This was a promising indicator for the military's remaining missions and operations. However, the necessity for new defence strategies to prevent cyber-attacks was also introduced.<sup>24</sup>

## 8.5. EU Efforts for Monitoring and Solving the Crisis

Regarding the second sub-question, I shall outline the most significant EU-imposed



measures in a chronological order.

**Figure 4:** EU efforts for monitoring and solving the crisis in a chronological order.<sup>25</sup>

The EU Civil Protection Mechanism was created on 28 January 2020, following the first European case of Coronavirus reported on 24 January 2020 in France and the activation of the Early Warning and Response System (EWRS) warning message. Three days later, the first EUR 10 million in financing for research on the novel Coronavirus were mobilised.

On February 1st and 2nd, EU citizens residing in vulnerable places around the world were repatriated. 447 EU individuals were ultimately returned from Wuhan with the help of France and Germany, as well as the EU Civil Protection Mechanism.

On February 24, the European Commission (EC) announced a new aid package totaling EUR 232 million to assist its Member States and front-line medical personnel. Four days later, a cooperative purchase of protective gear was initiated. A month later, EU standards for clinical applications were made openly available in terms of facilitating rapid manufacture and market placement, while also ensuring a high level of security. Furthermore, with the introduction of "green lines" was ensured the uninterrupted flow of products on the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) to serve the Member States.

The EU's solidarity with the Western Balkans and Eastern Neighbourhood was reinforced by the allocation of EUR 140 million and the deployment of existing mechanisms worth EUR 700 million to help mitigate the socioeconomic effects of the Coronavirus outbreak and therefore implemented lockdowns and restrictions. Support was offered also for socioeconomically disadvantaged countries and emergencies.

Additionally, in April, data sharing and monitoring platforms for academics were developed in order to aid rapid data collection and sharing. The portal is part of the ERAvsCorona Action Plan, which encourages collaboration in the battle against the virus.

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<sup>25</sup> Figure made by the author.

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Later in June, the European Investment Bank (EIB) authorized a EUR 100 million funding to BioNTech for COVID-19 vaccine research. BioNTech was the first EU company to commence clinical testing, first in Germany and then in the United States, in early May. Later that month, the European Commission proposed an European strategy for researching, producing, and distributing vaccines.

On August 27, the European Commission signed the first contract with AstraZeneca, negotiating the purchase of 300 million doses of vaccines with an option for an additional 100 000 doses. The contract also gives opportunity for excess quantities to be donated to low- and middle-income countries. Contracts were established with other vaccine producers such as Jonson & Jonson, Moderna, and several others.

On October 18, the EU Digital COVID Certificate was announced as one of the key components of Europe's pandemic response, with over 591 million certificates generated not only in the eurozone, but globally. The granting of such certificate enabled for the gradual reintroduction of tourism, travel, cultural life, and restaurant businesses.

On December 21, the European Commission approved BioNTech and Pfizer as the first safe and effective vaccine in Europe. Then, by the end of December, the Member States acquired early access.

The EU Recovery and Resilience Facility as a recovery plan, was adopted on February 11, 2021. Six days later, the "HERA Incubator" was certified, allowing researchers and scientists to detect new mutations and aid in the discovery and refinement of current and upcoming vaccines.

By the 31st of August, 70% of the EU adult population had been completely vaccinated, with the entire course of vaccination completed.

Last but not least, on October 22nd, the European Commission announced a portfolio of the ten most promising COVID-19 therapeutics that will be available in all Member States once approved by the European Medicines Agency (EMA).<sup>26</sup>

In addition, the military forces have played a key role in national crisis response. This mostly consisted of general support such as command and control, logistics, public-area

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<sup>26</sup> Cf.: Homepage of European Commission. Coronavirus response. Timeline of EU Action. URL: [https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/coronavirus-response/timeline-eu-action\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/coronavirus-response/timeline-eu-action_en). [15-11-21].

disinfection, and help to the police. Military medical services, such as: providing access to military hospitals and constructing temporary hospitals in public areas, have increased civilian health system capacity while alleviating demand on public hospitals.<sup>27</sup>

Soldiers from the 1st Battalion, The Yorkshire Regiment, on the other hand, were sent to the front lines of the COVID-19 fight in addition to their military fatigues. While doing antigen testing on members of the public, they were required to wear plastic aprons and face shields.<sup>28</sup> This circumstance is another example of the armed forces' missions shifting, with 95 percent of actions in peacetime, aiding the public arena and only 5 percent taking place in the military domain.

To summarise, the EU has taken effective steps to develop vaccines and treatments for the virus, to promote and support Coronavirus research and monitoring, as well as to aid its Member States in combatting the outbreak through funding and civil and military forces reinforcement. However, vaccination of a large percentage of the population is the most reasonable solution to the problem.

## **9. Discussion of Results and personal Conclusions**

### **9.1. Discussion of Results**

To summarise, the pandemic has an impact on the CSDP and will almost certainly have long-term effects in terms of military, civil planning and organisation, as well as better strategies for detecting and combating future outbreaks of infectious diseases, bioweapons and bioterrorism. One significant component is that the COVID-19 crisis brought to the surface long-standing issues, the resolution of which has been postponed.

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<sup>27</sup> Cf.: Policy Department for External Relations & Directorate General for External Policies of the Union. (2021). Op.cit. P. 25-27.

<sup>28</sup> Cf.: Smith-Spark, L. (2020). Military forces drafted in as Europe risks being overwhelmed by Covid cases. CNN Article.

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This was a convincing argument for them to be managed and resolved on behalf of Member States or long-standing adversaries.

Despite the hard situation and the distraction of the forces while contributing to the battle with the virus, EU succeeded in protecting its borders from migrant crisis and continuing to exercise its missions and operations in the hotspots of the world.

The COVID-19 catastrophe provided us with vital economic and industrial lessons, since these sectors should adopt newer and better strategies to counteract similar crises and become more robust to disasters. Healthcare systems have also acquired significant data about necessary revision of mass-incident policies and procedures.

In addition, the EU has encouraged small and medium-sized businesses to enter the market by assisting with the internal supply of masks, protective gear, and first-aid supplies. This eased the market's load as customers began to stock up on necessities at the beginning of the pandemic, leaving the stores empty.

The EU imposed outstanding measures to assist its Member States and decrease the impact on their economies and healthcare systems. This was in light of substantial research funding for the development of reliable vaccines and treatment. Contracts with the companies that manufacture the first authorised vaccines were also signed promptly and dosages were supplied rapidly. Medical teams were dispatched to assist the most affected countries, as well.

Furthermore, massive recovery programmes were implemented in attempt to assist the economy return to pre-COVID levels.

Another key action was the introduction of the COVID-19 Digital Certificate, which is now accepted worldwide. This accomplishment substantially sped the immunisation process, allowing individuals to continue going out in public, visiting restaurants and hotels, travelling and involving in the tourism industry. As these were among the most affected industries, they started to recover their losses and resume normal functioning, refuelling the damaged economy. Also, the promotion of vaccination with the "green certificate" reduces the pressure on healthcare systems, since fewer people need acute medical care.

Governments will also need to consider establishing more secure and reliable information portals. One of the most fundamental challenges in this pandemic has been

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and continues to be misinformation in the media concerning vaccines and the overall direction of the crisis. As a result, ordinary citizens and those lacking in expertise are unable to make informed decisions or effectively analyse the situation. This resulted in great outpouring of discontent and unwillingness to execute the measures suggested by the leading EU medical organisations.

One thing that should have been done is creating an unique online platform not only for researches, but also for common people. Such information portal for COVID-19 spread, monitoring and vaccine information would have prevented the overall leak of false statements and would have helped the decision-making process. Such actors, advertising misleading information should have been liable to undergo criminal charges for endangering far too many human lives through incompetence and creation and dissemination of false information. Vaccination against COVID-19 is a right of choice for every individual. But what is essential for making the right choice is to receive actual and scientific-based information. Because vaccines may not prevent the infection, but they can prevent from losing all your favourite people by a disease for which there is free and effective immunisation.

## **9.2. Personal Conclusions**

As a medical student and a cadet, the last year and a half have been quite challenging for me. Every dimension of human life was changed, the most significant of which was the substantial reduction in social contacts. It is broadly acknowledged that humans are "social animals" and that communication and face-to-face interactions are vital for proper development and mental wellbeing.

On the other hand, I believe that the last year was an ideal opportunity for self-care and development in areas where we frequently do not have time to improve. The period was ideal for understanding one's inner self and identifying one's human values. Many

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people, I suppose, learnt during lockdowns that material goods are ephemeral and wealth is meaningless when you may not get a chance to spend it or when your loved ones are sick.

This past year and a half has been an ideal time to recognise that everyone, no matter how big or small, rich or poor, has responsibility. Everyone is responsible to himself and also to the society that we all live in. Responsibility – seen as a choice to make an informed decision in order to protect himself and others and to terminate this catastrophe.

I would like appeal to each and everyone with these wise words from Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission at the plenary session of the European Parliament on 26 March 2020:

*"We must look out for each other, we must pull each other through this. Because if there is one thing that is more contagious than this virus, it is love and compassion. And in the face of adversity, the people of Europe are showing how strong that can be."*<sup>29</sup>

I hope everyone could implement some of the European Union's values as a foundation of one better global society.

## 10. Annexes

### 10.1 List of Abbreviations

ACLED.....	The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
AIDS.....	Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
CET.....	Central European Time

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<sup>29</sup> Speech by President von der Leyen at the European Parliament Plenary on the European coordinated response to the COVID-19 outbreak. 26 March 2020. Brussels.

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CPCC.....	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CSDP.....	Common Security and Defence Policy
EC.....	European Council
ECDC.....	European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control
EIB.....	European Investment Bank
EMA.....	European Medicines Agency
EU.....	European Union
EWRS.....	Early Warning and Response System
IT.....	Information Technology
PESCO.....	Permanent Structured Cooperation
SARS.....	Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
TEN-T.....	Trans-European Transport Network
US.....	United States
USS.....	United States Ship
WHO.....	World Health Organisation

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### 10.3.1 Articles

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### 10.3.6 Speeches

01. Speech by President von der Leyen at the European Parliament Plenary on the European coordinated response to the COVID-19 outbreak. 26 March 2020. Brussels.

## 11. Affidavit

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I declare that I have written the present essay independently and on my own. I have clearly marked any language or ideas borrowed from other sources as not my own and documented their sources. The essay does not contain any work that I have handed in or have had graded as a previous scientific paper earlier on. I am aware that any failure to do so constitutes plagiarism. Plagiarism is the presentation of another person's thoughts or words as if they were my own – even if I summarize, paraphrase, condense, cut, rearrange, or otherwise alter them. I am aware of the consequences and sanctions plagiarism entails. Among others, consequences may include nullification of the essay, exclusion from participation in the CSDP Olympiad. These consequences also apply retrospectively, i.e. if plagiarism is discovered after the essay has been accepted and graded. I am fully aware of the scope of these consequences.

Signature

.....

(Cadet Antonia Pushkarova)

Varna, Bulgaria in November, 2021

# **The Danger of Fake News for Common Security and Defence Policy**

Essay

created for the CSDP Olympiad 2022

in Salon-de-Provence – France

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Warsaw, October 2021

## **Abstract and Keywords**

Controlling public opinion has become even easier these days thanks to the mass media. The Russian Federation is definitely one of the countries that have mastered this art perfectly. It is very important to note that the Russian Federation uses the ability to sow 'Fake News' to wage an offensive information war which has a real impact on the layout of contemporary state borders. In this essay, the author will show how important it is to have a skilful defence against this phenomenon on the example of the situation in Ukraine and the Crimean Referendum as well as what kind of threat the Russian Federation poses to the EU and what role the CDSF has in defending against it.

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## **2.Preface**

As a Polish citizen, I am not unfamiliar with the concept of disinformation being used to sow propaganda in a country due to the fact that Poland was under the Soviet sphere of influence until 1989. This was commonplace in the Eastern Bloc countries. As far as the offensive use of disinformation phenomenon is concerned, including one of the most popular tools to control public opinion like for example 'Fake News', I came across it while analysing the war in Ukraine and the Crimean Referendum.

I also owe part of my knowledge to the webinars that were organised between the Military Academy of Technology and the Zhytomyr War Institute as part of the NATO DEEP programme. The cadets from the Zhitomir War Institute opened my eyes to how important a problem Russian actions are, also for the EU. I would like to thank them for this, and I would also like to thank Msc Piotr Ciężki and PHD Wiesława Załoga for their help in collecting materials and also for making contact with the Ukrainian side.

## **3.Introduction**

The 20th century showed the world that war is not only about action on the real battlefield, not only about dying soldiers and scorched earth, but also about playing outside the theatre of operations. We are talking here not only about propaganda, which was mastered by the authoritarian states of the time, but also about the offensive use of lies as a tool to gain an advantage and sometimes even to tip the balance of victory in favour of the other side.

The 21st century, including the events in Ukraine, has shown that the world is moving forward not only in terms of science, technology and ideas, but also in terms of weapons that are not conventional, such as the aforementioned lies. The phenomenon of 'Fake News' has emerged which is extremely effective due to the highly developed mass media, the social media. This phenomenon has even become a tool for waging war 'without war', a way to dominate the enemy by turning their own people against them. 'Fake News' can be defined as deliberately false information that is intended to influence a group of people or the entire population of a region or even a country in a certain way.

The situation in Ukraine shows that you can annex an entire peninsula with virtual impunity if you use this tool properly, which the Russian Federation is doing. The Ukrainian side has had to make an attempt to neutralise Russian influence in its country which has resulted in the establishment of, for example, the Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine<sup>1</sup>.

In view of the crisis facing the European Union's eastern neighbours, such as Ukraine and Belarus, Citizens of EU must realise how important an appropriate defence policy is for us. The CSDP should be a response to Russian actions against European countries and, if such actions have not been taken, the development of the CSDP should be preventive in order to avoid possible destabilisation.

Measures to ensure greater security for EU citizens were already taken in March 2015 when the East StratCom task force, which is responsible for combating disinformation in EU states, became operational. Additionally, the European Centre for Combating Hybrid Threats was established in Helsinki in 2017. Awareness of the threat is growing as shown by the increased funding for the East StratCom group.

The Crimean referendum, which led to the annexation of the Crimean peninsula by the Russian Federation, shows that the security of EU countries will be ensured not only by traditional armament, but also by the appropriate filtering of information provided by the media, because modern wars, like the traditional ones, can even lead to the loss of part of the territory.

## **4.Current State of Research**

Over the last few years, there have been many publications on disinformation activities carried out by the Russian Federation. The Republic of Ukraine, being on the front line, has devoted a lot of resources to understand these activities and, as a result, produce effective defenses against them. Organizations such as 'StopFake' or the 'Ukrainian Crisis Media Centre', as well as the Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine, can be an important source of information for the EU through the experience they have gained. As for the positions from the Ukrainian side worth mentioning, it will certainly be the 'White Book' special information operations against Ukraine in 2014-2018 by Dmytro Zolotukhin.

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<sup>1</sup> Dmytro Zolotukhin 'White Paper' of special information operations against Ukraine in 2014-2018



As for the items written by the Polish side, these will certainly be 'Internal Security Reviews'. They are periodically published by the Ministry of Internal Affairs

The EU, seeing how dangerous a tool 'Fake News' is, has also made efforts to understand this weapon and produce an effective way to defend against it. In Brussels, an Action Plan against Disinformation was created in 2018 which lists 4 pillars to increase the effectiveness of actions taken against disinformation<sup>2</sup>. Very importantly, it sought to achieve effective methods without simultaneously restricting freedom of expression.

## **5. Research Gap**

Researching a weapon, which definitely is the 'Fake News', researchers focus mainly on matters which are currently in progress or on those which happened in the recent past. This is nothing strange because 'Fake News' as defined is a new phenomenon. This does not change the fact that the target of this weapon does not have to be contemporary events, but historical ones. Changing history can help public opinion accept the actions of a given state and, as the example of the annexation of Crimea shows us, this is a real threat. Historical truth is a controversial subject because it is said that history is written by the winners. On the example of Poland I can point to institutions such as the Institute of National Remembrance which cares about preserving this historical truth but, because of insufficient funding, they do not have the necessary impact. Based on the annexation of Crimea, one can also understand that such a lack of breakthrough can lead to a loss of territory. According to the author, the Action Plan Against Disinformation<sup>3</sup> should include a fifth pillar - increasing historical awareness because Russians often use falsified historical claims to justify their actions. History must be known in order to proper defence.

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<sup>2</sup> JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Action Plan against Disinformation Brussels, 5.12.2018 JOIN(2018) 36 final

<sup>3</sup> JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Action Plan against Disinformation Brussels, 5.12.2018 JOIN(2018) 36 final

## **6. Research Questions**

What can be learnt from the example of Ukraine's war with the Russian Federation? What threat does 'Fake News' pose to the CSDP and what options does the EU currently have to defend itself against an information war waged by the Russian Federation?

## **7. Methodology**

Due to the extent of the topic, additionally, considering that the Russian Federation is waging an information war on multiple fronts, I decided to focus mainly on the case of Ukraine and Poland. An important factor in my decision was the fact that I had contact with people affected by these actions and I was able to gain some of my knowledge by talking to them. Furthermore, I studied many publications issued by the Polish Internal Security Agency as well as works published by colleagues from Ukraine. This allowed me to draw concrete conclusions, notice important points in Russian actions and, also, come up with many ways how to reduce the effectiveness of 'Fake News'.

## **8. Research and Results of Research**

### **8.1 Current situation in Ukraine and EU**

Presently, 7 years after the outbreak of the conflict in Donbass, the situation in Eastern Ukraine remains tense. In the understanding of countries such as Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Poland, these actions were aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine. The Russian Federation is also acting openly against EU countries, including Poland, claiming that the Soviet Union was not one of the countries that caused the Second World War. In their narrative, Poland was not attacked by them. Vladimir Putin, in this statement, did not say where, in the spring of 1940, 22 000 Polish citizens disappeared, including 10 000 Polish Army officers.

### **8.2 Changing history by Russian Federation**

The Russian Federation is carrying out many activities aimed at educating the generation that believes in a different history from the one that really happened. Their actions go back not

only 80 years to the Second World War, but also to much more distant times, such as the 10th and 11th centuries. These actions make Russian claims to specific regions of Europe seem more well-founded.

### **8.2.1 Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation**

This is by far the most controversial event of recent years. In 2014, the Crimean peninsula was annexed by the Russian Federation. Focusing on Russian disinformation activities, one cannot fail to mention the information provided by the Russian mass media. In fact, the 'Crimean Referendum' they described looked very different. Following the armed intervention of the Russian Federation, it was held to show that the citizens of Crimea wanted to be part of Russia. The figures given by the Russian media indicate that the turnout for the referendum was around 83%, whereas in reality it was no more than 32%<sup>4</sup>. It is interesting to note that the Russian President admitted that the annexation of Crimea was planned weeks before the referendum<sup>5</sup>. It is clear that Russia's intention was not to give any help to the people living there but simply to annex the territory. The release of the results of the turnout survey was intended to manipulate public opinion in an attempt to avoid punishment for the illegal and unjustified attack on the Republic of Ukraine. This, however, did not work out for Vladimir Putin, as severe sanctions were imposed on Russia. The ethnic group of Crimean Tatars has once again been subjected to repression. They were first expelled from their home in 1944 by the USSR for alleged collaboration with Nazi Germany. And on April 26, 2016, the Supreme Court of Crimea outlawed the Medjlis (Islamic elders)<sup>6</sup>. Russian actions also after the annexation show that it was simply unlawful. By manipulating historical facts, the Russian media have created a narrative that Crimea was never Ukrainian. It is worth mentioning that the Russian side also conducted 'surveys' about how important the topic of the peninsula is for Ukrainians. In this research, only 6% of people considered it something worthy of attention but they completely ignored the research saying that this number is 55%<sup>7</sup>. The situation in Ukraine shows that insufficient media clout in the country can lead to a loss of control over international opinion. The Ukrainians have been dominated by the Russians in this respect, as a result of which many citizens of EU countries are not familiar with the problem but, more importantly, they can get to know it from the completely wrong side.

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<sup>4</sup> Dmytro Zolotukhin 'White Paper' of special information operations against Ukraine in 2014-2018

<sup>5</sup> <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31796226>

<sup>6</sup> Piotr Kościński Biuletyn Nr 33 (1383), 18 maja 2016 © PISM Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych

<sup>7</sup> Dmytro Zolotukhin 'White Paper' of special information operations against Ukraine in 2014-2018

## 8.2.2 The Russian narrative on the outbreak of World War II

Every European knows the date of 1 September 1939 when the world was plunged into the bloodiest armed conflict in history. It was preceded by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union which paved the way for the European totalitarian states of the time to launch World War II. In order to attack Poland, Germany had to be sure of the reaction of the Soviet Union which bordered Poland to the east. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, apart from the non-aggression agreement between Nazi Germany and the USSR, also contained a secret annex. The annex fixed the division of Polish lands along the rivers Narew, Vistula and San<sup>8</sup>. In 2019, the European Parliament issued a document 'European Parliament resolution on the 80th anniversary of the outbreak of the Second World War and the importance of European memory for the future of Europe' in which it was unequivocally stated that the pact significantly contributed to causing the war. At the CIS summit in St. Petersburg on 20 December 2019, the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin was asked if this was actually the case, He replied 'Well, maybe'<sup>9</sup>. In the same statement, Putin states that the Russian (formerly Soviet) side, has always tried to help preserve the quality and veracity of history. Every citizen of the countries in the eastern part of the EU, however, knows that it was completely different. Moreover, the Russian President mentions other pacts signed by European countries with Nazi Germany. Anyone familiar with European history will immediately be able to see that the term 'Katyn Massacre' does not appear once in Putin's speech. Vladimir Putin did not once mention in his declaration that the Soviet Union, coming to Poland with 'brotherly help', committed a brutal crime against almost 22 000 Polish citizens, according to the Institute of National Remembrance. It is worth noting that, according to INR data, more than 14,000 of these people were prisoners of war. The number of exactly 14,700 Polish officers, civil servants, landowners, policemen, intelligence agents, gendarmes, settlers and prison guards can be found on the first page of the resolution of the Political Bureau of 5 March 1940<sup>10</sup>.

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<sup>8</sup> Małgorzata Strasz, Magdalena Baj: 'Zbrodnia Katyńska' Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu, 2020 ISBN 978-83-8098-840-8

<sup>9</sup> [https://poland.mid.ru/web/polska\\_pl/glowna/-/asset\\_publisher/qi8drTMKe9IB/content/ze-stenogramu-przemowienia-prezydenta-rosji-wladimira-putina-na-szczycie-wnp-w-petersburgu-20-grudnia-2019-r-?inheritRedirect=false&redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fpoland.mid.ru%3A443%2Fweb%2Fpolska\\_pl%2Fglowna%3Fp\\_p\\_id%3D101\\_INSTANCE\\_qi8drTMKe9IB%26p\\_p\\_lifecycle%3D0%26p\\_p\\_state%3Dnormal%26p\\_p\\_mode%3Dview%26p\\_p\\_col\\_id%3Dcolumn-2%26p\\_p\\_col\\_pos%3D1%26p\\_p\\_col\\_count%3D4](https://poland.mid.ru/web/polska_pl/glowna/-/asset_publisher/qi8drTMKe9IB/content/ze-stenogramu-przemowienia-prezydenta-rosji-wladimira-putina-na-szczycie-wnp-w-petersburgu-20-grudnia-2019-r-?inheritRedirect=false&redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fpoland.mid.ru%3A443%2Fweb%2Fpolska_pl%2Fglowna%3Fp_p_id%3D101_INSTANCE_qi8drTMKe9IB%26p_p_lifecycle%3D0%26p_p_state%3Dnormal%26p_p_mode%3Dview%26p_p_col_id%3Dcolumn-2%26p_p_col_pos%3D1%26p_p_col_count%3D4)

<sup>10</sup> Małgorzata Strasz, Magdalena Baj: 'Zbrodnia Katyńska' Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu, 2020 ISBN 978-83-8098-840-8

возврату в течение 24 часов (Пост. ПБ ЦК от 5.V.27 г., пр. № 100, п. 5)  
часть Особого Сектора ЦК

**СТРОГО СЕКРЕТНО**

(из О. П.)

**Союзная Коммунистическая Партия (большевиков). ЦЕНТРАЛЬНЫЙ КОМИТЕТ**

№ 118/144.

Тов. Б о р и с я.

м а р т а 1990 г.

Выписка из протокола № 18 заседания Политбюро ЦК от 193 г.

Решение от 5.III.40 г.

144.- Вопрос НКВД СССР.

1. Предложить НКВД СССР:

1) Дела о находящихся в лагерях для военнопленных 14.700 человек бывших польских офицеров, чиновников, помещиков, полицейских, разведчиков, жандармов, осадников и тюремщиков.

2) а также дела об арестованных и находящихся в тюрьмах западных областей Украины и Белоруссии в количестве 11.000 человек членов различных к-р шпионских и диверсионных организаций, бывших помещиков, фабрикантов, бывших польских офицеров, чиновников и перебожчиков - рассмотреть в особом порядке, с применением к ним высшей меры наказания - расстрела.

II. Рассмотрение дел провести без вызова арестованных и без пред"явления обвинения, постановления об окончании следствия и обвинительного заключения - в следующем порядке:

а) на лиц, находящихся в лагерях военно-пленных - по справкам, представляемым Управлением по делам военнопленных НКВД СССР,  
б) на лиц, арестованных - по справкам из дел, представляемым НКВД УССР и НКВД БССР.

III. Рассмотрение дел и вынесение решения возложить на тройку, в составе т.т. Меркулова, Кабулова и Вештакова (начальник 1-го Спецотдела НКВД СССР).

СЕКРЕТАРЬ ЦК

4нк

С подлинным верно

Главный государственный архивист  
Российской Федерации



Г.Г.Никола

1. Certified copy of the Political Bureau decision transmitted to the Polish Government in 1993

This situation shows how effectively the President of the Russian Federation manipulates history by simply not telling certain things. However, one fundamental question needs to be asked: Is the statement that the Soviet Union did not take anything away from Poland simply a failure to say everything, or is it already a lie?

### **8.3 Defending the EU against 'Fake News' and the example of the Polish INR as a cell protecting against the falsification of history.**

By creating such organizations as: East Strategic Communication Task Force, Western Balkans Task Force, Task Force South, EU Hybrid Fusion Cell, European Union created a 'protective shield' for member states. These are young organizations but their increasing budget shows that there is more and more work they do. The national organizations of the member states are equally important, without which it would not be possible to supervise all aspects of the fight against disinformation. One of them is the fight for historical truth. The following organizations will be described in detail by the author: East Strategic Communication Task Force (East StratCom Task Force) and the Polish Institute of National Remembrance which will be used as an example of an organization effectively fighting for historical truth.

#### **7.3.1 East Strategic Communication Task Force**

It is an organization that was established as part of the fight against Russian disinformation in the eastern EU member states. Its main tasks are to promote EU policy in eastern countries, increase the power of the media and increase the media's ability to fight disinformation disseminated. Increasing budget over the period 2018-2021 from EUR 1.1 million to EUR 11.1 million<sup>11</sup>, shows how Europe's awareness of the fight against disinformation is changing. This organization is fighting Russia in a very difficult field. This is not a normal battlefield, but cyberspace, in which the rules of the fight are not entirely clear. That is why it is so important to develop organizations of this type so that they can adapt the methods of fighting to the current situation on an ongoing basis. Considering how aggressive the Russian Federation is in its actions, it can be concluded that the financial outlay is still too small. Russia Today alone has a budget of approximately 270 million euros<sup>12</sup>. Looking only at the budget, it can be deduced how difficult the task of the East Strategic Communication Task Force is. As indicated by the head of the East StratCom team, Martyna Bildzickiewicz, the Russians are able to perfectly adapt the type of message to specific countries, age or professional groups which will deepen the divisions and make these activities very dangerous for the stability of European countries<sup>13</sup>. It is also worth citing the example of the Crimean

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<sup>11</sup> [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/2116/questions-and-answers-about-east-stratcom-task-force\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/2116/questions-and-answers-about-east-stratcom-task-force_en)

<sup>12</sup> [https://pism.pl/publikacje/Walka\\_z\\_rosyjska\\_dezinformacja\\_w\\_Unii\\_Europejskiej](https://pism.pl/publikacje/Walka_z_rosyjska_dezinformacja_w_Unii_Europejskiej)

<sup>13</sup> <https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/news%2C881582%2Cszefowa-unijnego-zespolu-do-spraw-walki-z-rosyjska-dezinformacja-kremlowi>

Referendum which clearly showed that a divided society may be too weak to keep the disputed region under control. The division of this society may even lead to the loss of this region, as was the case here.

### **7.3.2 Polish Institute of National Remembrance**

This Polish organisation was established on 19 January 1999. This essay is mainly focused on one of the units of the INR - The Main Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation. It is worth mentioning that there are 7 units within the Institute of National Remembrance, including the Search and Identification Bureau. Its task is for example to find the families of the killed soldiers if their bodies or belongings are found. INR, as a whole, conducts very difficult activities in Poland. Its difficulty lies in digging up a history that is difficult not only for Poles, but also for the whole of Europe. The role of this organisation is invaluable when we are talking about accessing historical truth. At this point, it is worth mentioning the example of the Polish hero, Rotmistrz (the historical rank of the Polish Army, currently the corresponding rank is that of Captain) Witold Pilecki whose figure was to be erased from history by the Communist authorities of the People's Republic of Poland. The example of Pilecki is important not only for Poles as it was him who first infiltrated the Aushwitz concentration camp in order to create a report on the activities of this camp. What happened there doesn't need to be told to anyone these days. However, we should remember it so that this tragedy is never repeated. Thanks to this organisation, the whole Europe could learn about what really happened in Katyn in spring 1940. However, we must ask ourselves whether the funds allocated by the main provocateur, the Russian Federation, for attacks against historical truth can be compared in any way to the budget of organisations such as the INR. Russia Today and Sputnik, the powerful Russian television stations that operate in 100 countries and have dedicated channels in 30 languages, are not easy opponents. It is hard to drown out an opponent with such reach. Comparing the budget of Russia Today, which is around EUR 270 million<sup>14</sup>, with the INR's expenditure for 2020 which is around EUR 86.5 million<sup>15</sup>. It is impossible to say that the INR has a chance of preventing everything. The problem also lies in the attitude of contemporary society to history. European countries have not always lived in peace, and this should be remembered but at the moment we are allies and we face very serious threats that we can only combat if we cooperate. Many years have passed since the Second World War but these events should not be forgotten. This is a tragedy that

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<sup>14</sup> [https://pism.pl/publikacje/Walka\\_z\\_rosyjska\\_dezinformacja\\_w\\_Unii\\_Europejskiej](https://pism.pl/publikacje/Walka_z_rosyjska_dezinformacja_w_Unii_Europejskiej)

<sup>15</sup> <https://dzieje.pl/dziedzictwo-kulturowe/w-2020-r-wydatki-ipn-wyniosly-ponad-393-mln-zl>

should never be repeated. Only the knowledge of the past allows us to understand the present in its full extent.

## **9. Discussion of Results and Personal Conclusions**

Taking into account everything what have been written above, one can come to the conclusion that Europeans are aware of the threat posed by the phenomenon of 'Fake News'. A very important step was the creation of organisations such as the East Strategic Communication Task Force or the European Centre for Combating Hybrid Threats. Europe's awareness of modern warfare has also increased thanks to the situation in the Republic of Ukraine which has been conducting regular warfare for the last seven years. One of the things we can learn from our eastern neighbours is that inadequate disinformation warfare can even lead to the loss of territory or asymmetric operations. At the time of writing, similar things are happening on the Polish-Belarusian border, but I think that, Europeans are much wiser now than a few years ago. This situation, however, shows that the threat is real and that our potential adversaries are constantly testing our defensive capabilities. It is worth pointing out, however, the aspect of the fight against disinformation concerning historical events that I have mentioned. History is a field of study which, in my opinion, has been neglected these days. In my opinion it is neglected not so much through lack of awareness as through insufficient funds allocated to organisations such as the INR. I say this using the example of Polish society, because I know it best. Using the example of Poland, I can say that the interest of the society in this field is fully dependent on the involvement of the authorities in its promotion. As Poland, we celebrate many events from our past, to mark for example, the outbreak of the Warsaw Uprising. It happened on 1 August 1944 at 17.00. In modern Poland, on 1 August at 17.00, sirens can be heard all over Warsaw, and every citizen of Warsaw stands still for a moment to commemorate the people who made him or her a free man today. I also know from my own experience that the right amount of money to build museums makes people interested in the past. A good example is the Museum of the Second World War in Gdańsk where you can see people of all ages, people who want to know the past. In these times, times of increasing globalisation, we must not, as Europe, forget who we really are. I do not mean closing ourselves off to other cultures but simply remembering our own. This is quite simple to understand because if we forget our own culture we lose our character. This topic can be approached differently than INR because their activities are scientific and research ones. In my perspective, there are no organisations that simply popularise history. In schools we learn



it by heart and not to understand those events. Earlier in this essay I wrote that only by knowing the past can you fully understand the present. In my opinion, this slogan should guide the popularisation of this field of study. Of course, it is not possible to set up an umbrella organisation in the EU to deal with such activities, but in my opinion, the EU, within the framework of the CSDP, could support organisations such as the INR in the Member States with additional subsidies. This history is often very difficult, even brutal, but awareness will help to resist some attacks. The situation in Ukraine shows the rest of Europe the importance of constant vigilance and organisations that fight against very aggressive disinformation from Russia. As a citizen of an EU Member State, I feel safer knowing that there are organisations in the EU which care about what the media say. It should be remembered, however, that the world is constantly evolving and so are the ways in which armed conflicts are conducted. The words attributed to Hippocrates, the 'father' of physicians, 'prevention is better than cure', fit in well here. By reacting appropriately when the battle is limited to cyberspace, we can avoid tragedy. This tragedy is absolutely real, as events in eastern Ukraine show us every day. After all, this is still Europe, and looking at the map, one can get the impression that it is not so far from our home. I am of course speaking from a Polish perspective, but I believe that the Lithuanians, Romanians and other nations to the east of the EU would agree with me. An important role is played by the constantly developing CSDP which allows us to react appropriately to the actions of an opponent. In my opinion, however, some EU countries are still an easy target for Fake News spread by the Russian Federation, and it should be remembered that a chain is as strong as its weakest link.

## **10. Annexes**

### **10.1 List of Abbreviations**

CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States

CSDP – Common Security and Defense Policy

East StratCom Task Force – East Strategic Communication Task Force

EU – European Union

EUR – Euro ( European currency

MSC – Master of Science

PHD – Doctor ( science degree )

## 10.2 List of Figures

1. Page 9. Certified copy of the Politburo decision transmitted to the Polish Government in 1993.

## 10.3 List of Literature

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[?inheritRedirect=false&redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fpoland.mid.ru%3A443%2Fweb%2Fpolska\\_pl%2Fglowna%3Fp\\_p\\_id%3D101\\_INSTANCE\\_qi8drTMKe9IB%26p\\_p\\_lifecycle%3D0%26p\\_p\\_state%3Dnormal%26p\\_p\\_mode%3Dview%26p\\_p\\_col\\_id%3Dcolumn-2%26p\\_p\\_col\\_pos%3D1%26p\\_p\\_col\\_count%3D4](https://poland.mid.ru/web/polska_pl/glowna/-/asset_publisher/qi8drTMKe9IB/content/ze-stenogramu-przemowienia-prezydenta-rosji-wladimira-putina-na-szczycie-wnp-w-petersburgu-20-grudnia-2019-r-?inheritRedirect=false&redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fpoland.mid.ru%3A443%2Fweb%2Fpolska_pl%2Fglowna%3Fp_p_id%3D101_INSTANCE_qi8drTMKe9IB%26p_p_lifecycle%3D0%26p_p_state%3Dnormal%26p_p_mode%3Dview%26p_p_col_id%3Dcolumn-2%26p_p_col_pos%3D1%26p_p_col_count%3D4)

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9. <https://dzieje.pl/dziedzictwo-kulturowe/w-2020-r-wydatki-ipn-wyniosly-ponad-393-mln-zl>

## **Affidavit**

I declare that I have written the present essay independently and on my own. I have clearly marked any language or ideas borrowed from other sources as not my own and documented their sources. The essay does not contain any work that I have handed in or have had graded as a previous scientific paper earlier on.

I am aware that any failure to do so constitutes plagiarism. Plagiarism is the presentation of another person's thoughts or words as if they were my own – even if I summarize, paraphrase, condense, cut, rearrange, or otherwise alter them.

I am aware of the consequences and sanctions plagiarism entails. Among others, consequences may include nullification of the essay, exclusion from participation in the CSDP Olympiad. These consequences also apply retrospectively, i.e. if plagiarism is discovered after the essay has been accepted and graded. I am fully aware of the scope of these consequences.

..Owishi Meier.....

Warsaw, Poland in October 2021

**The need for an EU Defence Minister, Defence Council, or a Commission  
Director General (DG) on Defence.**

Essay

Created for the CSDP Olympiad 2022  
In Salon -de -Provence – France

Author:  
**Cadet Boris Raykov**

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Veliko Tarnovo, August 2021

## **Abstract**

After two World Wars that were seen ravaging the land of Europe, the nations of the old continent were wary that a new more destructive conflict could very well shatter the fragile state that the world had found itself in. The leaders of the battered countries found that a collective security of the continent was the way to guarantee the continuation of a peaceful existence. In the words of the British Prime Minister at the time, Winston Churchill, “*An Iron Curtain has fallen across Europe*”, it was clear that the continent’s future is still in jeopardy even though the Second World War, a conflict of global magnitude, was over. It quickly became apparent that forging alliances and cultivating trust and partnership between the European states is the only way to guarantee that Europe may rise again from the ashes of war, the danger of which had not disappeared on the continent.

Now, with the end of the Cold War, these alliances have run their course, the threats they were first made to face no longer exist. This has led to the position we, the European nations, find ourselves in: bound in ineffective alliances facing an old enemy, no longer existing; unable to identify new threats, and bound in old grudges only preventing further prosperity.

In the new and dynamic world, Europe must present a unified front against all threats, external or internal, and must stand ready to defend everything that to this day has made it great. One course of action that Europe and the body representing it on the world stage, the European Union, may take is to further centralize its defense coordination. A way this can be possible is the creation of a body that will serve the purpose to pursue the defense interests of the European Union. The Foreign Affairs Council serves this purpose, but only in part of its functions, as it is not the only direction where the Council focuses its attention. This new body would have only one purpose, one direction of attention and one point of interest - the defense of the European Member States and citizens, their values and rights, freedom and future.

### **Key words:**

Permanent, governing body, defense, European Union

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## **2. Preface**

As a cadet at Vasil Levski National Military University, the author has bolstered his interests in security policy, history and international relations, and has felt motivated to write an essay such as this. It is of great importance for a future officer to understand the inner workings of the organizations and alliances that his/her state is part of. The author's situation is no different, for the Republic of Bulgaria is a member of both the European Union and North - Atlantic Treaty Organization. The preparation for the writing of this paper, has further served the aforementioned purpose in the author's preparation for service in the Bulgarian Armed Forces. The writing of the paper itself has become an indispensable source of knowledge for the author. Having just finished his bachelor degree for National and Regional Security at the National Military University, the author has seen the writing of this paper as an enormous opportunity to dive even further in the field of security and defense of a state. With the evolution of technology, ever-changing political situation in volatile regions close to the European Union, migration crisis, threat of terrorism and the shifting of the balance of power, new changes must be made to the CSDP and the Union's view of defense as a whole. The threats which endanger the European way of life are ever-present, ever-evolving and never dormant. The way to combat this is to take an aggressive approach and to dedicate a body, solely to serve as a shield against these threats.

These are the author's views, and they are the reason for the choice of topic for the essay to be presented at the 6<sup>th</sup> Common Security and Defense Policy Olympiad 2022 in Salon –de –Provence –France.

## **3. Introduction**

The issue of security has always been a, sensitive one. A list of reasons could be made that showcase this sensitivity. One of those reasons is that the issue of security, be it national or regional, has always put the interested parties at odds with each other. The security of a nation, alliance or union, leads to the unsureness and suspicions of the party that does not benefit from a strong and secure adversary. This of course goes both ways. Overall security is a very delicate situation and should not be observed as a maximum/minimum situation. The reason is that, just like the balance of power between nations, too much leverage on one side could lead to destabilization of international relations.

In the period, known as the Cold War, the old continent was caught in the crossfire between the global superpowers - the United States of America and the Soviet Union. During this period the balance of power flickered between the two juggernauts, yet neither could tip it to the breaking point. Now in the new age of the twenty first century, Europe stands united. For the first time the cradle of the world presents a united front on the global stage. And for this reason it could no longer be swept aside on the matter of international politics. In the last decade we have observed that the balance of power is dramatically shifting to the east. The hegemony of the West, established after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, is no longer relevant as it used to be. Europe and the United States of America, must respect that the east is now as relevant in the decision making process of the world.<sup>1</sup> <sup>2</sup>The old continent must also prepare itself; otherwise, it might find itself unprepared for the world stage.

The geopolitical stage has evolved and new response measures are needed. It is time for the European Union to make a stronger stance on security, and yet it must be non-threatening to our neighbors and competitors. But that is easier said than done, for, while all member states desire security and peace, the strategic goals and national interests differ from one another. Every single EU member state has set its own national goals and interests, has identified different national threats, and has approved differing decisions regarding them. A more unified position is needed, yet the achievement of such should not be at the expense of the national policies of the member states.<sup>3</sup>

## **4. Current State of Research**

In this chapter the goal is to showcase existing defense and security cooperation between the member states within the European Union. Military organizations within the EU will be presented in order to create a foundation on which the author will elaborate in order to address the issues raised by the problem that is the focus of this essay.

### **4.1 The Maastricht Treaty**

Signed in 1992, this treaty established the European Union. In the Final Act of the treaty, in the form of a declaration, the Member States agree on the need to develop a genuine

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<sup>1</sup> Cf: Harrison R. (2018). Shifts in the Middle East Balance of Power: A Historical Perspective. Aljazeera Centre for Studies. Report.

<sup>2</sup> Cf: Kristof N. (1993). The Rise Of China. Foreign Affairs Magazine. Article

<sup>3</sup> Conclusions based on the author's arguments so far.



European security and defence identity and a greater European responsibility on defence matters.<sup>4</sup>

## **4.2 Treaty of Lisbon – Foreign Affairs Council**

The Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) is one of the ten Councils of the European Union configuration. The FAC and General Affairs Council (GAC) are explicitly mentioned in the Treaty of the European Union, signed in 2007.<sup>5</sup> The Foreign Affairs Council can meet in the format of ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Development or Trade.<sup>6</sup> The council meets on a monthly basis or as the international situation demands. As stated in Article 9 E, presiding over this council is the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR). The HR will conduct the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and contribute by his proposals to the development of that policy.<sup>7</sup>

## **4.3 Permanent Representatives Committee and the Political and Security Committee**

As stated in Article 16, a committee on ambassadorial level comprised of representatives from each member state is responsible for preparing the work of the Council. This committee, also known as Coreper (Comité des représentants permanents), meets in two formats and the one responsible for CSDP matters is referred to as Coreper II. This committee prepares the agenda for the Council meeting by categorizing the points for discussion. The Political and Security Committee, having usually two weekly meetings is responsible for monitoring the international situation that covers the areas of the CFSP, and presents opinions and information to the Council. The PSC, according to Article 38, may be authorized by the Council to act and make decisions regarding the operation for the purpose of crisis management.<sup>8 9</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Cf: Treaty on European Union. (1992). Maastricht. Article B.

<sup>5</sup> Cf: Treaty of Lisbon. (2007). Lisbon. Article 9 C.

<sup>6</sup> Cf: Homepage of the European Council. URL: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/configurations/fac/> [25.09.21]

<sup>7</sup> Treaty of Lisbon. (2007). Lisbon. Article 9 E

<sup>8</sup> Cf; Cconsolidated version of the Treaty on European Union. (2012). Article 16.

<sup>9</sup> Cf: Homepage of the European Council. URL: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/preparatory-bodies/political-security-committee/> [25.09.21]

## 4.4 European Commission

Along with the other main EU institutions, the European Commission develops the overall strategy and political direction of the EU. Every five years, at the beginning of a new Commission term, the president of the Commission also determines the political priorities for its upcoming term of office. The Commission turns these priorities into concrete actions on a yearly basis through an annual work program.<sup>10 11</sup>

## 5. Research Gap

In this chapter the research gap of the essay will be described. Due to the fact that a large quantity of sources could be found on the existing bodies that tackle the issues regarding security and defence within the EU, the creation of a foundation upon which the author will elaborate will not raise an issue. Using this foundation, the author will expand and make an effort to answer the question posed by the essay.

For this reason, the goal of the essay is to tackle the question by comparing existing bodies within the EU with the proposed, by the question, ones, thus making a conclusion on the need of the creation of such bodies.

## 6. Research Questions

The main issue dwelled on in the essay is formulated as follows: **The need for an EU Defence Minister, Defence Council, or a Commission Director General (DG) on Defence.**

In order to provide a clear understanding on the views of the author, an attempt to address the main issue will be made by answering sub-questions:

1. The need for an EU Defence Minister;
2. The need for an EU Defence Council;
3. The need for an EU Commission Director General (DG) on Defence.

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<sup>10</sup>Cf: Homepage of the European Commission. Page What the European Commission does. URL: [https://ec.europa.eu/info/about-european-commission/what-european-commission-does\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/info/about-european-commission/what-european-commission-does_en) [25.09.21]

<sup>11</sup>Cf: Homepage of the European Commission. Page What the European Commission does in strategy and policy. URL: [https://ec.europa.eu/info/about-european-commission/what-european-commission-does/strategy-and-policy\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/info/about-european-commission/what-european-commission-does/strategy-and-policy_en) [25.09.21]

## 7. Methodology

To achieve the goal of addressing the main issue, a plethora of sources will be used. Books, academic journals, EU factsheets and internet publications are in the range of sources that will be used. The following graph will be used to further provide an understanding of the way the author seeks to achieve the goal of the essay.




Figure 1: Methodological approach of the author to answer the main question / address the main issue.<sup>12</sup>

## 8. Research and Results of Research

In this chapter the goal is to provide an answer to the main question. As described in the *Methodology* section, this will be achieved by conducting research upon three sub-questions. The format that this chapter will follow is that each sub-question will first state if the proposed position is possible and then if it is needed by comparing it to the existing bodies within the EU, that are listed in Chapter 4.

### 8.1 The need for an EU Defence Minister?

<sup>12</sup> Figure created by the author

By definition a minister is – a senior member of the government who is in charge of a government department or a branch of one.<sup>13</sup>

In light of this definition in order to describe the powers that the “minister” (the Defence Minister in particular) has, articles from the Law of Defence and Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria (LDAFRB) will be used.

According to LDAFRB, article 25, the minister is responsible to “conduct policy in the field of defence and exercise civil control on the armed forces”<sup>14</sup>. If we are to look for an equivalent of Defence Minister within the European Union institutions, we would find similarities in the face of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR). The HR conducts the CFSP similarly as a Defence Minister (DM) conducts national defence policy.<sup>15</sup>

Unlike the DM though, the HR also chairs different FAC variations. Each and every one of those variations equals in importance the functioning of the Union. The HR also heads the European Defence Agency (EDA) and is one of the VP of the European commission.<sup>16</sup>

The need for such a post, or a similar one, is a glaring fact. The HR is one of the most important roles in the EU as, according to the Consolidated Treaty on the European Union, the HR “shapes and conducts the EU’s CFSP and CSDP. Furthermore, the HR is also expected to chair all variations of the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) despite the aid of the Political and Security Committee, which as stated in Article 16 of the Consolidated Treaty on the European Union, advises and prepares the work of the FAC.<sup>17 18</sup> A single person cannot be expected to be competent in all fields that the different variations of the FAC cover and preside over.

## 8.2 The need for an EU Defence Council?

By definition a council is – “a group of people chosen to give advice, make rules, do research, etc.”<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Homepage of Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries. Page Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary. URL: [https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/minister\\_1?q=minister](https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/minister_1?q=minister) [30.09.21]

<sup>14</sup> LDAFRB (2010) Bulgarian government gazette №16 from 2010. Article 25

<sup>15</sup> Cf; Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union. (2012). Article 18, line 2.

<sup>16</sup> Homepage of the European Union. Page EUR-lex. URL: [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/high\\_representative\\_cfsp.html](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/high_representative_cfsp.html) [30.09.21]

<sup>17</sup> Cf: Consolidated Treaty on the European Union, Article 16, Line 7.

<sup>18</sup> Cf: Consolidated Treaty on the European Union, Article 18, Line 2.

<sup>19</sup> Homepage of Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries. Page Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary. URL: <https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/council?q=council> [02.10.21]

In the European Union a body that corresponds to this definition is the Council of the European Union, and in the field of defence, the same council in the variation of the FAC attended by the ministers of defence of the Member States.

In light of this, we can transform the question to the following one- **Does the Foreign Affairs Council in the format of the Ministers of Defence of the Member States need to be a separate entity?**

In order to answer this question we will take a look at another international body that presides over the fields of security and defence: namely the **Security Council of the UN**.

As stated in Article 24, line 1 of the UN charter<sup>20</sup>, the Members of the organization confer to the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace, which, as stated in Article 1, line 1 of the same Charter<sup>21</sup>, is the primary purpose and by default the policy of the organization. In the European Union, in the field of defence and security, we find this represented by the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Within the EU, the counterpart of the UN Security Council, could be found in of the PSC.<sup>22</sup>

And yet while the UN Security Council has the executive powers to act in the interests of the UN, as stated in Chapter 6 of the UN Charter, The PSC will first need to be granted this right by the FAC.<sup>23</sup>

The European Union, being an economic and political union unlike the UN, which is an organization with a primary goal to preserve and maintain the peace<sup>24</sup>, seeks to merely “promote peace, its values and the well-being of its citizens”.<sup>25</sup> As such a body within the EU having the executive powers to enforce the CSDP would be in violation with EU principles,

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<sup>20</sup> Cf: Charter of the UN. (1945). Statue of the International Court Of Justice. Chapter 5, Article 24, line 1.

<sup>21</sup> Cf: Charter of the UN. (1945). Statue of the International Court Of Justice. Chapter 1, Article 1, line 1.

<sup>22</sup> Cf: Homepage of the German Federal Foreign Office. Page European Foreign Policy/ CFSP. URL: <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/aussenpolitik/europa/aussenpolitik/gasp/-/201784> [10.10.21]

<sup>23</sup> Cf: Homepage of the European Union. Page EUR-lex. URL: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/RO/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:r00005> [10.10.21]

<sup>24</sup> Cf: Charter of the UN. (1945). Statue of the International Court Of Justice. Chapter 7, Article 39.

<sup>25</sup> Cf: Homepage of the European Union. Page Aims and values. URL: [https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/principles-and-values/aims-and-values\\_en](https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/principles-and-values/aims-and-values_en) [10.10.21]

seeing as in the field of CSDP the EU and the Member States have a shared competence, even though the role of the EU in that instance is a special one.<sup>26</sup>

### **8.3 The need for an EU Commission Director General (DG) on Defence.**

Within the EU, a body exists with a purpose to help shape the EU's overall strategy, proposes new EU laws and policies, monitors their implementation and manages the EU budget. This body is the European Commission.<sup>27</sup>

It consists of 27 commissioners, led by the commission president. The day-to-day running of Commission business is performed by its staff, which is organized into departments, each known as a Directorate-General (DG). These DGs serve to fulfill the main tasks of the commission.<sup>28</sup>

At this moment 33 DG's are active.<sup>29</sup> <sup>30</sup>Yet there is no department type of a Directorate-General allocated to the field of security and defence.

In 2016, President Juncker stressed in his State of the Union Speech the need of a Union that protects, empowers and defends.<sup>31</sup> In the same year the Foreign Affairs Council concluded that by the end of 2016 an ambitious and realistic implementation plan for security and defence will be prepared for consideration and implementation. All this culminated in the European Defence Action Plan, developed by the European Commission.<sup>3233</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Cf: Homepage of the European Commission. Page Areas of EU Action. URL: [https://ec.europa.eu/info/about-european-commission/what-european-commission-does/law/areas-eu-action\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/info/about-european-commission/what-european-commission-does/law/areas-eu-action_en) [10.10.21]

<sup>27</sup>Cf: Homepage of the European Commission. Page What the European Commission does. URL: [https://ec.europa.eu/info/about-european-commission/what-european-commission-does/law/areas-eu-action\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/info/about-european-commission/what-european-commission-does/law/areas-eu-action_en) [15.10.21]

<sup>28</sup>Cf: Homepage of the European Commission. Page How the Commission is organized. URL : [https://ec.europa.eu/info/about-european-commission/organisational-structure/how-commission-organised\\_en#commission-offices](https://ec.europa.eu/info/about-european-commission/organisational-structure/how-commission-organised_en#commission-offices) [20.10.21]

<sup>29</sup>Cf: Homepage of the European Commission. Page Departments and executive agencies. URL: [https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments\\_en?field\\_core\\_topics\\_target\\_id\\_entityreference\\_filter=All&field\\_core\\_eco\\_organisation\\_value\\_i18n=Directorate-General&field\\_department\\_tasks\\_tid\\_entityreference\\_filter=All](https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments_en?field_core_topics_target_id_entityreference_filter=All&field_core_eco_organisation_value_i18n=Directorate-General&field_department_tasks_tid_entityreference_filter=All) [20.10.21]

<sup>30</sup> Juncker J. (2016) . Towards a better Europe - a Europe that protects, empowers and defends. Strasbourg. Speech

<sup>31</sup> European Defence Action Plan. Chapter 1

<sup>32</sup>Cf: Homepage of the European Commission. Page Defence. URL: [https://ec.europa.eu/info/topics/defence\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/info/topics/defence_en) [23.10.21]

<sup>33</sup>Cf: Council conclusions on the Global Strategy on the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy. (2018). Luxembourg. Chapter 1. Line 6.

### 9. Discussion of Results and Personal Conclusions

In this chapter, the author will expand upon the answers of all sub-questions, with the purpose to provide a clear understanding to the reader. The approach to this goal will be as follows: first and foremost, present the proposed position; second, by the use of the Pros and Cons, showcase its viability and possibility of existence, and last, make a conclusion on it.

#### 9.1 Sub-question #1: The need for an EU Defence Minister

Answer: The position of a EU defence minister will provide the EU with a position of power, directly responsible for CSDP. The HR position in the EU is responsible for the conducting of policy in the field of defence. But while a DM would be solely functioning in the fields of defence and security, the HR is the de-facto face of the Union in all international affairs. This leads us to the conclusion that a DM is a much needed position within the EU. We have reached our answer for this question, and we observe a YES answer. There is a need for such a post of such competences.

The way that this could be achieved is an appointment of a person directly under the HR, but over the FAC in the variation the MoD. And the most sure way to achieve this is to select and vote one representative to ascend to the position for a term.




Figure 2: Proposed integration of an EU DM within EU acting Chain of Command<sup>34</sup>

We are able to observe the following Pros and Cons of this proposed position:

<sup>34</sup> Figure created by the author.

**Pros:**

- Solely occupied in the fields of security and defence;
- Directly responsible for the EU's defensive capabilities;
- Providing consistency in the leadership of the FAC in the variation of the MoD;
- Ability for the FAC to function without the direct presence of the HR.

**Cons:**

- The matter of the way of filling the position and length of term ;
- Way to guarantee that this DM would uphold EU security and defence policy over national one;
- No clear understanding on the level of power that this position would possess.

The answer to this sub-question is **YES**. The creation of such a post would increase the level of control over the EU's CSDP.

**9.2 Sub-question #2 - The need for an EU Defence Council**

Answer: The proposed body - a Defence Council, after the required research has been proven to exist, and that is the PSC. In light of this, the proposed body would only be possible if it has more power in its possession than the PSC. That is to be able to act solely in the fields of defence and security and able to make decisions on the matters of the defence of the Union. The PSC has that power, but it needs to be first granted by the FAC.

In light of this, the proposed body is neither required to exist, nor even possible. It is due to the fact that even though the EU has a special role in this instance, it still has a shared competence on the matters of CFSP and CSDP with its Member States, according to the Treaty of Lisbon. A body with the proposed powers is in direct violation of that Treaty.

We would still observe **Pros** and **Cons** despite the glaring facts:

**Pros:**

- A body able to react with more speed on matters related to CFSP and CSDP;
- A body not only able to observe but also react to the international situation;
- A body solely responsible for the defence of the EU and its citizens;

**Cons:**

- In direct violation of the existing Treaty of Lisbon.
- Where does this body's power begin and end?



- Will this body be accountable for its actions to the EU or the Member States?

In conclusion the answer is **NO**. The EU does not require the presence of a **Defence Council** nor does it need it to be a separate entity. For the tasks that would be normally posed to such a council are performed by the PSC, and are accomplished in full length.

### **9.3 Sub-question #3 - The need for an EU Commission DG on Defence**

Answer: The creation of a DG, specialized in the field of Defence, would empower the European Commission by providing a body that has narrow competence, solely focused on the defence of the Union. It would be responsible for running the day-to-day commission business on the issues of security and defence. As far as the issues of CFSP and CSDP are concerned, the Commission tackles obstacles and tasks with its full efforts and capabilities. An example would be the European Defence Action Plan, which is the culmination of the combined efforts of the whole European Commission.

Observing the **Pros** and **Cons** of the creation of such a body, we see:

**Pros:**

- A DG solely responsible in the fields of Defence and Security, running the day-to-day work of the Commission in the above mentioned fields;
- Specialists within this DG, focused on proposition of new Laws and Policies and monitoring their implementation.

**Cons:**

- Interrupting the already working system established within the Commission;
- Where would this DG's competence start and end?

We can conclude that a proposed body such as a new DG concentrated on a field as vast as security and defence, which requires vast competences to navigate safely, would upset the system that is in place within the Commission. The answer is **NO**, for the purpose of this would-be DG is fulfilled thoroughly by the Commission at the moment.

In conclusion, the answers to all three sub-questions has shown that bodies within the EU, providing further control over the fields of CFSP and CSDP, are a required and can be viewed as a natural further step in providing a continent with a stable and secure environment. Yet there must be caution when it comes to the creation of such bodies. For rash steps and just creation for the sake of creating would lead to some stress within the well-oiled machine that is the European Union.

With this thought in mind the author has chosen this topic for the essay, and the message that this paper seeks to promote is: Further cooperation and a stronger stance of defence are necessary, yet they should not be achieved by sacrificing existing, working bodies, and upsetting the well-functioning system.

## 10. Annexes

### 10.1 List of Abbreviations

CFSP.....	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP.....	Common Security and Defence Policy
DG.....	Directorate-General
DM.....	Defence Minister
EDA.....	European Defence Agency
EU.....	European Union
FAC.....	Foreign Affairs Council
GAC.....	General Affairs Council
HR....	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
LDAFRB.....	Law for Defence and Armed Forces of the Republic Of Bulgaria
PRC.....	Permanent Representative Committee
PSC.....	Political and Security Committee
UN.....	United Nations

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## 11. Affidavit

I declare that I have written the present essay independently and on my own. I have clearly marked any language or ideas borrowed from other sources as not my own and documented their sources. This essay does not contain any work that I have handed in or have graded as a previous scientific paper earlier on.

I am aware that any failure to do so constitutes plagiarism. Plagiarism is the presentation of another person's thoughts or words as if they were my own- even if I summarize, paraphrase, condense, cut, rearrange, or otherwise alter them.

I am aware of the consequences and sanctions plagiarism entails. Among others, consequences may include nullification of the essay, exclusion from participation in the CSDP Olympiad. These consequences also apply retrospectively, i.e. if plagiarism is discovered after the essay has been accepted and graded. I am fully aware of the scope of these consequences.

A handwritten signature in blue ink is written over a horizontal dotted line. The word "Signature" is written in a cursive script above the line. The signature itself is a stylized, illegible scribble in blue ink.

Cadet Boris Raykov

Veliko Tarnovo, Bulgaria in November 2021

**The need for an EU “Defence Minister”, “Defence Council”, or a  
“Commission Director General (DG) on Defence”**

Essay

Created for the CSDP Olympiad 2022  
in Salon-de-Provence – France

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Wiener Neustadt, November 2021

## **Abstract**

The security situation throughout the world continues to deteriorate. The rifts between major powers such as the USA and China are deepening, raw materials are becoming scarce, refugee flows are endangering domestic stability and radical terrorist organisations are putting entire states on alert. And that was all before the COVID crisis, which is causing inflation rates to rise worldwide, the "world police", the United States of America, to move towards protectionism and almost crippling the world economy.

So it can be said with a fair degree of certainty that we are currently in very uncertain times. But are we, the European continent, the European Union, really sufficiently prepared for such times? Or are we lagging behind the geopolitical events in terms of security policy? These are the questions that led to the topic of this essay.

Is there a need for an EU "Defence Minister", "Defence Council", or a "Commission Director General (DG) on Defence"?

At the beginning of the essay, the author identifies the current state of research on the posts and bodies and then settles on one. He then supplements the main question with two supplementary questions. After a short diagram showing the methodology used, the author begins to present his research and its results. He focuses on two main points:

- The financial aspect.
- The aspect of autonomy.

At the end, there is a discussion of the results, positive and negative aspects of the work and the author's final personal opinion on the topic.

## **Keywords:**

Autonomy, Commission Director General (DG) on Defence, CSDP, Defence industry, European Union.



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## 2. Preface

In a world controlled by global players, it is of unprecedented importance to unify the European Union (EU) externally. In order for the EU to remain not only an economic but also a political force in world politics, it is therefore essential to at least steer the military interests of the individual member states, the European Member States (EU MS), in a similar direction, if not to unify them with the help of a common defence minister.

The author is writing this essay for the sixth CSDP Olympiad, for which he is one of the three nominees from the Theresan Military Academy.

As an EU citizen, Austrian soldier and officer candidate at the Theresan Military Academy, the author has already had to deal with the topic of a homogeneous European defence policy, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and a possible European Defence Minister or a European Defence Council from many different angles.

The topic was chosen because the author is very interested in the subject and believes that it is necessary for the preservation of the EU's political relevance to take a common military line. The creation of the post of a European Minister of Defence would, in the author's opinion, be a big step in this direction.

Furthermore, the author would like to take this opportunity to express his gratitude to Col Assoc. Prof. Harald Gell, PhD, head of the international office of the Theresan Military Academy for his dedicated support to the participants of the CSDP Olympiad.

### 3. Introduction

In this paper, the author will focus on three areas, all of which have the potential to give the EU a much more prominent political role globally.

These areas are political posts and political bodies respectively and are enumerated:

- EU Defence Minister.
- Defence Council.
- Commission Director General (DG) on Defence.

By implementing one or more of these positions/bodies, the EU would take a big step towards autonomy. This is more necessary than ever due to several political developments.

For the reader's understanding, before turning to these political developments, the author will first define the often-mentioned term autonomy.

Merriam-Webster defines the term as follows: *“The state of existing or acting separately from others”*<sup>1</sup> or with regard to state: *“The power or right of a country, group, etc., to govern itself”*.<sup>2</sup>

So this is exactly the capability that is demanded by the United States of America as well as by more and more EU citizens. The independence as a state or, in this case, as a confederation of states.

In the coming paragraphs, the author will address some of the political changes that are forcing Europe to develop this very autonomy which will be discussed in more detail in the course of the essay.

One of them are the long shadows cast by Donald Trump's presidency, that have not yet disappeared. The United States of America is certainly retreating more and more from its role as international regulator and turning to protectionism and political nationalism.

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1 Homepage Merriam Webster. Page Autonomy. URL: <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/autonomy>. [16-11-21].

2 Ibid.

With the election of Joe Biden, the dialogue between America and Europe has become friendlier again, but America continues to demand more autonomy from Europe.<sup>3</sup>

Joe Biden also calls for a common front of Europe and America against China, which would mean a new era of polarisation similar to that of the Cold War except that instead of a battle of ideologies, it would become a battle of technology. This would pose major problems for some EU member states as they maintain active trade relations with China. The EU is therefore in danger of becoming a pawn in the game of the great powers if it is not soon in a position to establish itself as a partner that acts on an equal footing with the USA (United States of America).<sup>4</sup>



**Figure 1:** President of the United States Joe Biden during a speech.<sup>5</sup>

But that is only one problem. Due to the steady withdrawal of the United States of America, the security guarantee for the European continent, which until now has always been provided by the USA, is also beginning to crumble. The European Union now

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3 Cf.: Krastev, I. (2021) Die EU im globalen System. In: Direktion für Sicherheitspolitik. Sicher. Und morgen? Sicherheitspolitische Jahresvorschau 2021. Translated into English the title means: The EU in the global system. In: Secure. And tomorrow? Annual Security Policy Forecast 2021. Vienna. Heeresdruckzentrum. 1st Edition. P. 221.

4 Cf.: Ibid. P. 225.

5 Homepage HD Wallpapers. URL: [https://www.hdwallpapers.in/president\\_joe\\_biden\\_with\\_blue\\_coat\\_in\\_background\\_of\\_us\\_flag\\_hd\\_joe\\_biden-wallpapers.html](https://www.hdwallpapers.in/president_joe_biden_with_blue_coat_in_background_of_us_flag_hd_joe_biden-wallpapers.html). [16-11-21].

faces the problem of being responsible for the security and order of the entire European continent.<sup>6</sup>

These and some other political problems and challenges trigger the desire of many for the above three political posts/bodies to face the challenges with more clout. The author will devote this essay to answering the question whether the need for such posts actually exists.<sup>7</sup>

*“The Common security and defence policy (CSDP) is a policy setting the EU’s framework in the field of defence and crisis management, including defence cooperation and coordination between Member States.”<sup>8</sup>*

*“The European Union (EU) is an association of 27 European countries.”<sup>9</sup>*

*“The Defence Capabilities Development, Research, Acquisition and Armaments Agency, or European Defence Agency (EDA), is a European Union agency established in 2004 for defence planning, acquisition and research.”<sup>10</sup>*

*“The European Defence Community (EDC) was an association of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands with the aim of creating a purely European multinational military capability.”<sup>11</sup>*

*“The Directors-General are in charge of management and development of services, or policy areas of the various Council configurations. They ensure that the work of the*

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6 Cf.: Krastev, I. (2021). Die EU im globalen System. Translated into English the title means: The EU in the global system. Op. cit. P. 223.

7 Remark of the author: These are the author's set goals for this essay.

8 Fact Sheets on the European Union. Page Common security and defence policy. URL: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/159/common-security-and-defence-policy>. [03-11-21].

9 Homepage Wikipedia. Page European Union. URL: [https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Europ%C3%A4ische\\_Union](https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Europ%C3%A4ische_Union). [16-11-21].

10 Homepage Wikipedia. Page European Defence Agency. URL: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European\\_Defence\\_Agency#:~:text=The%20European%20Defence%20Agency%20%28EDA%29%20is%20an%20agency,High%20Representative%20%28HR%2FVP%29%2C%20and%20reports%20to%20the%20Council](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Defence_Agency#:~:text=The%20European%20Defence%20Agency%20%28EDA%29%20is%20an%20agency,High%20Representative%20%28HR%2FVP%29%2C%20and%20reports%20to%20the%20Council). [16-11-21].

11 Cf.: Homepage Globalsecurity.org. Page European Defence Community. URL: <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/edc.htm#:~:text=Though%20it%20was%20ultimately%20defeated%20on%20a%20procedural,to%20create%20a%20purely%20European%20multinational%20military%20capability>. [16-11-21].

*Council is conducted in a manner that is efficient, coherent, and consistent with the overall objectives of the EU.”<sup>12</sup>*

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12 Homepage of the European Union. Page Directors-General. URL: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/general-secretariat/directors-generals/#:~:text=The%20Directors-General%20are%20in%20charge%20of%20management%20and,consistent%20with%20the%20overall%20objectives%20of%20the%20EU.> [16-11-21].

## 4. Current State of Research

In this chapter, the author aims to present the current state of research on the three sub-areas of:

- EU Defence Minister.
- Defence Council.
- Commission Director General (DG) on Defence.

Most of the research results come from the EU itself, as it is constantly interested in finding new and better methods to achieve its goals. Therefore, many official EU websites were used for research. However, as many of the terms and functions are very similar, a very selective choice of literature by the author was necessary.

The Austrian Security Policy Annual Forecast 2021 also served as a source of much information to the author.

### 4.1 EU Defence Minister

The idea of an EU Defence Minister is not a new one. As early as 1950, the states that would later unite to form the European Union were considering the post of a defence minister to create a purely European multinational military capability.<sup>13</sup>

Today there is a position in the EU which already holds a part of the spectrum of tasks of a possible defence minister. This position is called “The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy”.

Its task is to steer the EU's general foreign and security policy in a certain direction and to ensure compromises between the member states on foreign and security policy issues. He also has the task of representing the EU in international meetings.<sup>14</sup>

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13 Cf.: Homepage of the European Defence Agency. Page Our History. URL: <https://eda.europa.eu/our-history/our-history.html>. [16-11-21].

14 Cf.: Homepage of EEAS. Page High Representative/Vice President. URL: [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage\\_en/3598/High%20Representative/Vice%20President](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/3598/High%20Representative/Vice%20President). [16-11-21].



However, if one searches for information about the post of an EU Defence Minister, one finds extremely little information. Most of it only deals with the decisions of all European defence ministers.

## 4.2 Defence Council

Many states have implemented such a body for years. Examples are the United Kingdom, Croatia, Ghana and the former Soviet Union. In most cases, the Defence Council is part of the Ministry of Defence, either incorporated or subordinate.<sup>15</sup>

The idea of a Defence Council is not new to the EU either. The idea, which was put forward in 1950, was as follows:

*“A European armament and equipment programme would be drawn up and carried out under the authority of a European Defence Minister, who in turn would operate under a European Defence Council.”<sup>16</sup>*



**Figure 2:** The French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, on 9 May 1950, during the signing of the so-called Schuman Declaration.<sup>17</sup>

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15 Cf.: Homepage Wikipedia. Page Defence Council. URL: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defence\\_Council](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defence_Council). [16-11-21].

16 Homepage of the European Defence Agency. Page Our History. Op. cit. URL: <https://eda.europa.eu/our-history/our-history.html>. [16-11-21].

17 Homepage Schulze-Europa. Page 70 Jahre Schuman-Erklärung: Der Grundstein für die EU. Translated into English the title means: 70 Years of the Schuman Declaration: The Foundation

This proposal, which was implemented in the larger idea of the European Defence Community (EDC), received a severe setback in 1954 when the treaty was rejected by France.<sup>18</sup>

The agency most similar to a Defence Council in the EU at the moment is the European Defence Agency (EDA).

The introduction of a Defence Council is currently not a priority or a planned step for the EU, so the current research progress in this area is correspondingly vague.

### **4.3 Commission Director General (DG) on Defence**

With many new initiatives concerning the common defence of the EU, especially the EDF (European Defence Fund), the EU has been planning to create the post of DG DEF (Director General on Defence) for some time. In August 2018, the plans became more concrete and Jean-Claude Juncker, then President of the European Commission, agreed to the plans.<sup>19</sup>

One of the main tasks of such a DG DEF would be to manage the EDF in a proper and forward-looking manner. Also it is intended to promote cooperation between member states in the field of military research.

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Stone for the EU. URL: <https://www.schulze-europa.eu/70-jahre-schuman-erklaerung-der-grundstein-fuer-die-eu/>. [16-11-21].

18 Cf.: Homepage of the European Defence Agency. Page Our History. Op. cit. URL: <https://eda.europa.eu/our-history/our-history.html>. [16-11-21].

19 Cf.: Homepage Eyes on Europe. Page A NEW DG FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION? MEET DG DEFENCE. URL: <https://www.eyes-on-europe.eu/dg-defence/>. [16-11-21].



**Figure 3:** Sign with the imprint "DG DEF"<sup>20</sup>

The general opinion is that a DG DEF could make the already very complex system of the defence sphere even more complex. On the other hand, it would bring many opportunities.<sup>21</sup>

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20 Homepage Eyes on Europe. Page A NEW DG FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION? MEET DG DEFENCE. Op. cit. URL: <https://www.eyes-on-europe.eu/wp-content/uploads/Article-A-new-DG-for-the-European-Commission-Meet-DG-Defence.jpg>. [16-11-21].

21 Cf.: Homepage Eyes on Europe. Page A NEW DG FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION? MEET DG DEFENCE. Op. cit. URL: <https://www.eyes-on-europe.eu/dg-defence/>. [16-11-21].

## 5. Research Gap

*“With its own army, Europe could credibly respond to a threat to peace in a member state or a neighbouring country of the European Union”<sup>22</sup>*

Jean-Claude Juncker, former head of the EU Commission, said at the time. The political implications of an EU army are already being explored. However, the financial potential of a European army that obtains its equipment from the domestic arms industry is less talked about.<sup>23</sup>



**Figure 4:** Jean-Claude Juncker, the former Head of the European Commission.<sup>24</sup>

Since the author is firmly convinced that history repeats itself again and again, he will, in addition to the advantages and disadvantages of such posts, also highlight the effects that an already existing post could have had at these times of crisis.

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22 Homepage Tagesschau. Juncker will eine gemeinsame EU-Armee. Translated into English the title means: Juncker wants a common EU army. Translated from German. URL: <https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/juncker-armee-finanzminister-101.html>. [16-11-21].

23 Cf.: Homepage Welt. Page Sieben gute Gründe für eine europäische Armee. Translated into English the title means: Seven good reasons for a European army. URL: <https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article138253485/Sieben-gute-Gruende-fuer-eine-europaeische-Armee.html>. [16-11-21].

24 Homepage The Telegraph. URL: [https://www.telegraph.co.uk/content/dam/news/2017/03/21/TELEMMGLPICT000123918462-xlarge\\_trans\\_NvBQzQNjv4BqVeV8OoZxp1WMt6i1E9eewBJUDwhvmx6f5qGjnRKsrd0.jpeg](https://www.telegraph.co.uk/content/dam/news/2017/03/21/TELEMMGLPICT000123918462-xlarge_trans_NvBQzQNjv4BqVeV8OoZxp1WMt6i1E9eewBJUDwhvmx6f5qGjnRKsrd0.jpeg). [16-11-21].

The political developments that may necessitate the introduction of such posts are already covered in a number of journals and books, but the author will nevertheless cover them in this essay in order to achieve a more comprehensive understanding on the part of the reader.<sup>25</sup>

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25 Remark of the Author

## 6. Research Questions

The main focus of this essay is to explore whether there is a need for certain posts or bodies in the EU. The question of necessity arises in relation to strategic autonomy, effectiveness of the management and use of specific funds and the speed of action of the European Union. Accordingly, the main research question is:

**Is there a need for an EU “Defence Minister”, “Defence Council”, or a “Commission Director General (DG) on Defence”?**

In order to be able to answer this question, the author devotes himself to examining this question from two different points of view:

- Supplemental question number 1: What would be the advantages of a "Minister of Defence", a "Defence Council" or a "Director General (DG) of the Commission for Defence" for the management of EU funds?
- Supplemental question number 2: What would be the impact on Europe's autonomy if a "Minister of Defence", a "Defence Council" or a "Director General (DG) of the Commission for Defence" was introduced?

Due to the length of the essay, author will focus with emphasis on the post of Commission Director General (DG) on Defence and cover the other posts in passing.

## 7. Methodology

In order to be able to make a qualitatively valuable statement at the end of this essay, the author has made it his task to use as many different sources on this topic as possible in order to avoid a tunnel vision. The sources are mainly official internet sources, but the author also used books, articles of scientific magazines and newspaper articles to also discuss the general opinion of the population on this topic.

In order to be able to answer the main question sufficiently, the author has decided to formulate two sub-questions, the answering of which throughout the essay leads to an answer to the main question.

The approach to developing this essay is mainly based on the author's methodical interpretation of various texts. This process of understanding and interpretation is called hermeneutics. In the following graphic, the author provides a pictorial representation of the methodology used and the literary approach.



Figure 5: Flowchart of the methodical approach.<sup>26</sup>

26 Figure created by the author.

## **8. Research and Results**

### **8.1 Impact of a Director General (DG) on Defence on the European Defence Budget**

Since the EU does not have a unified army, it also does not have a classical military budget as known from regular states. But the will to cooperate together, despite constant disagreement among member states about a unified army, eventually led to the introduction of the European Defence Fund. At the moment, this is the closest project to an EU defence budget.

#### **8.1.1 Reasons for the Foundation of the EDF**

The EDF was founded because, despite some preliminary attempts, the European defence industry clearly lacked international investment and thus could not compete. All research and procurement continued to take place at the national level. The figures here ranged between 80% and 90% for member states.<sup>27</sup>

In terms of the number of weapon systems in use, the EU is also far behind global players such as the USA. While the US has standardised weapon systems, the EU is extremely fragmented in this area. The 30 weapons systems in use in the US speak for themselves when compared to the 178 weapons systems in use in the EU. This lack of coordination between member states leads to a large amount of duplication in research and thus to an inefficient use of national defence budgets that could be reinvested in other areas.<sup>28</sup>

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27 Cf.: European Commission. (2017) Launching the European Defence Fund. Document to the European Parliament, the council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. S. 2f.

28 Ibid.



Therefore, in June 2017, a new instrument was developed by the European Commission to counteract these problems. The European Defence Fund, or EDF for short.<sup>29</sup>

### 8.1.2 Budget of the EDF

A budget of approximately eight billion euros has been earmarked for the EDF for the period from 2021 to 2027. This budget will be divided into two main areas:




Figure 6: Breakdown of the EDF budget for 2021 to 2027.<sup>30</sup>

The exact strategy and allocation of these funds per year is outlined as follows:




Figure 7: Allocation of EDF funds per year.<sup>31</sup>

29 Homepage of European Committee of the Regions. Page Local leaders support the European Defence Fund. URL: <https://cor.europa.eu/da/news/Pages/Local-leaders-support-the-European-Defence-Fund.aspx>. [18-11-21].

30 Ibid.

The purpose of this budget, as shown on the illustrations, is to promote European defence research and encourage it to work together to avoid unnecessary duplication. Furthermore, the development of this industry is to be promoted in order to increase the procurement of European defence products. This is linked to an increase in Europe's autonomy and the further development of a large economic sector.<sup>32</sup>

However, although this is already a very good approach, neither the monetary resources nor the speed of development of this project are sufficient to keep pace with current developments in the world of politics.

### 8.1.3 Possibilities of a DG DEF in Relation to Finances

What would change with the implementation of a Director General (DG) on Defence? If such a decision were to be made, it would have a very significant impact on the European Union. For the first time, it would be possible to request a budget for the defence of the Union itself.

*“The Commission draws up the draft budget, which it proposes to the Council and Parliament under Article 314 TFEU”<sup>33</sup>*

In addition, it would be possible to enact binding laws for all member states, since the European Commission has the legislative power of the EU. For example, minimum percentages for defence budgets could be set across Europe.<sup>34</sup>

Basically the Treaty of Lisbon does not plan for such a function.<sup>35</sup> However, considering the political changes of modern times, the thought comes that such an implementation might not only be an important but even a necessary step.

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31 European Commission. (2017) Launching the European Defence Fund. Document to the European Parliament, the council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Op. cit. S.4.

32 Summary of the author.

33 Homepage Fact Sheets on the European Union. Page The European Commission. Op. Cit. URL: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/25/the-european-commission>. [19-11-21].

34 Cf.: Ibid.

35 Cf.: Homepage of EUR-Lex. Page The European Commission. URL: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:ai0006>. [19-11-21].

### 8.1.4 Reference to the Past

Every crisis in which the EU has reacted too slowly and not forcefully enough is directly linked to the lack of a DG DEF. By implementing such a post at an early stage, the EU would have been forced to agree on a common foreign and defence policy more quickly. If the EU had already cooperated on foreign and defence policy in past crises, this could have had a major impact on its autonomy and position in geopolitics.

The "preventive war" in Iraq from 2003 to 2011 is an example of this European disunion when it comes to armed conflict.




Figure 8: Opponents and supporters of the war in Iraq.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>36</sup> Translated by the Author. U. a. Cit. acc. to. Homepage Academic. URL: [https://de.academic.ru/pictures/dewiki/73/Iraq\\_war\\_opponents.PNG](https://de.academic.ru/pictures/dewiki/73/Iraq_war_opponents.PNG). [19-11-21].

Such cases will occur less or at least not at this scale nowadays due to the CSDP, but a DG DEF would further strengthen joint military action within the EU and make it more effective, as a post would then be created whose sole task is to manage the day-to-day business of European defence. This would bring a lot of routine into the European defence policy and thus enable a faster and more efficient but above all united action in case of a new crisis.<sup>37</sup>

This concludes the answer of the Supplemental question number 1. The implementation of a DG DEF would not only improve the management of EU funds through the unity of command principle, but it would also open new financial doors for the entire defence industry in Europe.<sup>38</sup>

## **8.2 Impact of a DG DEF on the European Autonomy**

### **8.2.1 Autonomy through Arms Industry**

The autonomy<sup>39</sup> that can be gained by having one's own defence industry has many Advantages:

- Promotion of own economy.
- Autonomy and security in terms of replenishment.
- Fewer restrictions on procurement.
- Prevent dissemination of sensitive technical data to other countries.
- More control to which countries weapons may be sold.
- Fewer political dependencies.

But these benefits come at a price. A fully autonomous defence industry is almost impossible in today's world, especially for an association of states like the EU, which is

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37 Homepage Fact Sheets on the European Union. Page The European Commission. Op. Cit. URL: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/25/the-european-commission>. [19-11-21].

38 Remark of the Author.

39 Definition on Page 3.

deeply rooted in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Nevertheless, the EU has been striving to strengthen and unify the domestic defence industry since 2013.<sup>40</sup>

*“Fragmented European defence markets threaten the viability and competitiveness of the European defence and security industry.”<sup>41</sup>*



**Figure 9:** German main battle tank.<sup>42</sup>

By investing in its own defence industry, not only autonomy but also the economy is strengthened. In 2019, for example, the EU spent a total of €45.6 billion on defence equipment. If the EU succeeds in investing this money within the Union, it would be a huge gain for the entire European continent.<sup>43</sup>

Furthermore, the EU would experience an increase in its autonomy through more freedom in arms exports. Under the “International Traffic in Arms Regulations”, the US

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40 Cf.: Homepage Youtube. Page RÜSTUNGSINDUSTRIE: So will sich Europas Militär von den USA emanzipieren. Translated into English the title means: ARMED INDUSTRY: This is how Europe's military wants to emancipate itself from the USA. URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FHkeLF9sCDw>. [20-11-21].

41 EUROPEAN COUNCIL. (2013). EUROPEAN COUNCIL 19/20 DECEMBER 2013 CONCLUSIONS. Brussel. P.2.

42 Rainer. A. (2015). Ausverkauf deutscher Panzer an Frankreich verhindern!. Frankfurt. Frankfurter Allgemeine as of 8-7-15. URL: [https://media1.faz.net/ppmedia/aktuell/politik/2997502112/1.3691653/format\\_top1\\_breit/der-kampfpanzer-leopard-2-a6.jpg](https://media1.faz.net/ppmedia/aktuell/politik/2997502112/1.3691653/format_top1_breit/der-kampfpanzer-leopard-2-a6.jpg). [20-11-21].

43 Cf.: Möhrle. S. (2020). Arms Information Centre as of 27-4-20. URL: <https://www.ribev.at/2020/04/27/ruestungsausgaben-steigen-weltweit/>. [20-11-21].

has the right to restrict exports of all products which incorporate US technology, which makes the EU highly dependent on the consent of the USA.<sup>44</sup>

Military security also plays a role in this case, as it would be possible to develop weapons systems whose technical details are not known to other states. It is therefore safe to say that a strong European defence industry would bring military, economic and political benefits. The promotion of such an industry could be accelerated enormously by a European defence budget.<sup>45</sup>

### **8.2.2 Autonomy through Legislation**

*“As a rule, the Commission has a monopoly on the initiative in EU law-making (Article 17(2) TEU). It draws up proposed acts to be adopted by the two decision-making institutions, Parliament and the Council.”<sup>46</sup>*


If a Commissioner of Defence were to make a legislative proposal for a directive or regulation, which would then be implemented, it would be binding on all states. This would offer many new possibilities, such as a uniform increase in the defence budget of the individual states to a certain percentage, as NATO has been trying to implement for years.

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<sup>44</sup> Cf.: Homepage Youtube. Page RÜSTUNGSINDUSTRIE: So will sich Europas Militär von den USA emanzipierten. Translated into English the title means: ARMED INDUSTRY: This is how Europe's military wants to emancipate itself from the USA. Op. cit. URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FHkeLF9sCDw>. [20-11-21].

<sup>45</sup> Remark of the Author.

<sup>46</sup> Homepage Fact Sheets on the European Union. Page The European Commission. Op. Cit. URL: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/25/the-european-commission>. [19-11-21].



**Figure 10:** Pictorial representation of the European legislation.<sup>47</sup>

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47 Homepage of the European Parliament. Page The EU Institutions. Op. Cit. URL: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/unitedstates/resource/static/images/the-european-triangle.png>. [20-11-21].

## 9. Discussion of Results and personal Conclusions

### 9.1 Discussion of Results

In order to summarise the results of this work, the author has decided, for the sake of clarity, to create a graph with points that are for and against the implementation of the DG DEF post. Because as the famous saying goes: A picture is worth a thousand words.




Figure 11: Advantages and disadvantages of implementing a DG DEF.<sup>48</sup>

48 Figure created by the author.



As can be seen from the graphic, there would be more advantages than disadvantages for the EU in implementing such a post. However, this conclusion was drawn from the perspective of the European Union and not from that of the member states. Even if, in the author's opinion, the only promising opportunity for European countries in the long term is the EU, there are, as indicated in the graph above, many anti-EU parties that are averse to such changes, since they are imposed at the expense of part of the self-determination of the individual member states.

The reorganisation of the hierarchy would also probably mean a deterioration of the administration within the EU in the short term until the newly created posts have become established. The replacement of the EDA as the managing body for the EDF would be such an example.

However, the positive aspects would outweigh these negative ones. The economic and technical boost the EU would receive from an competitive arms industry would be enormous. The economically strongest country in the world, the US, has built its industry around the arms industry for a reason.

Furthermore, the introduction of such a post would also make a clear statement in terms of foreign policy: The EU is now ready to represent its interests on the world stage militarily and sees itself not only as a referee but as an active player in geopolitics.

In summary, geopolitically and economically, there is a strong need for a Commission Director General (DG) on Defence. This is especially true if the EU wants to continue to move forward towards a common army, in which case the need is definitely there.

The biggest drawback in writing the paper was the scope. Such an extensive topic would require significantly longer explanations, which is why the author had to cut back in many places than he would have liked.

Probably the most positive effect of the work is the variety of sources. The author has looked at both EU positive and EU critical sources in order to gain a well-founded impression of the situation. Due to the extensive research, the author was ultimately able to answer the research question clearly. The fact that the author had the advantage of a civilian as well as military view of the subject also contributed positively to answering the question.

## **9.2 Personal Conclusion**

The results of this work are in line with the author's expectations. The advantages of a DG DEF outweigh the disadvantages. The author's opinion is this: If the European continent wants to maintain itself as a sphere of prosperity and human rights over the next three to five decades, sooner or later the member states will have to start lining up their own nationality behind the EU. The introduction of a position like that of DG DEF is a right accent in this direction. In the author's opinion, it is an absolute necessity to create such a position in the coming years in order to keep pace with geopolitical changes and to strengthen its own autonomy.

## 10. Annexes

### 10.1 List of Abbreviations

CSDP .....	Common Security and Defence Policy
DG DEF .....	Director-General of Defence
DG.....	Director-General
EDF .....	European Defence Fund
EU .....	European Union
EU MS .....	European Member States
NATO .....	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
USA .....	United States of America

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## 10.3 List of Literature

### 10.3.1 Documents

- 01 BMLVS/Direktion für Sicherheitspolitik. (2021). Sicher. Und Morgen? Sicherheitspolitische Jahresvorschau 2021. Translated into English the title means: The EU in the global system. In: Secure. And tomorrow? Annual Security Policy Forecast 2021. Vienna.
- 02 European Commission. (2017) Launching the European Defence Fund. Document to the European Parliament, the council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.
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
## 11. Affidavit

I declare that I have written the present essay independently and on my own. I have clearly marked any language or ideas borrowed from other sources as not my own and documented their sources. The essay does not contain any work that I have handed in or have had graded as a previous scientific paper earlier on.

I am aware that any failure to do so constitutes plagiarism. Plagiarism is the presentation of another person's thoughts or words as if they were my own – even if I summarise, paraphrase, condense, cut, rearrange, or otherwise alter them.

I am aware of the consequences and sanctions plagiarism entails. Among others, consequences may include nullification of the essay, exclusion from participation in the CSDP Olympiad. These consequences also apply retrospectively, i.e., if plagiarism is discovered after the essay has been accepted and graded. I am fully aware of the scope of these consequences.

Signature

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Reitsperger". The signature is written in a cursive style with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right. Below the signature is a dotted line.

(Officer Cadet Georg REITSPERGER)

Wiener Neustadt, Austria in November 2021



**The context between „strategic autonomy“ and the Common Security  
and Defense Policy (CSDP)**

Essay

Created for the CSDP Olympiad 2021

in Salon de Provence, France

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Varna, November 2021

## **Abstract**

Since its creation the European Union (EU) has always been a significant pillar of peace, freedom of its citizens, security and justice, the sustainable development in Europe and many others. However, for several decades now the EU has been playing a prominent role in the military-political aspect as well. Its main instrument is Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Since 2016 a new idea emerged – the so called “strategic autonomy”. This was provoked by the new threats for security, which occurred.

In this essay I am going to expose the first attempts of the EU towards its own defense policy. What is more, I am going to consider CSDP as a strategic instrument of the Union and a future fundament of the idea of strategic autonomy, its goals and its contribution to the world peace and security crises management.

The essay will also describe the new obstacles in which our world and partly the EU have to evolve and indeed why the Union needs to play a role in the military-political aspect. I am going to give a detailed explanation of what this concept stands for: a definition for strategic autonomy, the dimensions that the idea reaches in different representatives’ opinions and visions for the future, the advantages and disadvantages of this new idea and what steps were taken to bring the EU closer to this concept. The most significant part of the essay, though, is the answer of the Research question: ”What is the context between strategic autonomy and CSDP?”. Being a guideline through the whole essay, this problem is going to be solved in the Research and Results of Research part. Actually, in this part my personal research and opinion is going to be strongly exposed.

**Key words:** European Union, strategic autonomy, Common Security and Defense Policy, European Union Global Strategy, new security threats

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## 2. Preface

The essence and the problems of a complex world with serious threats for security leads to the vital need of a good professionals with exceptional consciousness of the processes and the tendencies in global aspect, huge specialized knowledge and deep knowledge about history, adaptive thinking and last but not least a strong character. Actually, the idea of an open-minded, highly prepared and thinking officers who „ask questions on the base of knowledge, competence and ideas“ is a strongly supported thesis and mission by the Bulgarian military leadership.<sup>1</sup> Since I decided that I want to join the Naval Forces of Bulgaria 7 years ago, my ambition has not only been becoming an officer. My ambition has been becoming an officer with the above mentioned qualities and abilities, because of the essence of a true contemporary leader.

What is more, one of the main reasons which made me decide to join the Armed Forces was the aspect of the new threats in security, and more specifically, the War in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 – areas, which concern the regional security. I was personally affected and inspired to become an officer and to understand more about global politics, the EU and the CSDP even more by the new problems of the security a year later. A main goal of mine has been a future contribution to the security.

Actually my “second home” is a small town close to the South-Eastern border of Bulgaria called Malko Tarnovo so I was a personal witness of the actions related to the border protection from the migration flow process. Moreover, close relatives of mine were involved in the border protection. However, these men were not the only ones involved in the security and defense aspect which gave me a personal example of responsibility, professionalism and commitment to the national and international causes. My father, uncles and grandfathers have served proudly in the Armed Forces, but there is no better personal example than the one of my great grandfather who fought and died as a sergeant in the World War 2 (1939-1945). The letters and photos which this man had left behind made a huge impact on my ideas and principles since I was a child and inflamed a sustainable passion in history, military sciences, geopolitics.

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<sup>1</sup> Homepage of Ministry of Defense of Bulgaria (MOD). Minister Georgi Panayotov: The Bulgarian Army has always been a guardian and generator of national values URL: [https://mod.bg/bg/news.php?fn\\_mode=fullnews&fn\\_id=12206](https://mod.bg/bg/news.php?fn_mode=fullnews&fn_id=12206) [29.10.2021].

Taking into account the above mentioned goals of mine and my interest, this topic was chosen in order to take me one step further towards becoming an effective, useful, promising, open-minded and thinking officer. The authorship of this essay would give me significant knowledge of CSDP, the concept of strategic autonomy and also a lot of secondary but useful knowledge of the recent defense programmes and military platforms. What is more, it will affirm and further develop knowledge of certain aspect of the recent history.

Moreover, I want to dedicate the essay to my great grandfather sergeant Sava Dimitrov Ludiev, who died young (32 y.o.) of a land mine in the last day of World War 2, on 8-th May 1945 in Austria, and thank him for the personal example and the sacrifice in the name of our country and a peaceful and free Europe.

### 3. Introduction

#### 3.1 The new security environment

The European Union is recently experiencing new difficulties. The Russo-Georgian War in 2008 marked the beginning of a new period of increased regional and global tension due to new threats for security. Serious menaces were the Syrian conflict, which broke out in 2011, Russian hybrid war operations, the War in Ukraine and the Russian annexation of Crimea, which occurred in 2014. The huge migration flows in 2015 which reached the heart of Europe, posed many challenges to the national security and especially in border protection institutions.<sup>2</sup> What is more, the cases of terrorism in Europe increased as one of the consequences of the migrant crisis.<sup>3</sup> The rising of China and its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) strongly enlarged China's economic and political influence, threatening the Union's global power.<sup>4</sup> The COVID-19 pandemic is turning EU's sight towards common health policy, protecting its citizens' health and safety, Recovery plan for the economics.<sup>5</sup> Actually, the pandemic proved the instability and vulnerability of the Union in such type of crisis. Another problem was Brexit, threatening the EU's economy by restricting the international market.

#### 3.2 Awareness on time

History has proved that systematization, purposefulness and reforming the system is reached many times not until this problem escalates and irreversible consequences occur. For instance, the sinking of the "unsinkable" Titanic in 1912 and its nearly 1500 victims led to the signing of Safety of Life at Sea convention (SOLAS) in 1974.<sup>6</sup> Another example is the establishing of the Coal and steel community in 1952 based on

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<sup>2</sup> Cf.: Homepage of Fact Sheets on the European Union. Page Management of the external borders. URL: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/153/management-of-the-external-borders> [01.11.2021].

<sup>3</sup> Cf.: Homepage of European Union External Action Service (EUEAS). Page Counter-terrorism. URL: [https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/counter-terrorism/411/counter-terrorism\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/counter-terrorism/411/counter-terrorism_en) [01.11.2021].

<sup>4</sup> Cf.: Homepage of Council on Foreign affairs. Page China's Massive Belt and Road Initiative. URL: <https://www.cfr.org/background/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative> [13.11.2021].

<sup>5</sup> Cf.: Homepage of European Movement International (EMI). Page EMI: A European Union Response to COVID-19. URL: <https://europeanmovement.eu/emi-a-european-union-response-to-covid-19-eurmove/> [02.11.2021].

<sup>6</sup> Cf.: Homepage of International Maritime Organisation (IMO). Page International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). URL: [https://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/Pages/International-Convention-for-the-Safety-of-Life-at-Sea-\(SOLAS\),-1974.aspx](https://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/Pages/International-Convention-for-the-Safety-of-Life-at-Sea-(SOLAS),-1974.aspx) [02.11.2021].

Shuman Plan. This EU progenitor's aim was to prevent another war by placing the control of strategic resources – Franco-German coal and steel production, at single authority i.e. to minimize potential conflict probability by economic commitment.<sup>7</sup> That is why, despite being an economic union, the EU has always had a peacekeeping orientation. Although nothing crucial or fatal has affected the EU, problems, caused by the new security threats, are piling up.

## **4. Current state of research**

In this chapter I want to consider the current state of research referring to strategic autonomy and CSDP. Defining the sources of the research will help to confirm the

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<sup>7</sup> Cf.: Homepage of European Defense and Security College (ESDC). AKU 01 - History and Context of ESDP/CSDP. URL: [https://esdc.adlunap.ro/ilias.php?baseClass=iLSAHSPresentationGUI&ref\\_id=66670](https://esdc.adlunap.ro/ilias.php?baseClass=iLSAHSPresentationGUI&ref_id=66670) [02.11.2021].

authenticity of the information. The objectivity of the problem will be achieved by considering various sources and opinions.

#### 4.1 Progressive concept development

Over the years European States gradually came to the idea of autonomous aspects of the EU's internal and external policy, which purpose was to strengthen its positions and increase its global influence. In order to accomplish this task efficient agencies were created, numerous treaties and declarations were signed and implemented, but one of the most important is the Lisbon Treaty, signed in 2007. This treaty had a significant and diverse impact on the European Union, but one of the most important achievements was the establishment of Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). It was presented as "*integral part of the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) and shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets*".<sup>8</sup>

In 2016 in order to regain the Union's global supremacy and influence, EUGS set out 5 priorities on EU external actions:

- „*The Security of our Union*
- *State and Societal Resilience to our East and South*
- *An Integrated Approach to Conflicts*
- *Cooperative Regional Orders*
- *Global Governance for the 21st Century*".<sup>9</sup>

The EUGS is a culmination of the gradually deepening the defense and security cooperation in European Union. Setting accurate and clear priorities, it gives the opportunity to the Member States (MS) not only for getting over the alarming international situation but also for a major progress in many different aspects of development: political, mobility, economical, industrial, etc.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Treaty of Lisbon (2007). Official regulation 2007. P 34

<sup>9</sup> Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy (2016). Our Shared Interests and Principles Official regulation 2016. P. 9-10.

<sup>10</sup> Cf.: Ibid.



I will consider the scale of CSDP and what stands between it and the autonomy, leaning on the historical concepts of CSDP, the different representatives' points of view to the question and the gradual changes in security environment.

## **4.2 Research sources**

This topic was analyzed by the EU representatives and by the CSDP specialists. Many experts and advisors, for instance part of European Policy Centre (EPC), have posted their papers and reports. Statements of Member States' heads and representatives on this topic are available as well. However, the most considerable current state of research remains in the official EU treaties, declarations and analyzes.

## 5. Research Gap

*“We need to react and show that we have the power and capacity to defend ourselves.”<sup>11</sup>* These words told during the present year by an emblematic European president – Emanuel Macron, speak very clearly about the essence of strategic autonomy. They also show the ambition of France in this direction. However, this is the point of view of only one of the Member States representatives. This, indeed, is a key point in researching the problem of the topic and the gap of research.

The research gap defines that there is no clarity on some issues referring to the chosen topic. Defining the gap requires detailed and comprehensive knowledge about the CSDP and strategic autonomy. In that aspect concrete measures were taken in order to ensure the EU with partial autonomy but strategic autonomy hasn't been reached yet. A future ambiguity about implementation of this concept exists and therefore there is no specific plan about its enforcement. A basic and emblematic EU principle is of a great significance for the current obstacles and crossroads in front of the Union – the decision making and the specifics which determines it i.e. the context of 28 Member States with different national interests. Hence the gap concerns the argumentation of various aspects and details of the concept of strategic autonomy and the possibility of its implementation.

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<sup>11</sup> Homepage of Euronews. Page Macron tells Europe to 'stop being naive' after France signs defence deal with Greece.. URL: <https://www.euronews.com/2021/09/29/france-greece-defence> [03.11.2021].

## 6. Research Questions

By asking questions this part of the essay will serve as a continuation of the Research Gap chapter. Being a guideline through the whole essay, the main question is “What is the context between strategic autonomy and CSDP?”. Answering this question though requires the consideration of two sub-questions:


- Why strategic autonomy is a good concept for the European Union i.e. what is argumentation of that concept?
- To what extent this concept is feasible?

What is more, an effective and suitable methodology is required in order to give appropriate and objective answers to these three questions.

## 7. Methodology

The essay, concerning a sensitive and significant topic, requires a complex and responsible approach.

In order to give appropriate and objective answers to this main question, the sub-questions must be answered on the basis of a detailed and comprehensive knowledge and topic analyzes. To gain it I used a variety of sources such as official Internet web-pages, documents and other literature: for instance, Handbook on CSDP. This methodology is based on a systematic approach.



**Figure.1:** Methodology based on systematic approach.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Figure created by the author.

## 8. Research and Results of Research

The Research and Results of Research chapter is going to give the readers a comprehensive picture about the historical development of the CSDP and concept of strategic autonomy. It will also focus on answering the two supplementary questions and most importantly, it will clarify the main research question.

### 8.1 Historical overview

#### 8.1.1 Emergence of common European values and goals

The tragedy and the horror of World War 2 (1939-1945) changed the world forever: dozens of millions casualties – both military and civilians, Holocaust and other ethnic mass killings, the emerging and the destroying use of nuclear weapons, economic collapses, the arise of new technologies. Shortly the awareness of not taking long-term and effective measures supporting the peace in Europe and in global aspect after the Great War (1914-1919) changed the Europeans' mindset - peace, freedom and prosperity of the European citizens became main values and goals.

#### 8.1.2 Enhancing common foreign policy

Number of initiatives set the stage for interaction between European countries. One of the most prominent was the Brussels Treaty (1948) – a basis for the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, the Coal and Steel Community in 1951 and the Western European Union (WEU) in 1957.<sup>13</sup> A key role in that treaty played the clause which bound the Member States *“to afford assistance to each other, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in maintaining international peace and security and in resisting any policy of aggression”*.<sup>14</sup>

Realizing the necessity of a common foreign policy, European Political Co-operation (EPC) was established in the 1960-s. In 1992 the systematic foreign policy efforts resulted in the creation of CFSP by the Maastricht Treaty. However, the tragic events

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<sup>13</sup> Rehr, J. & Weisserth, H. Handbook on CSDP (2013). Publication of the Federal Ministry of Defense and Sports of the Republic of Austria. Vienna. 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. P. 14

<sup>14</sup> Homepage of NATO. Page The Brussels Treaty. URL: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_17072.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17072.htm) [10.11.2021].

during and after the Yugoslavic wars on the Balkans (1991-1999) proved a lack of cooperation and a lack of relevant military capabilities in Europe.<sup>15</sup> Hence deepening the efforts, interaction and capabilities for a crises management was a must. Later initiatives as St. Malo declaration (1998), creation of ESDP (1999) and the introducing of the Headline Goal in 2003, made the EU more capable of performing different range of operations. A perfect example of a successful EU operation is Operation “Atalanta” – an extremely effective antipiracy naval operation near the Somalian coast, that began in 2008.

As I mentioned before ESDP later evolved in CSDP, established by the Lisbon Treaty in 2007. Actually it represented a key step forward towards deepening the independence of the EU.

The concept of strategic autonomy though has started to gain serious popularity over the last decade. Yes, the concept itself sounds like a perfect solution for EU’s problems, but is it really?

## 8.2 Essence of strategic autonomy

In order to effectively examine this concept, a brief look at the meaning of these two simple words is required. The web-page of Cambridge dictionary defines “autonomy” as “*the right of an organization, country, or region to be independent and govern itself*”.<sup>16</sup> The adjective “strategic” is “*relating to the way in which an organization, country, etc. decides what it wants to achieve and plans actions and use of resources over time to do this*”.<sup>17</sup>

However this idea of being able to act and plan autonomously was initially linked to the defense capabilities of the Union, it gradually acquired new dimensions: economical, political, industrial, etc. The reasons for this aren’t few. The main one though is that EU’s role of a global factor sensitively decreased. In this term many representatives find autonomy as a necessity and a must in order to reestablish the Union influence and

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<sup>15</sup> Cf.: Homepage of European Defense Agency (EDA). Page Our History. URL: <https://eda.europa.eu/our-history/our-history.html> [10.11.2021].

<sup>16</sup> Homepage of Cambridge dictionary. URL: <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/autonomy> [10.11.2021].

<sup>17</sup> Ibid

power. Macron's opinion is very indicative for the significance of strategic autonomy in security and defense.

He strongly emphasizes the importance of defending EU interests in regions close to EU borders: *"The Middle East and Africa is our neighborhood, not the U.S.'s."*<sup>18</sup> In fact, the EU's non-interference in Asian conflicts such as those in Nagorno-Karabakh, Syria and Libya let world powers such as Russia, Turkey and the United States to resolve these conflicts in their favor.<sup>19</sup> Hence the essence of the problem is not the absence of military capabilities but it is the political choice and strategic judgments. This resulted in slowly losing of EU's political influence.

However, not only would it be better for the Union itself to take beneficial initiative in the region, but what is even more important due to the regional features and factors, this could be the only effective way to deal with the regional threats. After all, the USA is thousands of kilometers away from Europe and the Middle East so its expertise, situational awareness and significance of its national interests are on a much lower level, compared to European countries. Other officials though don't share the same view on autonomy.

### **8.3 Different perceptions and opinions about this idea**

As I mentioned in the Research Gap chapter, one of the reasons this concept is not easily applicable to the EU policy is because of the consensus decision making principle in the EU. But why there is no unity in such an important initiative? A general problem is that there is no certain and official EU definition and view of this concept. This may lead to different perceptions and interpretation in EU community. President Macron, for instance, have a clear vision on strategic autonomy, while others put emphasis on deepening certain aspects of autonomy such as economical, border protection or defense for example.

### **8.4 Current situation and the near future**

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<sup>18</sup> Homepage of US Naval Institute. Page French President Macron Calls For European 'Strategic Autonomy'. ff. URL: <https://news.usni.org/2021/02/08/french-president-macron-calls-for-european-strategic-autonomy> [15.11.2021].

<sup>19</sup> Homepage of EEAS. Page Why European strategic autonomy matters. URL: [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/89865/why-european-strategic-autonomy-matters\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/89865/why-european-strategic-autonomy-matters_en) [17.11.2021].

In my personal opinion the most recent security threats would play a key strategic role. The Polish-Belarus border crises, the continuing COVID-19 pandemics, the Turkish actions in the Eastern Mediterranean and most importantly the Afghanistan crises and hence the new migration crisis, etc. are part of the process of dynamic and crucial changes in the security environment. These events may actually set the question of strategic autonomy on a daily basis again. Especially with the French presidency of the EU in 2022, bearing in mind the legislative functions of the Presidency.<sup>20</sup>

## **8.5 To what extent the concept is feasible?**

In my opinion, the approach towards a possible implementation of strategic autonomy should be initially in one direction, referring to a problem of a great significance for each MS: for instance, this could be the migrant crises. In that way, the spill-over effect could be reached, expanding the scope of autonomy. Otherwise, the establishing of this idea may encounter strong resistance. Anyway, even if strategic autonomy succeeds in time, it would take long-term, complex, gradual and systematic measures. The reason is that it is about a change in EU's mindset. And however the changes in the Union occur hardly, their effectiveness and meaning are indisputable.

## **8.6 Answer of the main question**

We could best understand the context between the CSDP and strategic autonomy through an in-depth insight into one aspect of EU development from the perspective of both. In this case the most important is of course the defense policy of the Union.

### **8.6.1 Defense policy in accordance with CSDP**

Eloquent examples of successful cooperation in defense sector are the Permanent Structured Command (PESCO), the European Defense Action plan (EDAP), the European Defense Fund (EDF) and of course the European Defense Agency (EDA), established in 2004. As a part of CSDP policy and the execution of EUGS, these

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<sup>20</sup> Cf.: Homepage of European Council. Page The presidency of the Council of the EU. URL: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/presidency-council-eu/#> [13.11.2021].



instruments support our countries' economy, local industry, harmonize maintenance and management of various military platforms, increasing EU defense market competitiveness in global aspect. These are advantages of a great importance not only for the defense capabilities but in many other directions of EU development. To me as a future Navy officer, an important EDA project called MARSUR (MARITIME SURVEILLANCE), PESCO's EPC (EUROPEAN PATROL CORVETTE) and also DIVEPACK (DEPLOYABLE MODULAR UNDERWATER INTERVENTION CAPABILITY PACKAGE) with Bulgaria as a coordinator, were of a great interest.<sup>21</sup> However, military-industrial cooperation doesn't mean military operational independence, a necessity for autonomous foreign policy. In this case the following questions could be asked:

- To what extent is the EU capable of conducting operations?
- And what is even more important, to what extent is the Union capable of independent strategic decision making in this sphere?

### **8.6.2 Defense perceptions according to strategic autonomy**

The dependence from NATO and especially from the USA, still restricts the Union from a necessary intervention in the interests of the Union or from common measures to counter foreign threats. Actually, the essence of autonomy here stands for planning and conducting operations, defending EU interests independently from NATO with MS own divisions and capabilities. It is important to note that the cooperative approach to military industry and project management initiatives remains an important development principle.

A complement to the CSDP in terms of strategic autonomy could be even the creation of European army, considered as a provider of efficient territorial protection of the Union of all kinds of threats like military attack, hybrid threats, huge migrant flows, etc. Moreover, it would contribute to collective defense of Europe, vital for EU MS which are not part of NATO such as Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta, and Sweden.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Cf. Homepage of EDA. Page Projects. URL: <https://pesco.europa.eu/#projects> [13.11.2021].


<sup>22</sup> Cf.: Homepage of BBC. Page EU must step up and build defence. URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-58570505> [13.11.2021].

Eventually here, in the defense aspect, we can very brightly understand what stands between strategic autonomy and CSDP:

- Modern European forces, whether European Army or MS divisions, armed with integrated combat systems and equipment of own production, performing various operations and making decisions independently but still cooperating with partners.

Or on the other hand:

- Military forces in close cooperation, both industrial and operational, capable of conducting different operations, but still depending of NATO in planning and performance.



**Figure 2:** Principles of strategic autonomy<sup>23</sup>

By knowing the history and the essence of CSDP and the idea of strategic autonomy, it becomes clear that strategic autonomy is a complement to the CSDP. Indisputably, the need of continuing the current policy of increased cooperation and increased self-dependence is a must, bearing in mind the accumulation of more and more security threats. In my opinion, one of the EU priorities – defense policy, should temporarily

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<sup>23</sup> Figure created by the author.

remain a part of EDA, PESCO, etc. within CSDP, while strategic autonomy should focus on countering nonconventional risks and threats for the national security of all Member States. In this way, setting an initial solid fundament in autonomy, could later result in fully applying if this concept.

## **9. Discussion of results (pros and cons) and personal Conclusions**

All in all, the concept of strategic autonomy is an appropriate and fair one, which would have to be precisely and conceptually discussed due to the new challenges of security.

After all, it is meant not to replace CSDP, but to amplify it. However, the fact that there is no certain official EU position on what is actually strategic autonomy, makes a lot of officials to project their fears and doubts on this concept.

## 9.1 Concerns and doubts

By a probable applying of strategic autonomy, the vital cooperation especially during and after Covid pandemics between its ongoing partners and mostly NATO would be questioned. To counter this thesis and to reveal that autonomy doesn't mean isolation, protectionism and non-interaction, in 2019 High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini explained the significance of the interaction between EU and NATO while maintaining autonomy, called cooperative autonomy: "*strategic autonomy and cooperation with our partners are two sides of the same coin.*"<sup>24</sup> Emmanuel Macron, an "advocate" on strategic autonomy, also countered the concerns of harmful isolation by giving an example with the French military forces' successful interaction with the USA and the UK in Syria. In that context he strongly emphasized the importance of interoperability between the EU and NATO.<sup>25</sup>

Fear of abandoning the traditional long-standing principles of the Union by setting strategic autonomy in the aspect of economy is a logical problem. But avoiding transactional policies, for example, doesn't mean interrupting Member States' traditional economical approach or setting protectionism.

What is more, to deal with the increasing number of harsh and bold unconventional actions, threatening the EU sovereignty, integrity, border protection, etc., the EU needs appropriate crises management capabilities and efforts.

## 9.2 Ideas for mobility and prospects of strategic autonomy

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<sup>24</sup> Homepage of European Union. Page Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the Munich Security Conference. URL: <https://www.avrupa.info.tr/en/eeas-news/speech-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-munich-security-conference> [13.11.2021].

<sup>25</sup> Cf.: Homepage of US Naval Institute. Page French minister Macron calls for strategic autonomy. Op.cit. URL: <https://news.usni.org/2021/02/08/french-president-macron-calls-for-european-strategic-autonomy> [15.11.2021].

In that context I think that it would be useful to consider the stronger applying of the regional principle in the crises management. For instance, in the context of migration crises on the Polish-Belarusian border in November 2021, the closest Polish allies' help – Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, could be vital for overcoming the regional threat. The valuable expertise of these countries, their experience and role in the region could play a significant role in the crises management. Moreover, these countries' national security is bounded with the security situation in the region so they could benefit from the successful dealing with that threat.

Another interesting problem could be enhancing the use of military forces to deal with natural disasters, nonconventional threats and hybrid wars which became the main form of conflict recently. Because of the dynamic changes in the global security situation, the newest military forces mission became their participation in peacetime operations such as border protection, firefighting, dealing with floods and many other critical situations including dealing with COVID-19 pandemics. However, the effective integration of the military in such various operations in the context of an autonomous Europe requires increasing of the capabilities, the training and the competence of the officers, sergeants and soldiers; their readiness and potential to deal with such type of crises. After all, maintaining autonomy means not only establishing a new mindset, independence and common policies but also having own potential in dealing with different threats. Of course, this does not exclude cooperating with partners from other organizations.

### **9.3 Conclusion**

Seventy years have passed since the establishment of the first common European organization. Seventy years of intensive interaction, cooperation and interdependence between 27 Member States in the economic, political or defense and security sphere in this Union, which we know today as the European Union. Among all other areas of the

EU's policy, defense capabilities are undoubtedly the most important factor for maintaining regional and world peace. However, in the context of recent world events and processes, new trends in the doctrine of the Union are emerging. Strategic autonomy, whether it refers to economics, defense or industrial affairs, is one of them. In my opinion, it is not only an attempt to a positive change, but a vital necessity that would lead the Union forward in every area of its policy overcoming the latest threats and regaining EU global power. To me it is a matter of defending the main principles of the Union, its unique achievements, its history, its present, its future and the honor of those who have fallen in the struggle for the freedom and the human rights, which nowadays the EU represents.

## **10. Annexes**

### **10.1 List of Abbreviations**

## 10. Annexes

### 10.1 List of Abbreviations

BBC.....	British Broadcasting Corporation
BRI.....	Belt and Road Initiative
CFSP.....	Common Foreign Security Policy
COVID-19.....	Corona Virus Disease 2019
DIVEPACK.....	DEPLOYABLE MODULAR UNDERWATER INTERVENTION CAPABILITY PACKAGE
EDA .....	European Defense Agency
EDAP.....	European Defense Action plan
EDF.....	European Defense Fund
EMI.....	European Movement International
EPC .....	European Policy Centre
EPC.....	European Political Cooperation
EU.....	European Union
EUEAS.....	European Union External Action Service
EUGS.....	European Union Global Strategy
HR/VP.....	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission
IMO .....	International Maritime Organisation
MARSUR.....	MARITIME SURVEILLANCE
MOD.....	Ministry of Defense

MS.....	Member States
NATO.....	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
PESCO.....	Permanent Structured Command
SOLAS.....	Safety of Life at Sea
UK.....	United Kingdom
USA.....	United States of America
WEU.....	Western European Union

## 10.2 List of figures

Figure 1- Methodology based on systematic approach. P. 10

Figure 2 – Principles of strategic autonomy. P. 16

## 10.3 List of Literature

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
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## 11. Affidavit

I declare that I have written the present essay independently and on my own. I have clearly marked any language or ideas borrowed from other sources as not my own and documented their sources. The essay does not contain any work that I have handed in or have had graded as a previous scientific paper earlier on. I am aware that any failure to do so constitutes plagiarism. Plagiarism is the presentation of another person's thoughts or words as if they were my own – even if I summarize, paraphrase, condense, cut, rearrange, or otherwise alter them. I am aware of the consequences and sanctions plagiarism entails. Among others, consequences may include nullification of the essay, exclusion from participation in the CSDP Olympiad. These consequences also apply retrospectively, i.e. if plagiarism is discovered after the essay has been accepted and graded. I am fully aware of the scope of these consequences.



Signature  
(Petty officer Dimo Savov)

Varna, Bulgaria in November, 2021

**The context between strategic autonomy and the Common Security and  
Defence Policy**

**= Study Case on the Black Sea =**

Essay

created for the CSDP Olympiad 2022 in Salon-de-Provence, France

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## **Abstract**

When the United Kingdom, France, and the Benelux signed the Treaty of Brussels in 1948, the idea of a united European defence policy was born. European Union Member States agreed to develop permanent political, military, and civilian organizations in order for the European Union to fully undertake its crisis management obligations and operate as a global security actor. The Union's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) allows it to play a prominent role in peacekeeping operations, conflict prevention, and international security. It is an important aspect of the EU's comprehensive crisis management strategy, which includes both civilian and military capabilities. As part of its Common Security and Defence Policy, the European Union has conducted several foreign operations employing civilian and military instruments in several nations across three continents (Europe, Africa, and Asia). However, the EU Member States have realized that the maritime environment plays an important role into security defence strategy.

In this essay the author wants to talk about the context of the Common Security and Defence Policy in terms of maritime security in the Black Sea. This essay begins by describing the history of the CSDP as well as the implementation of the EU Global Strategy.

### **Key words:**

*Global Maritime Domain, maritime security, strategic, autonomy, CSDP*

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## 2. Preface

Due to the confluence of the primary economic, trading, and transit channels of natural resources to and from the Middle East, North Africa, and Eurasia, the Black Sea is one of the regions of greatest geostrategic relevance for the European Union.

As a Romanian second-class midshipman in the Romanian Naval Academy “Mircea cel Bătrân”, the author is interested in the geostrategic role that the Black Sea is playing in the international defence policy. Besides the fact that the author has professional interests as a cadet, he also has a personal perspective as a citizen and firmly believes that Europe requires a strong Common Security and Defence Policy, especially in the field of maritime security.<sup>1</sup>

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1 Statement of the author

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### 3. Introduction

**Motto:** “*Now the going gets tough, it’s time to get going*”<sup>2</sup>

For a good understating of the European strategic autonomy in security defence, it is important to have knowledge and understand the definitions of the key terms of this topic.

According to the dictionary, “*autonomy*” represents “*the state of existing or acting separately from others*”<sup>3</sup>. Autonomy has origins in law; because “*nomos*” means “*law*” in Greek, everything autonomous sets its own laws.

In the same line of thoughts, according to dictionary, “*strategic*” is “*relating to the way in which an organization, country, etc. decides what it wants to achieve and plans actions and use of resources over time to do this*”<sup>4</sup>.

Using CSDP Handbook, the idea of Global Maritime Security refers to “*a series of crossroads: money, power, influence, people, and information*”.<sup>5</sup>

The term of “*maritime domain*” represents “*all areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances*.”<sup>6</sup>

In this moment it is easy to observe that the map become to be more complicated. For sure, the things get complicated based on some new risks, new elements of the hybrid risks, but the geopolitical map stays constant and states that exercise tactics in the area of increasing or decreasing risks of all kinds in the field of security are the same.<sup>7</sup>

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2 Dick Zandee & Bob Deen & Kimberley Kruijver & Adája Stoetman (2020), European strategic autonomy in security and defence, Clingendael Report

3 C.f.: Homepage of Merriam Webster Dictionary. URL : <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/autonomy>

4 C.f.: Homepage of Cambridge Dictionary. URL: <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/strategic>

5 Cf.: Rehl, J (2017). Handbook CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. Vienna. Armed Forces Printing Centre. Volume 1. 3rd edition. P. 225

6 Cf.: U. a. Cit. acc. to. Homepage of national plan to achieve maritime domain awareness for the national strategy for maritime security. URL : [https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/HSPD\\_MDAPlan.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/HSPD_MDAPlan.pdf)

7 Assessment by the author



For the Black Sea's imminent risks we can rely on the support of the partner states, we have the support of USA through strategic partnerships, and we are NATO members, all in the idea of creating a common front to the risks that come from Russia.<sup>8</sup>

Furthermore, the Black Sea area conjugates and correlates with other risk areas such as:

- Risk area of the eastern Mediterranean<sup>9</sup>
- The western Balkans which is a very sensitive area.<sup>10</sup>

A transit area, an area where not only cultures, but also the great global geopolitical powers meet and it means that we need to somehow broaden our vision and look at the world in its complexity, especially in the idea of intersections, in the idea of what the map tells us about how the great powers choose to exercise their interests in border areas.

In the following pages, the author wants to deepen the geopolitical and geostrategic issues in the Black Sea area.

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8 Author's note

9 C.f: Homepage of New Strategy Center. URL: <https://www.newstrategycenter.ro/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/FLANKS-Policy-Brief-Russia-and-Frozen-Conflicts-in-the-Black-Sea-Region.pdf>

10 Ibid.

## 4. Current State of Research

### 4.1 Brief History

The foundations of Europe's security and defense architecture may be traced back to the post-World War II period. Several initiatives allowed increased cooperation across Europe. The signing of the Brussels Treaty (1948) and the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 are two examples.<sup>11</sup>

The European Community (EC) began looking into ways to harmonize member countries' foreign policies in the late 1960s. European leaders instructed their foreign ministers to investigate the potential of closer political unity during The Hague Summit in December 1969.<sup>12</sup>

The Davignon Report (October, 1970) proposed the notion of European Political Cooperation (EPC). The EPC's objectives were specified in the report, which included position harmonization, consultation, and, when necessary, joint measures. It also mentioned specific procedures, such as biannual Foreign Affairs Ministers meetings and quarterly meetings of the Political Directors who make up the Political Committee. Overall, EPC attempted to make the process of consultation among EC Member States easier. The EPC laid the groundwork for the Maastricht Treaty's Common Foreign and Security Policy.<sup>13</sup>

The Treaty of Rome established a single institutional framework, the European Union, based on three pillars, the second of which was the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP- November 1, 1993). The CFSP went above and beyond the EPC. It made history with Article J(4): *“all matters relating to the Union's security, including the ultimate design of a common defense policy, which may lead to a common defense in the future”*<sup>14</sup>.

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11 C.f.: Rehr, J (2021). Handbook CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. Volume I, 4<sup>th</sup> Edition. P.16

12 C.f: Ibid. P. 16.

13 C.f: Ibid. P. 17.

14 C.f: Ibid. P.18.

The ambitious goals set by the Maastricht Treaty, the evolved position of the United Kingdom, and the meeting of the European Union's defense ministers in Vienna set the ground for the Saint-Malo bilateral meeting between France and the United Kingdom, which many regard to be the trigger for the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).<sup>15</sup>

Following the Saint-Malo Declaration (1998), a series of European Council summits defined the military and civilian capabilities required to carry out the Petersberg tasks, which included humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping missions, and combat force missions in crisis management, including peacemaking.<sup>16</sup>

Through the initial ESDP missions and operations in 2003, the ESDP became operational. Over thirty-five crisis-management missions and activities have been launched by the EU since 2003. In addition, in December 2003, the EU released its first-ever European Security Strategy (to outline the major dangers and problems that Europe faces). In June 2016 the policy was changed with a new EU Global Strategy and the ESDP was renamed the Common Security and Defense Policy after the Lisbon Treaty (CSDP-December 1, 2009). The Lisbon Treaty also created the office of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (combines the two roles of High Representative for CFSP and Commissioner for External Relations), signaling the end of the EU pillar system. The Lisbon Treaty formally endorsed the expansion of the "Petersberg tasks", which now include "*joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue missions, military advice and assistance missions, conflict prevention and peacekeeping missions, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacekeeping and post-conflict stabilization*"<sup>17</sup>(Article 43(1) TEU).

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15 C.f: Ibid. P.17.

16 C.f: Ibid. P.17.

17 C.f.: Ibid. P17

## 4.2 Current Development of CSDP

The EU Global Strategy of 2016 gave new impetus to the Common Security and Defense Policy's development. The Council, for example, adopted conclusions on implementing the EU Global Strategy in the field of security and defense in November 2016. Three strategic priorities were outlined in the conclusions: responding to external conflicts and crises, enhancing partner capacities, and protecting the European Union and its inhabitants.<sup>18</sup>

The topics covered in the November 2018 Council Conclusions, which were also part of the EU Global Strategy were:

- Civilian CSDP (Civilian CSDP Compact),<sup>19</sup>
- Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC),<sup>20</sup>
- Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO),<sup>21</sup>
- Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD),<sup>22</sup>
- European Defence Fund (EDF)- the first time that an EU budget envelope can be used to fund efforts in the European defense sector related to innovation, research, and development, European Peace Facility (EPF), military mobility, and EU-NATO cooperation.<sup>23</sup>

It is important to mention that PESCO, CARD, and EDF are coordinated under the auspices of European Defence Agency (EDA).<sup>24</sup>

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19 C.f: Homepage of European Council, Council of the European Union. URL: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/12/07/civilian-csdp-compact-2021-council-adopts-conclusions/>

20 C.f: Homepage of Oficiul pentru publicatii europene. Translated into English the name means: The office for European Publications. URL: [https://op.europa.eu/ro/web/who-is-who/organization/-/organization/EEAS/EEAS\\_CRF\\_244637](https://op.europa.eu/ro/web/who-is-who/organization/-/organization/EEAS/EEAS_CRF_244637)

21 C.f: Homepage of Permanent Structured Cooperation. URL: <https://pesco.europa.eu/>

22 C.f: Homepage of European Defence Agency. URL: [https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/EU-defence-initiatives/coordinated-annual-review-on-defence-\(card\)](https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/EU-defence-initiatives/coordinated-annual-review-on-defence-(card))

23 C.f: Homepage of European Commission. URL: [https://ec.europa.eu/defence-industry-space/eu-defence-industry/european-defence-fund-edf\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/defence-industry-space/eu-defence-industry/european-defence-fund-edf_en)

24 C.f: Homepage of European Defence Agency. URL: <https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do>

In 2020, an initiative for an EU Strategic Compass, which contains a shared threat analysis that combines the perspectives of EU member states on risks and challenges, was announced, based on the EU Global Strategy. The Compass will outline more explicit objectives along four primary pillars: crisis management, resilience, capability development, and partnerships, in addition to fostering more coherence.<sup>25</sup>

As a result of these improvements, a substantial proportion of this inquiry is concentrated on these specific European Defence Agency (EDA)-based processes.<sup>26</sup>

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25 C.f.: Rehr, J (2021). Handbook CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. Volume I, 4<sup>th</sup> Edition. P.19.

26 C.f: Homepage of European Defence Agency. URL: <https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do>

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## 5. Research Gap

*“Neighbourhood policy is the sensible and attractive alternative. We intend to develop such a neighbourhood policy particularly towards the Black Sea region and Central Asia during our Presidency.”*<sup>27</sup>

This allegation belongs to the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Angela Merkel, in a speech to the European Parliament in Strasbourg on Wednesday, 17 January 2007 and it seems to emphasize the importance of developing a security policy in the maritime domain, especially in the Black Sea area and Central Asia region.<sup>28</sup>

Furthermore, until this moment the author has revealed similar traits of the CSDP aims and the concept of maritime security in terms of the interests of the EU. It is straightforward to see the connection between the purposes of the CSDP and the importance of the maritime security. The global maritime area is considered to be a series of intersection where money, power, influence, people, and information all converge. Seas and oceans have become important gathering places for a variety of global interests. Scrutinizing these ideas, the signification of a maritime security in EU has become stronger.<sup>29</sup>

Nevertheless, the solution to the precise context between "maritime security" and the CSDP has yet to be found in the available studies. The author's goal in revising this essay is to achieve this.<sup>30</sup>

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27 Cf.: U. a. Cit. acc. to. Homepage of European Commission. URL: <https://ec.europa.eu/dorie/fileDownload.do;jsessionid=V7B6MjLMWkjQyhRQMCYc112Pdp1QYcjQSYPNtM01X1yy8SLTjXp4!213109669?docId=300145&cardId=300145>

28 Author's note

29 Cf.: Rehl, J (2017). Handbook CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. Vienna. Armed Forces Printing Centre. Volume 1. 3rd edition. P. 225

30 Assessment by the author

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## 6. Research Question(s)

The major goal of this essay is to establish a relationship between the Black Sea Region's idea of "maritime security" and the EU's CSDP. In the direction of finding and describing this connection, the key question of this paper is:

**Why should the Black Sea have an important role in the Common Security and Defence Policy maritime security?**

In order to answer to this main question of the paper, the author needs some further questions to be asked:

- Further question number 1: Why "maritime security" matters?
- Further question number 2: Which are the operational aspects of "maritime security"?
- Further question number 3: Which actions from the Black Sea can threaten the security of CSDP of EU?

## 7. Methodology

The author employs a variety of sources to obtain the necessary information for this essay in order to create a genuine and reliable outcome. These sources include EU-documents, books, online articles, and news, as well as information that have been formally published on the internet.

To gain a deeper grasp of the topic, the research gap was first investigated, and three more questions were established. This strategy also makes it easier to reply to the main question. Finally, the answers to the three additional questions bring to the primary question's solution and the essay's conclusion. The methodical approach of this essay is based on a thoroughly research that conduct to debateable information and in this way, the author can conclude the answer of the main question. The author depicts the framework of the study project and the stages that lead to the final results in the diagram below.




Figure 1 : Flowchart of the methodical approach<sup>31</sup>

31 Figure created by the author.



## 8. Research and Results of Research

### 8.1. Importance of “maritime security”

In this chapter, the author wants to emphasize some of the reasons that led to the implementation of a “maritime security” policy in CSDP.

People's well-being, prosperity, and security are inextricably related to Europe's maritime interests. The global marine realm is critical not only for the EU and European citizens, but also for the entire human race. Seas and oceans are important for maintaining the earth's biodiversity and they are home to numerous unique and diverse marine ecosystems. The principal means of transport for EU imports and exports to the rest of the world is made on seas and oceans. In fact, maritime transport accounts for 90% of the EU's foreign trade and 40% of its internal trade. Seas and oceans that are safe and secure are essential for free trade, the EU economy, and living standards.<sup>32</sup> The author refers to the seas and oceans as the "*Global Maritime Commons*"<sup>33</sup>, which we all share. Because of their crucial meaning, seas and oceans become a hot spot and a perfect place where interests meet. Now, consider territorial disputes resulting from rival marine claims, illegal Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) extensions, illicit fishing, irregular migration, trafficking, piracy, and maritime terrorism. The only way to deal with all these sort of dangers and hazards is to take a multi-sectoral strategy and engage in successful marine multilateralism, which means working with international partners.<sup>34</sup>

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32 Cf.: Homepage of European External Action Service. URL: [https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/maritime\\_security/docs/maritime-security-information-toolkit\\_en.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/maritime_security/docs/maritime-security-information-toolkit_en.pdf)

33 Cf.: Rehl, J (2017). Handbook CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. Vienna. Armed Forces Printing Centre. Volume 1. 3rd edition. P. 225

34 C.f: Ibid. P. 225.

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The Baltic Sea, the North Sea, the North East Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, the Black Sea, and Europe's further edges are all bordered by EU coastal regions. Based on this diversity of nations and flags along the European coast line, there are some facts that indicate the EU's interests in maritime security:<sup>35</sup>

- More than 1,200 commercial ports, more than 8,100 flagged vessels (above 500 GT), 4,300 authorized maritime entities, 764 large ports, and more than 3800 port facilities are available across the EU;<sup>36</sup>
- European ship-owners possess 30% of the world's vessels and 35% of global shipping tonnage, including 55% of container ships and 35% of tankers, accounting for 42% of worldwide maritime transport commerce value;<sup>37</sup>
- Each year, more than 400 million travellers pass through EU ports;<sup>38</sup>
- More than 20% of the world's tonnage is registered under EU flags, and EU entities control more than 40% of the world's fleet.<sup>39</sup>

In the global maritime security area, the EU not only has interests, it also has commitments. As a result, the EU actively contributes to safe and secure seas and oceans in various parts of the world, utilizing existing EU instruments such as the Instrument Contributing to Peace and Stability (IcSP)<sup>40</sup> or the European Development Fund (EDF)<sup>41</sup>, as well as EU policies such as the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)<sup>42</sup>.

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35 Homepage of European External Action Service. URL: [https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/maritime\\_security/docs/maritime-security-information-toolkit\\_en.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/maritime_security/docs/maritime-security-information-toolkit_en.pdf)

36 C.f: Ibid. P.2.

37 C.f: Ibid. P.2.

38 C.f: Ibid. P.2.

39 C.f: Ibid. P.2.

40 C.f: Homepage of European Commission. URL: [https://ec.europa.eu/fpi/eus-instrument-contributing-stability-and-peace-icsp-2014-04-03\\_ro](https://ec.europa.eu/fpi/eus-instrument-contributing-stability-and-peace-icsp-2014-04-03_ro)

41 C.f: Homepage of European Commission. URL: [https://ec.europa.eu/defence-industry-space/eu-defence-industry/european-defence-fund-edf\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/defence-industry-space/eu-defence-industry/european-defence-fund-edf_en)

42 Cf.: Rehr, J (2017). Handbook CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. Vienna. Armed Forces Printing Centre. Volume 1. 3rd edition. P. 112.

## 8.2. Operational aspects of “maritime security” of CSDP

The peaceful resolution of disputes is not only a core principle of the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), but it is also at the heart of the EU's entire commitment to peace and security. CSDP missions and operations assist in the implementation of conflict settlements and the prevention of renewed violence, but they also engage in security force capacity-building and training in weak state settings where regional conflict and non-state actors pose challenges to government capacity to provide security to citizens.<sup>43</sup>

The missions and operations carried out under the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) were created to respond to a wide range of crises and conflicts around the world. They attempt to address systemic instability and insecurity (Central African Republic), improve border management (EUBAM Libya) and the rule of law (EULEX Kosovo), and combat piracy, among other things (EUNAVFOR Atalanta). The goal of this contribution is to provide a brief perspective on maritime security and to consider the seas and oceans (the "*global maritime domain*")<sup>44</sup> as a venue for CSDP missions and operations.<sup>45</sup>

To sum up, the CSDP identifies some strategies for solving the maritime security problems:

- a multi-sectoral strategy (i.e. a thorough strategy);
- integrity of operation (i.e. all activity is based on pre-existing regulations or competencies);
- multilateralism in the maritime sector (i.e. cooperation with partner countries and organizations that is effective);
- rules and principles must be respected (i.e. the EU is a values-based community, and the Strategy highlights or demonstrates these principles in the maritime sector, such as human rights and rule-based good governance).<sup>46</sup>

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43 C.f: Ibid. P.226.

44 C.f: Ibid. P.225

45 C.f: Ibid. P.226

46 Homepage of European External Action Service. URL: [https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/maritime\\_security/docs/maritime-security-information-toolkit\\_en.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/maritime_security/docs/maritime-security-information-toolkit_en.pdf)

Maritime professionals assist maritime security authorities on how to increase their operating capacity. Law enforcement professionals, for their part, teach maritime police or coast guard officers how to conduct successful maritime surveillance. All actions are carried out in accordance with international law and European norms, and as recommendations for counterparts to adopt as a standard in their own self-sustaining marine security development. In addition, there are CSDP missions whose mandate includes the marine domain in addition to other sectors.<sup>47</sup>

In what follows, the author wants to emphasize some of the functions that maritime police or coast guard officers have to comply:

- maritime safety, which includes ship traffic management;
- maritime, ship, and harbour side security;
- activities related to marine customs;
- preventing and combating human trafficking and smuggling, as well as related maritime law enforcement;
- control of the marine border;
- surveillance and monitoring;
- environmental protection and response in the maritime sector;
- maritime search and rescue;
- service for shipwrecks and maritime assistance;
- response to maritime disasters and accidents;
- inspection and control of fisheries and
- actions linked to the tasks of the coast guard mentioned above.<sup>48</sup>

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47 C.f.: Rehr, J (2021). Handbook CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. Volume I, 4th Edition. P.71

48 C.f.: Rehr, J (2021). Handbook CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. Volume I, 4th Edition. P.78..

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According to European specialists in the subject, the EU is gaining a better grasp and awareness of the operational aspects of maritime security and enforcement.

CSDP missions are now a specific EU contribution to maritime capacity building, combating maritime crimes, and maintaining law and order at sea because they include the maritime dimension.<sup>49</sup>

### **8.3. Black Sea challenges and risks**

The Black Sea has played many roles throughout history. The most typical function has been as a trade route. The most important role has been as a battleground, or at the very least as a sideshow to the wars raging on the ground around it. And, while there is no conflict in its waters at this moment, the Bosphorus – which provides littoral nations with access to the Mediterranean and thus serves as the starting point for any discussion about the Black Sea – is always in danger.<sup>50</sup>

The Russians have fought in Syria's civil war. They have occasionally been in close conflict with the Turks, who hold the Bosphorus in spite treaties. Control of the Bosphorus, or at the very least neutralization, has been a top geopolitical priority for Russia. Russia has traditionally had Mediterranean interests that have been primarily obstructed by the Black Sea.<sup>51</sup>

The US, on the other side, wants an air base built exactly where Incirlik is. It is a valuable asset because it is close to a port for logistics and within range of targets in Ukraine for tactical attack planes, as well as being able to operate through the Middle East. No other foundation would be as wonderful as this one. As a result, the United States is unable to exert excessive pressure on Turkey, and Turkey does not wish to alienate the United States. It would be excessive to change the status of the Bosphorus.<sup>52</sup>

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49 C.f. Ibid. P. 79.

50 C.f: Homepage of New Strategy Center. URL: <https://www.newstrategycenter.ro/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Reasearch-Paper-NSC-GPF-Black-Sea-Challenges-Old-and-New.pdf>

51 C.f: Ibid.

52 C.f: Ibid.

The US maintains assets stationed in Romania as an alternative to Turkish bases and, more importantly, to ensure that if the Russians embarked on an unexpected trip southward, toward Turkey or the Mediterranean, the US would be able to strike quickly and forcefully.<sup>53</sup>

All of this indicates that the Black Sea will continue to be what it has been for a long time. It is coiled, ready to spring, but it is unable to do so because the intricacy of force around its borders is so complex, with so many hostile and intertwined interests, that it is unable to move. This provides Romania with the most valuable asset in geopolitics. It will be too late if the Black Sea springs, or rather when it springs, because Romania cannot simply remain a bystander. A three-player game is now available. There's Russia, which is weaker but still the Black Sea's strongest force. There's Turkey, which has the capacity to be powerful but is currently undergoing a terrible redefining. There's the United States, the world's most powerful country, which prefers to fight in the Mediterranean rather than the Black Sea. All of this will change over time, as it always does, but it is impossible to rule out the possibility of the coil being turned loose to spring. But, of all the powers, Turkey is the least predictable and, in the long run, the most powerful.<sup>54</sup>

As it was already told, one of the most powerful country that tries to control Black Sea is Russia. For a better understanding of the situation in the Black Sea, the author will use the methodical approach of understanding a text that is the author-based interpretation, also known as hermeneutics. In this case, the author will answer to some additional questions in order to make the situation clear.<sup>55</sup>

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53 C.f: Ibid

54 C.f: Homepage of New Strategy Center. URL: <https://www.newstrategycenter.ro/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Reasearch-Paper-NSC-GPF-Black-Sea-Challenges-Old-and-New.pdf>

55 Assessment by the author

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### 8.3.1 Why is the Black Sea important to Russia?

Russia's strategy for the Black Sea is based on decades of conflict with Europe's great powers, as well as Russia's long geopolitical rivalry with Turkey. Its objectives include repelling off any NATO threat to Russia's heartland or strategic bastion in Crimea. It also seeks to sabotage NATO's cohesion by fomenting divisions among alliance members along the Black Sea, as well as preventing Ukraine and Georgia from joining the alliance.

Moscow regards the Black Sea region as crucial to its geo-economics strategy, which includes projecting Russian strength and influence in the Mediterranean, protecting its economic and trade linkages with important European markets, and increasing southern Europe's reliance on Russian oil and gas.<sup>56</sup>

### 8.3.2 Russia - more aggressive in the Black Sea area

Moscow feels that the Black Sea region's threats have increased in recent years and are now more than only regional threats. Because of the Black Water's proximity to Russia's heartland, a large portion of European Russia might be within range of US intermediate-range missiles launched from sea and land. The deployment of the NATO missile defense system in Romania, according to Russian officials, symbolizes an incursion of US strategic infrastructure in Russia's region and is meant to weaken Russian security.

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56 C.f: Homepage of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. URL : <https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/05/20/what-is-russia-doing-in-black-sea-pub-84549>

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Russia now sees the Crimean peninsula as a platform from which to project influence over the Mediterranean. After the Cold War, Moscow's aspirations to re-establish power in the region diminished, as did Crimea's importance in Russia's mission to deter and defend against the US and NATO in the event of an East-West clash. Russia has solved this deficiency by annexing Crimea in 2014 and building up its naval, land, and air defensive capabilities since then. Nonetheless, the Kremlin's robust response to US naval and aviation patrols in and over the Black Sea reveals Russian concerns of vulnerability in the region.<sup>57</sup>

### **8.3.3 Future of Russia in the Black Sea**

Despite Russia's recent expansion of Black Sea capabilities and demonstrated willingness to participate in the affairs of its Black Sea neighbours, the Black Sea region's prognosis is not favourable to Russia. Russia's economic influence will be weakened by Europe's pursuit for a zero-carbon objective by 2050, as well as a more competitive gas market for both liquefied natural gas and Azerbaijani pipeline gas. Moscow may have prevented Georgia and Ukraine from joining NATO, but in doing so, it has turned both nations into permanent adversaries, requiring Russia to maintain substantial military assets due to their proximity to Russia's border and expanding connections with NATO. The reconciliation between Russia and Turkey may be the most significant change in Black Sea regional dynamics in the last decade. Despite this, Turkey remains an untrustworthy partner for Moscow, having a long history of antagonistic relations with Moscow. Turkish military assistance for Azerbaijan in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war exemplifies Ankara's desire to enhance its influence in what Russia perceives as its protected zone. Turkey also continues to express its support for Ukraine's territorial integrity, including over Crimea, and to export weaponry to the country.<sup>58</sup>

Finally, NATO is beginning to recognise Russia as its primary opponent. This has strengthened calls for a more forceful Western response to Russia, notably in the Black Sea region and south-eastern Europe. When confronted with these obstacles, Russia, on the other hand, is unlikely to back down and would vigorously maintain its position.<sup>59</sup>

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57 C.f. Ibid.

58 C.f. Ibid.

59 C.f. Ibid.

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## 9. Discussion of Results and personal Conclusions

### 9.1 Discussion of Results

Maritime security protects the peace and promotes prosperity, but highways run the length of our planet, posing a variety of security challenges. Several aspects of European maritime security have improved dramatically in recent years, including international or regional collaboration, information sharing, capability development, risk management, and training.<sup>60</sup>

The world around us is rapidly changing. We are living in an increasingly complex and worsening security environment, with rising tensions and conflicts erupting all over the world, including right on Europe's doorstep. In an increasingly unpredictable world, the EU needs to be stronger, taking full responsibility for crisis management and acting as a global security provider.<sup>61</sup>

Because an imagine can describe better any idea, the author created a sketch of the main ideas that led to the answer of the main question of this paper: Why should the Black Sea have an important role in the Common Security and Defence Policy maritime security?<sup>62</sup>

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60 C.f: Homepage of European External Action Service. URL: [https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/maritime-security\\_en?page=1](https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/maritime-security_en?page=1)

61 C.f: Homepage of #EUinAction. URL: [https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/security-defence-crisis-response/88365/euinaction\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/security-defence-crisis-response/88365/euinaction_en)

62 Author's notes.




Figure 2. Answer to the main question<sup>63</sup>

## 9.2 Personal Conclusion

The aforementioned findings have met the author's definition from the beginning. This is: a well-fit of maritime security should be made by all the involved parts in the area we are talking about, taking in account the strategic autonomy of the countries involved.

It is known that the countries around the Black Sea costal line have a strategic autonomy well implemented, but the peace and the prosperity in this area should not be disturb by any political interest of the countries. The pressure in the Black Sea area has increased significantly over the last years because of each power that need something from this area: Russia that wants to have free access to the Mediterranean Sea, USA that wants to keep an eye on what is happening in the Bosphorus region, and the Turkey that wants to be away from USA and Russia interests.

<sup>63</sup> Figure created by the author

A stronger coordination of policies implemented by various bodies involved in addressing concerns linked to conflicts and policies toward Russia is required at the Euro-Atlantic level. A stronger coordination of policies and collaboration between the two pillars of the Euro-Atlantic system, the EU and NATO, is critical here, but the role of other international organizations, such as the OSCE, in working on these disputes should also be reassessed.<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> C.f: Homepage of New Strategy Center. URL: <https://www.newstrategycenter.ro/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/FLANKS-Policy-Brief-Russia-and-Frozen-Conflicts-in-the-Black-Sea-Region.pdf>

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## 10. Annexes

### 10.1 List of Abbreviations

CARD.....	Coordinated Annual Review on Defence
CFSP.....	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP.....	Common Security and Defence Policy
EC.....	European Commission
ECFR .....	European Council on Foreign Relations
EEC .....	European Economic Community
EEAS.....	European Union External Action Service
ECSC.....	European Coal and Steel Community
EDA.....	European Defence Agency
ESDP.....	European Security and Defence Policy
EU.....	European Union
EU MS.....	European Union Member State
NATO.....	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PESCO.....	Permanent Structured Cooperation
TEU.....	Treaty of the European Union
US.....	United States

## 10.2 List of Figures

Figure number	Description	Page
1	Flowchart of the methodical approach	11
2	Answer to the main question	21

## 10.3 List of Literature

### 10.3.1 Documents

- 01 Rehr, J. (2021). Handbook CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. Volume 1. 4<sup>th</sup> edition.
- 02 Dick Zandee & Bob Deen & Kimberley Kruijver & Adája Stoetman (2020), European strategic autonomy in security and defence, Clingendael Report

### 10.3.2 Books

- 01 Rehr, J. (2017). Handbook CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. Volume 1. 3rd edition.

### 10.3.3 Internet

- 01 Homepage of Cambridge Dictionary. URL: <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/strategic>
- 02 Homepage of national plan to achieve maritime domain awareness for the national strategy for maritime security. URL : [https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/HSPD\\_MDAPlan.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/HSPD_MDAPlan.pdf)

- 03 Homepage of New Strategy Center. URL: <https://www.newstrategycenter.ro/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/FLANKS-Policy-Brief-Russia-and-Frozen-Conflicts-in-the-Black-Sea-Region.pdf>
- 04 Homepage of European Council, Council of the European Union. URL: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/12/07/civilian-csdp-compact-2021-council-adopts-conclusions/>
- 05 Homepage of Oficiul pentru publicatii europene. Translated into English the name means: The office for European Publications. URL: [https://op.europa.eu/ro/web/who-is-who/organization/-/organization/EEAS/EEAS\\_CRF\\_244637](https://op.europa.eu/ro/web/who-is-who/organization/-/organization/EEAS/EEAS_CRF_244637)
- 06 Homepage of Permanent Structured Cooperation. URL: <https://pesco.europa.eu/>
- 07 Homepage of European Defence Agency. URL: [https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/EU-defence-initiatives/coordinated-annual-review-on-defence-\(card\)](https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/EU-defence-initiatives/coordinated-annual-review-on-defence-(card))
- 08 Homepage of European Commission. URL: [https://ec.europa.eu/defence-industry-space/eu-defence-industry/european-defence-fund-edf\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/defence-industry-space/eu-defence-industry/european-defence-fund-edf_en)
- 09 Homepage of European Defence Agency. URL: <https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do>
- 10 Homepage of European Commission. URL: <https://ec.europa.eu/dorie/fileDownload.do;jsessionid=V7B6MjLMWkjQyhRQMCYc112Pdp1QYcjQSYPNtM01X1yy8SLTjXp4!213109669?docId=300145&cardId=300145>
- 11 Homepage of European External Action Service. URL: [https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/maritime\\_security/docs/maritime-security-information-toolkit\\_en.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/maritime_security/docs/maritime-security-information-toolkit_en.pdf)
- 12 Homepage of European External Action Service. URL: [https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/maritime\\_security/docs/maritime-security-information-toolkit\\_en.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/maritime_security/docs/maritime-security-information-toolkit_en.pdf)
- 13 Homepage of European Commission. URL: [https://ec.europa.eu/fpi/eus-instrument-contributing-stability-and-peace-icsp-2014-04-03\\_ro](https://ec.europa.eu/fpi/eus-instrument-contributing-stability-and-peace-icsp-2014-04-03_ro)
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14 Homepage of European Commission. URL: [https://ec.europa.eu/defence-industry-space/eu-defence-industry/european-defence-fund-edf\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/defence-industry-space/eu-defence-industry/european-defence-fund-edf_en)

15 Homepage of New Strategy Center. URL: <https://www.newstrategycenter.ro/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Research-Paper-NSC-GPF-Black-Sea-Challenges-Old-and-New.pdf>

16 Homepage of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. URL : <https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/05/20/what-is-russia-doing-in-black-sea-pub-84549>

17 Homepage of #EUinAction. URL: [https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/security-defence-crisis-response/88365/euinaction\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/security-defence-crisis-response/88365/euinaction_en)

18 Homepage of New Strategy Center. URL: <https://www.newstrategycenter.ro/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/FLANKS-Policy-Brief-Russia-and-Frozen-Conflicts-in-the-Black-Sea-Region.pdf>

## 11. Affidavit

I declare that I have written the present essay independently and on my own. I have clearly marked any language or ideas borrowed from other sources as not my own and documented their sources. The essay does not contain any work that I have handed in or have had graded as a previous scientific paper earlier on.

I am aware that any failure to do so constitutes plagiarism. Plagiarism is the presentation of another person's thoughts or words as if they were my own – even if I summarize, paraphrase, condense, cut, rearrange, or otherwise alter them.

I am aware of the consequences and sanctions plagiarism entails. Among others, consequences may include nullification of the essay, exclusion from participation in the CSDP Olympiad.

These consequences also apply retrospectively, i.e. if plagiarism is discovered after the essay has been accepted and graded. I am fully aware of the scope of these consequences.

Signature

  
.....

(MIDN 2/C Vlad-Vasile Abiculesei, cadet)

Constanța, România, November 2021



# **The effect of climate change on future CSDP missions and operations**

Essay

created for the CSDP Olympiad 2022  
in Salon-de-Provence - France

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Thessaloniki, November 2021

## **Abstract**

This essay is about the effect of climate change on future CSDP missions and operations. The author deals with the impacts of climate change on security, the EU's response to the problem and the link between climate change and CSDP missions so far. After conducting research, the author concludes that future CSDP missions firstly have to meet the EU Green Deal's requirements and reduce energy consumption. Secondly, the mission planning process has to conduct in-depth research to discriminate the factors that lead to a conflict, taking the necessary measures. Thirdly, the EU-UN cooperation will be enhanced, promoting a holistic and effective strategy. Finally, the appointment of persons with specialist knowledge about the environment and climate change is necessary, as they will give useful advice contributing to the effectiveness of the mission.

## **Keywords**

EU, climate change, security, CSDP missions, future

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## 2. Preface

As a cadet of the Hellenic Military Academy of Combat Support Officers (HMACSO), the author is offered academic education for his speciality – Military Legal Advisor - by the Academy and the Faculty of Law of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki as well. The Undergraduate Program of Studies in Law School stipulates that during the 6<sup>th</sup>-semester students have to attend five compulsory courses and one more course, which is chosen from a group of five courses. One of the options was a course about International and European Environmental Governance. The author was always concerned about environmental pollution aspects and the impact of human activity on the environment; hence the course content seemed to be very interesting.

The author would like to regard with esteem both the course instructors, Associate Professor Anna Gizari – Xanthopoulou, who taught the EU Environmental Policy, and Dr Dimitra Manou, who taught the global dimension of sustainable development and the initiative of global institutions and actors to deal with climate change. They held the students’- including the author’s, of course - interest during lessons and not only allowed them to realize the size of the problem and its negative impact on all aspects of economic and social life but also motivated them to take action as future legal experts to limit it. That’s why the author is writing this essay, as a small yet important step to study deeper the connection between climate change and security aspects.

### 3. Introduction

Climate change comprises one of the bigger environmental problems nowadays, which affects negatively every living organism on Planet Earth. As a term, it is used to describe both the global warming provoked by humans and its impact on Earth's weather patterns. Generally, changes are normal up to a point. The difference between them and this occurring problem is that although the Planet faced periods of climate variation in the past, these changes are arising more rapidly than them.

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) states (Article 1) that: "*Climate change*" means a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods."<sup>1</sup> Reading this, it is inferred that human activity is the point where the difference between "*change*" and "*variability*" lies, as the last term is used to describe a change that stems from nature as a result of a process and is observed around time, without any human interference.

Human factor affects the climate and the earth's temperature through the use of fossil fuel, deforestation and stock-breeding. These activities accrete the greenhouse gases emission in the atmosphere and as a result, the greenhouse effect and global warming strengthen. Three independent organisms confirmed that July 2016 was the warmest month recorded ever since they keep track of temperature levels. On 21<sup>st</sup> July 2016, an intense heatwave struck the Middle East and Southwestern Asia. A weather station in Kuwait recorded 54 °C degrees, maybe the highest temperature ever recorded in the Eastern Hemisphere and Asia.<sup>2</sup> Although it is not approved either by the International Commission on Stratigraphy (ICS) or the International Union of Geological Sciences (IUGS) as a recognized subdivision of geological time, some scientists have proposed the term "*Anthropocene*" to describe an epoch dated from the impacts of human activities in the ecosystems, including climate change as well.<sup>3</sup>

At a first sight, climate change does not seem to have impacts on security, as it mostly affects the environment causing sea level to rise, melt of the continental glacier in

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<sup>1</sup> United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (1992).

<sup>2</sup> Homepage of Naftemporiki. URL: <https://www.naftemporiki.gr/story/1137972/o-ioulios-2016-itan-o-thermoteros-pou-exei-katagrafei-stin-istoria>.

<sup>3</sup> Homepage of Wikipedia – Term Anthropocene. URL: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthropocene>.

Antarctica, and extreme weather conditions. Moreover, it impinges on ecosystems too, as climate change contributes to desertification, a phenomenon that makes lands degrade in drylands and lose their fertility, affecting negatively the indigenous fauna so. This is harmful to humans too, as desertification begets destruction of crops and agriculture and leads to undernutrition. Furthermore, a warmer climate is a condition that makes the transmission of infectious diseases easier, such as dengue fever and malaria, and as a result, thousands of additional deaths are observed every year and are expected to increase in the future. Under these circumstances, populations can be displaced due to scarcity of food and clean water, as an outcome of the extreme changing weather conditions, both within and between countries, struggling for survival.

From this point of view, there is a link between climate change and security, since environmental migration is a disorganization factor for states, as they have to look after the displaced populations to provide them housing and necessities. Also, lack of natural resources can increase countries' competition over them, which can lead to conflicts and forcing populations to migrate as well. Consequently, climate change has begun to have an impact on security, which must not be disregarded, as it can pose a threat to EU security and that's why the Common Security and Defence Policy must take it into account as a strategy and especially when planning missions and operations.

## 4. Current State of Research

The legal basis of the EU climate policy network is set in Article 3 (3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), where is stated that the internal market focuses on the promotion of sustainable development in Europe while protecting and improving the quality of the environment. This article was stated in its present form in the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 in order to include the protection of the environment as an EU goal. Additionally, Article 191 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prescribes the Union's responsibilities for the environment. This article was modified by the Lisbon Treaty to include combat against climate change as an international environmental problem that demands measures to be taken. Consequently, the EU has recognized the importance of taking action against climate change, as it harms the environment and humans, and several research has been conducted, so far, to estimate its impacts and cost.

Even though several research papers have been written so far studying the climate change impacts on security, the link between the EU's environment policy and security is a topic not studied in depth. In 2014, Youngs described the EU's environment policy and security connection as an "*unmet challenge*", as he proposed that even though policy documents are referring to climate change there is no specific implementation in this field.<sup>4</sup>

Recently, in July 2021, Youngs published a new study, "*The EU and Climate Security: Toward Ecological Diplomacy*". He admits that "*climate security has risen up the EU's external agenda but without clearly stated, specific priorities and actions*".<sup>5</sup> He also expresses the opinion that the EU "*has focused less on how the wider range of climate impacts requires far-reaching or systemic change to the EU's geoeconomic, military, development, migration, and other policies*"<sup>6</sup> and that climate instability should be seen "*as an issue that the EU's economic models and external policies contribute to*", highlighting the importance of adopting "*a wider ecological diplomacy*".<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Cf.: Youngs, R. (2014). *Climate Change and EU Security Policy: An Unmet Challenge*. Lisbon. *Nação e Defesa*. No. 137. P. 100-117.

<sup>5</sup> Youngs, R. and Lazard, O. (2021). *The EU and Climate Security: Toward Ecological Diplomacy*. P.11

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.* P. 12

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

Concerning the security-climate change nexus, Angela Liberatore sketches three scenarios for the future relationships between climate change and the EU's security policy.<sup>8</sup>

The first one, "*Greening Security*",<sup>9</sup> emphasizes the need for further analysis of the impacts of climate change on security. The second one, "*The War on Climate Change*"<sup>10</sup>, predicts that the EU's role will be marginalized as climate change will be misused as a tool in increasing restrictions. In the last one, "*Much Ado About Nothing*"<sup>11</sup>, the attention given to climate change will fade as a result of old lobbies prevailing and the EU's effectiveness will be decreased.

To sum up, the connection between climate change and security is a topic analyzed in-depth throughout international strategic and environmental literature. But, especially, research about EU's environmental policy – security nexus refers briefly to CSDP missions and the impacts of climate change on them, as it has a particular preference for the threats that climate change poses to security.

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<sup>8</sup> Liberatore, A. (2013). Climate Change, Security and Peace: The Role of the European Union. Brussels. Review of European Studies. Vol. 5. No. 3. P. 91f.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.



## 5. Research Gap

*“Here in Europe, experience tells us that peace and security are not only about peace treaties or defence budgets. Peace has to be sustainable in time as security has to be sustainable in time. And sustainable peace requires good jobs, decent access to natural resources, and sustainable development. Sustainable peace, sustainable security need climate action and I think this is the message today. This is also what we all agreed, globally, when we launched the Sustainable Development Goals.*

*So, let us keep this in mind: when we invest in the fight against climate change, we invest in our own security. It is not good feelings and charity. This is security-related, hard-core security.”<sup>12</sup>*

This quotation made by the ex- High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP) Federica Mogherini shows that climate change is closely related to security since it negatively affects humans, associating the fight against climate change in a matter of prime importance. CSDP missions and operations can be used as a tool to promote sustainable development goals to climate change-affected countries targeting peacekeeping and security strengthening simultaneously. Even though the threats that climate change poses and the measures that the EU has taken to cope with the problem are known, the impacts of climate change on future CSDP missions and operations have not been so far analyzed by researchers. This essay aims to close this research gap. The results will be discussed in chapter 9.

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<sup>12</sup> Homepage of Reliefweb.- Updates. Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the high-level event "Climate, peace and security: the time for action". URL: <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/speech-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-high-level-event-climate>.

## **6. Research Questions**

The key question that the author answers in this essay is:

**What effect will climate change have on future CSDP missions and operations?**

To answer this question, the author answers three sub-questions:

- 1) Which are the security implications of climate change?
- 2) How did the EU respond to the link between security and climate change?
- 3) Have CSDP missions dealt with climate change so far?

## **7. Methodology**

To answer the research topic, the author researched literature found on the world wide web. After making conclusions about the climate change-security nexus, the research gap was found. The author manages to close the gap by consequently answering three sub-questions, analyzing information about the impacts of climate change, the EU's environmental policy, and CSDP missions found in the literature. Finally, the author discusses the results of the answers to the sub-questions, answers the research topic and states his personal opinion concluding the essay.

## **8. Research and Results of Research**

### **8.1 Security implications of climate change**

#### **8.1.1 Economic, social and cultural aspects of security and their interaction with climate change**

To begin with, aspects of livelihood are directly affected by climate change, as in areas, i.e., with heavy precipitation events, crops will be damaged and land will not be able to be cultivated due to waterlogging of soils and, as a result, commerce will malfunction causing economic instability, and fertile land properties will be lost. Also, areas affected by drought increases are likely to suffer from land degradation and crop damage.

Therefore, there seems to be an increased risk of food and water shortage for populations, forcing them potentially to migrate to survive. Populations may be led to the same result due to sea-level rise and extreme events, as the risk of loss of lives, properties and crops is increased, damaging simultaneously tourism and fisheries and disrupting the state apparatus, which is going to struggle to face this challenge.

Taking into account the information stated in the previous paragraph, economies that depend mostly on the primary sector and tourism-based ones are prone to the adverse effects of climate change and their development is threatened. Developing countries may be unable to absorb these impacts on account of their vulnerability, and the deprivation of the basic needs of their people is likely to be increased.

Climate change affects indigenous people as well. They are the world's largest reserve of cultural diversity and have the ability to adapt to variable environmental conditions. Despite that, they cannot face effectively rapidly changing social conditions. Their livelihood and connection with their place are threatened because of climate change and the lack of traditional food sources does not allow them to respond to climate variations, rendering them vulnerable. They are forced to follow new habits, as traditional knowledge is not enough to ensure their survival and at worst, they even abandon their lands, as it is impossible for them neither to ensure access to food and water nor to inhabit there due to extreme weather conditions.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Author's note: Conclusions based on the author's arguments so far

## 8.1.2 Climate change impacts on migration and armed conflict

### 8.1.2.1 Migration

Migration is considered to be a human tactic, in the passing of thousands of years, to adapt to variable conditions, such as poverty, conflicts, and lack of food and water. Not only do economic factors contribute to population displacement, but also climate change is noticed to force people to involuntary migration. This phenomenon knows no geographical boundaries, as stricken populations may remain within the borders of their country – perhaps crossing administrative districts -, or even go across national borders. For this type of migration, some scientists use the term “environmental refugees” or “environmental migrants”. Lester Brown, an environmental analyst, was the first to propose the term “environmental refugee” in 1976.

According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the definition of this type of migrant is the following: *“Environmental migrants are persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad.”*<sup>14</sup> This definition leads to the conclusion that environmental migrants are not only those who are displaced due to extreme weather phenomena but also those who are forced to migrate as of degradation of environmental conditions, either for a short-term period or a long-term period.

The impacts of climate change are likely to force more people to decide to migrate, either voluntary or involuntary. Professor Norman Myers has stated that *“environmental refugees will soon become the largest group of involuntary refugees”*<sup>15</sup> and that climate change could cause 200 million people to be displaced by 2050.<sup>16</sup> By the end of 2019, the total number of people internally displaced due to conflict, violence, and disasters reached 50 million. From a legal point of view, all displaced populations due to environmental reasons are protected by International Human Rights Law. Additionally, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement were adopted on 17 April 1998, protecting internally displaced populations, as a result of natural or anthropogenic disasters.

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<sup>14</sup> Homepage of Wikipedia – Term Environmental migrant. URL: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Environmental\\_migrant](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Environmental_migrant).

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

However, it would be difficult to achieve the signing of a legally binding treaty about migration and displacement caused by climate change since there, for instance, would be hard to determine its regulatory field, as climate change does not constitute a single factor leading to migration.<sup>17</sup>

Examples of population displacement due to climate change can be found in almost every continent of the Earth, such as Africa (Sahel, Ethiopia), South America (Argentina), the Middle East (Iran), and Southeastern Asia (Indonesia, the Philippines).

<sup>18</sup>Especially, drought and land degradation in Africa harm crops, intensify food and water scarcity and force people to migrate as well. On the other hand, in Southeastern Asia flooding and extreme weather conditions such as typhoons increase migration rates and make coastal areas uninhabitable, conducting to permanent displacements.

### **8.1.2.2 Armed conflict**

It is commonplace that intense political struggles take place over access to natural resources and exploitation of them.


In cases that conflict management services are inefficient, potential attempts to adjust to climate change that causes disorder to the distribution of the benefits of the resources are likely to trigger a conflict. Armed conflict disrupts economic activities and development as well, destabilizes the state mechanism, challenges people, as they manage to survive under uncertain circumstances and fear, provokes death, and nullifies the sense of security. As every economic activity is suspended, so is the distribution of benefits from natural resources due to interruption of access to them. This constitutes a vicious circle. Moreover, long-lasting conflict seems to have adverse effects on the ability of state institutions to efficiently manage natural resources (e.g., water resources in the Gaza Strip).<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Homepage of Climate and Migration Coalition. URL: <https://climatemigration.org.uk/paris-climate-migration-displacement/>.

<sup>18</sup> General Assembly (2009) Climate change and its possible security implications. Report of the Secretary-General.

<sup>19</sup> Shomar, B. (2011). Water scenarios in the Gaza Strip, Palestine: thirst, hunger and disease. International Journal of Environmental Studies.



Picture 1: Indications of Climate Change and its impacts.<sup>20</sup>

## 8.2 The EU's response to the link between security and climate change

Europe is stricken by climate change too. Southern, mainly, Europe is increasingly hit by heatwaves and droughts. People's awareness about environmental problems is raised by the actions of both governments and the EU, as the impacts of climate change affect everyone without exception. People take action to promote an environmentally friendly lifestyle and economic systems have turned to the concept of sustainable development.

The EU did not turn a blind eye to environmental problems and especially global warming, recognizing that climate change is, into the bargain, a threat multiplier and adopting the European Green Deal. This is a set of policy initiatives that aim to make the EU climate neutral in 2050.<sup>21</sup> In respect of climate-related risks, the Green Deal complies with the EU Global Strategy (EUGS), which also considers climate change as

<sup>20</sup> Homepage of epluum. What Is Climate Change / Climate Change The Environment For Kids Updated Version Youtube - For the past 4.5 billion years, earth has gone through many ice ages and periods of tropical climate. URL: <https://eplumm.blogspot.com/2021/08/what-is-climate-change-climate-change.html>

<sup>21</sup> Rehr, J. (2021). Handbook on CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. Vienna. Armed Forces Printing Centre. 4<sup>th</sup> edition. P.218

a threat multiplier and source of risk.<sup>22</sup> Taking this into consideration, the implementation of the EUGS brings out climate change and its impacts as a key priority in the policy-making negotiations and mission planning process.

### **8.3 Climate change and CSDP missions so far**

At this moment in time, there are 18 ongoing CSDP missions, 7 military and 11 civilian ones, aiming to strengthen international security and to promote peace. The EU's comprehensive approach to Africa countries, especially to Sub-Saharan ones, implements policies that restore stability and consolidate effective and functional political institutions. Considering the geopolitical position of these countries, climate change is a factor, among others, that impacts negatively on security issues.

For example, Somalia suffers from floods and drought that cause disasters and food security aspects, and increase the vulnerability of the population. The natural disasters in combination with the country's unstable political situation forced many to migrate to survive.

The CSDP launched three missions/operations to address the crisis in Somalia. In November 2008, European Union Naval Force Somalia (EUNAVFOR SOMALIA), also known as Operation ATALANTA, was set up. This humanitarian mission aims to protect the shipments of food aid from the World Food Programme against piracy.<sup>23</sup> The second one, EU Training Mission Somalia (EUTM SOMALIA), was launched two years later, in 2010, aiming to provide the Somali National Army with strategic advice, guidance, education, and expertise, with a view to self-managing its force generation process.<sup>24</sup> At last, EU Capacity Building Mission in Somalia (EUCAP SOMALIA) was set up in 2012, contributing to strengthening the capacity building of maritime civilian law enforcement capability in Somalia, including Somaliland.<sup>25</sup>

In summary, these missions were launched by the CSDP in response to regional political instability and conflicts that take place in Somalia. Climate change should be noticed as a factor that risks human existence and exacerbates political instability. However, it is not a sufficient condition to lead to a conflict on its own, but in

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Rehr, J. and Glume, G. Handbook on CSDP missions and operations. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. Vienna. Armed Forces Printing Centre. P.224

<sup>24</sup> Homepage of the EUCAP SOMALIA. About us. URL: <https://www.eucap-som.eu/>.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.



combination with other pressing factors, even obscured – e.g., competition over natural resources-, it can trigger unsettled situations, linking indissolubly environment with security.

## **9. Discussion of Results and personal Conclusions**

In this chapter, the results are discussed and the main research question is answered.

### **9.1 Results**

Taking everything stated above into consideration, climate change and all of its manifestations harm the environment, intensify extreme weather conditions and as a result impinge adversely on the planet's ecosystems. Consequently, aspects of social and economic life are threatened, as climate change challenges sectors of the economy, especially the primary sector and the tourism which are dependent upon weather conditions. Furthermore, climate change could lead to a conflict alongside other factors, such as rivalry over resources access and management, and political instability, as it exacerbates them. It is hard to prove, though, that climate change can start a conflict on its own. Also, it contributes to increasing migration, as many populations that resident in places struck by the effects of climate change (e.g., coastal regions, drought-affected areas) are forced to migrate involuntarily to survive, within the state or abroad.

These aspects could not leave the EU untouched, since not only does it try to promote prosperity and safeguard human well-being, but it also takes action to ensure peace and strengthen the sense of security. The 2016 EU Global Strategy considers climate change as a threat multiplier and source of instability. The climate change impacts on security issues require a comprehensive approach since they are multidimensional. The newly adopted European Green Deal reflects the EUGS guidelines on climate security, aiming to promote sustainable development goals and to make the EU climate neutral in 2050. CSDP missions and operations also face climate change impacts, as the EU tries to promote through them well-being and protection of human rights in vulnerable countries that suffer from climate change, contributing to security enhancement as well. Thus, the CSDP mission planning process must take the climate-security nexus into account.

## **9.2 The Effects of Climate Change on future CSDP Missions and Operations**

Considering the climate-security nexus, future CSDP missions and operations have to meet the requirements that the EU Green Deal and sustainable development goals established by reducing the energy consumption to the minimum necessary and concentrating on renewable energy sources.

The mission planning process for states in conflict must investigate the impact of climate change in the situation itself, in order to discriminate the factors that led to the conflict and take the appropriate measures to mitigate it, following the principles and rules of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law, of course. Thus, an integrated approach must be done.

Furthermore, climate change could enhance collaboration between the EU and United Nations (UN). The first autonomous EU military operation, Artemis, was conducted in accordance with United Nations and was followed by a Joint Declaration on the UN-EU cooperation in crisis management, aiming to maintain international peace and security.<sup>26</sup> This cooperation could promote a holistic strategy, especially by exchanging information and conducting researches, as the UN is experienced enough in this field. The UN Environment Programme (UNEP), which turns 50 years old in the next year, could provide useful information that should be taken into account during the mission planning process and could lead to more effective actions.

Finally, persons with specialist knowledge about the environment and climate change must be appointed to each CSDP mission and operation, as they could be excellent advisors not only during the mission planning process but also during the practical application – the launch and function of the mission-.

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<sup>26</sup> Mattelaer, Alexander. (2010): The CSDP Mission Planning Process of the European Union: Innovations and Shortfalls, In: Vanhoonacker, Sophie, Hylke Dijkstra and Heidi Maurer (eds). Understanding the Role of Bureaucracy in the European Security and Defence Policy, European Integration online Papers (EIoP), Special Issue 1, Vol. 14, <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2010-009a.htm>. P.9

### **9.3 Personal Conclusions**

Climate change poses a threat to the environment and humankind. The only way to deal with it effectively through CSDP missions and operations is the implementation of an integrated approach during the mission planning process considering all the factors. Climate change exacerbates other factors that can lead to a crisis or a conflict. That's why an in-depth analysis contributes to taking effective measures. We shall not forget that the EU's primary role is to promote peace and enhance the protection of human rights. The adverse effects that climate change has on human lives should be taken into consideration when planning a mission. Because, through this operational role, the EU will have the opportunity to lead the way in human rights protection and give the right answer to those who question its need for existence.

## 10. Annexes

### 10.1 List of Abbreviations

CSDP.....	Common Security and Defence Policy
EU.....	European Union
EUCAP SOMALIA .....	EU Capacity Building Mission in Somalia
EUGS.....	EU Global Strategy
EUNAVFOR SOMALIA.....	European Union Naval Force Somalia
EUTM SOMALIA .....	EU Training Mission Somalia
HMACSO.....	Hellenic Military Academy of Combat Support Officers
HR/VP.....	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
ICS.....	International Commission on Stratigraphy
IOM .....	International Organization for Migration
IUGS .....	International Union of Geological Science
TEU .....	Treaty on European Union
TFEU.....	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UN.....	United Nations
UNEP.....	UN Environment Programme
UNFCCC.....	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

### 10.2 List of Figures

1. Indications of Climate Change and its impacts – Page 11

### 10.3 List of Literature

#### 10.3.1 Books

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
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7. Homepage of Wikipedia – Term Environmental migrant. URL: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Environmental\\_migrant](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Environmental_migrant).

## 11. Affidavit

I declare that I have written the present essay independently and on my own. I have clearly marked any language or ideas borrowed from other sources as not my own and documented their sources. The essay does not contain any work that I have handed in or have had graded as a previous scientific paper earlier on.

I am aware that any failure to do so constitutes plagiarism. Plagiarism is the presentation of another person's thoughts or words as if they were my own – even if I summarize, paraphrase, condense, cut, rearrange, or otherwise alter them.

I am aware of the consequences and sanctions plagiarism entails. Among others, consequences may include nullification of the essay, exclusion from participation in the CSDP Olympiad. These consequences also apply retrospectively, i.e. if plagiarism is discovered after the essay has been accepted and graded. I am fully aware of the scope of these consequences.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'Ioannis Michail Gkogkos', written over a dotted line.

(4<sup>th</sup> Year Cadet (LEGAD) Ioannis – Michail Gkogkos)

Thessaloniki, Greece in November 2021